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The “age of the masses” was inaugurated in Portugal without the 
upheavals of democratic regime crisis and overthrow affecting interwar 
Europe. On the eve of the twentieth century, Portugal, an old nation-
state with political frontiers unchanged since the late middle ages, was 
the “ideal type” of the state envisioned by liberal nationalists. State and 
nation coincided in conditions of cultural homogeneity. There were no 
national or ethno-cultural minorities in Portugal, or Portuguese popu-
lations in neighboring countries; similarly, Portugal had no religious or 
ethno-linguistic minorities. Dialects were rare, found only in some areas 
near the Spanish border. Portugal had no territorial claims in Europe; 
thus the historical and cultural variables so markedly present in other 
countries were either negligible or absent in Portugal.
Portugal’s imperial and colonial past, however, is vital to understand-
ing the country’s twentieth-century history. From the seventeenth cen-
tury on, Portugal was both an imperial power and a political and eco-
nomic dependency of Britain; indeed, Britain protected the country’s 
vast colonial empire. Africa had been the stronghold of Portuguese colo-
nialism since Brazilian independence in 1822, but at the end of the nine-
teenth century Portugal’s “historic rights” in Africa were threatened by 
other European powers.
Tensions with Britain increased dramatically in the 1880s, culminat-
ing in the Ultimatum of 1890, which foiled Portuguese aspirations to 
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rule what is now Zimbabwe. By threatening to invade Portugal, Britain 
forced it to abandon its project to unite Angola and Mozambique. This 
episode gave rise to modern Portuguese nationalism and provoked the 
`rst wave of anti-British sentiment, cementing what was to become the 
mainstay of Portuguese foreign policy until the 1970s: the defense of 
the colonial empire.
When the Portuguese republicans overthrew the constitutional mon-
archy in October 1910 and began to implement their political program, 
Portuguese society did not entirely ful`ll the economic, social, and cul-
tural requirements for “the formation of a civic political culture.”1 The 
republican elites adopted a program of universal suffrage, anticleri-
calism, and anti-British nationalism in defense of the colonial empire. 
Secularizing legislation was passed as early as 1910, accompanied by 
the emergence of a strong urban anticlerical movement. These measures 
were modeled on those undertaken by the Third French Republic `ve 
years earlier, and they had a profound impact on the Catholic hierarchy. 
The extension of universal suffrage, however, was not decreed as prom-
ised, having as a pretext the dangerous monarchical revolts that were 
organized in Spain.
The Democratic Party, under the leadership of Afonso Costa, suc-
cessor to the Republican Party after the defection of key leaders in the 
wake of the revolution, inherited the electoral machine of the liberal 
monarchy and became the ruling party.2 The establishment of a parlia-
mentary regime with the approval of the 1911 Constitution was under-
taken by a parliament dominated almost entirely by the Republican 
Party. According to the new constitution, the president was elected 
by a parliament that he had no powers to dissolve. The republicans 
still did not implement universal suffrage, arguing that clientelism in 
the countryside made such a policy impossible. As Manuela Aguiar 
argues in chapter 11, “1910: Portuguese Republican Women out of the 
Shadows,” the denial of universal suffrage was a major disillusion for 
feminists. In a way, they started their suffragist campaign hand in hand 
with their male associates, and “they gave up the aim of immediate and 
full equality to help strengthen the new regime until it could be self-
con`dent enough to be able to satisfy their demands.” Indeed, pres-
sures for universal suffrage were very limited, if not entirely absent, 
at the Republican Constitutional Assembly of 1911. Pressure “from 
below” was also very weak, both because of the “absence” of the rural 
world from the political arena and the antiparticipatory tendencies of 
the “active minorities” among the urban working classes. Universal suf-
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frage was nevertheless rare among the democratic regimes at the begin-
ning of the twentieth century. In response, social rights became the cen-
ter of women’s movements activism, as Deolinda M. Adão underlines 
in chapter 12, “Portuguese Women Writers.” At the forefront of this 
activism was Ana de Castro Osório, one of the most prominent women 
in the Portuguese Republican movement and one of the founders of 
the Liga Republicana de Mulheres Portuguesas (Republican League of 
Portuguese Women), “which provided a venue for open discussion of 
important social issues such as divorce and women raising children 
alone.”
As in other cases in this “`rst wave” of democratization, Stanley G. 
Payne writes in chapter 1, “Portugal’s First Republic in Comparative 
Perspective of Its Era,”
the emphasis was not, however, on economic modernization per se but on 
cultural and institutional change, the “Jacobin” cultural revolution of the 
nineteenth century that would produce progressive modern secular institu-
tions, from which all other bene`ts would supposedly follow. The Republic 
was directed by lawyers and intellectuals, common leaders in this era, who 
sometimes seemed more interested in elite education than in primary educa-
tion. Eventually this would produce a narrowing, rather than a democratiza-
tion, of the suffrage. Thus it is tempting to see the First Republic as a kind of 
continuation of the nineteenth century in its liberal nationalism, its limited 
suffrage, and its apotheosis of positivism and scienti`c or pseudo-scienti`c 
elitism, which was already being questioned in other parts of Europe.
Electoral stability and cabinet instability characterized the Republican 
era. Between 1910 and 1926, forty-`ve cabinets were formed. Of these, 
seventeen were single-party cabinets, three were military, and twenty-
one resulted from coalition governments.3 In Parliament, as Pedro 
Tavares de Almeida, Paulo Jorge Fernandes, and Marta Carvalho dos 
Santos underline in chapter 3, “The Deputies of the First Portuguese 
Republic,” “the dominant features of parliamentary careers in the First 
Republic were their instability and short duration: almost two-thirds 
of the deputies were elected for a single term of of`ce.” Although the 
Democratic Party dominated cabinets between 1912 and 1917, the con-
servative republican parties gained a foothold in some.
The `rst post-1910 cleavage was religious. Secularization had been 
a central republican propaganda theme, and during the `rst days of 
the revolution an anticlerical movement swept Lisbon. Convents were 
closed down and religious orders, such as the Jesuits, were expelled 
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from the country. On November 3, 1910, a divorce law was decreed; 
a month later, a law was passed that made marriage “exclusively civil.” 
Strict limitations were imposed on non-Church religious ceremonies. All 
state religious rites in the courts, the universities, and the armed forces 
were abolished. When the Church hierarchy reacted to the new restric-
tions, the government prohibited the reading of the pastoral letter; this 
led to the severance of Portuguese relations with the Vatican and of ties 
between bishops and the state.
This religious-secular cleavage became a focal point of Portuguese 
political life that lasted, despite subsequent paci`cation measures, until 
1926. From this conaict emerged a new Catholic movement that was 
closely linked to the hierarchy, as Susana Goulart Costa illustrates in 
chapter 4, “Politics and the Azorean Church under the First Republic.” 
The Catholic Center Party (CCP) naturally `lled the “space” for a 
Christian-Democratic or “popular” party. Though initially social-Cath-
olic, the CCP became corporatist and authoritarian and supported the 
Pais dictatorship in 1917.
The second cleavage of this period was the republican-monarchical 
split, also known as the “regime question,” which emerged in resistance 
to the republican regime of a small but relatively strong nucleus of mon-
archists, who desired the return of Manuel II but were not connected 
with the liberal parties dissolved in 1910. In 1911 and 1912, two mon-
archist incursions, launched from Galicia, were led by a former of`-
cer of caesarist leanings, Henrique Mitchell de Paiva Couceiro, who 
had led the African occupation campaigns at the turn of the century. 
Paiva Couceiro was accompanied by a number of young men who on 
their return from exile in 1914 would create the Integralismo Lusitano 
(IL) movement, which was based on the Maurrasian ideology that had 
guided Action Française. From their reading of Le Bon, Barrès, and 
Maurras these Integralists came to know the main proponents of `n-
de-siècle nationalism.
Participation in World War I had an immediate destabilizing impact 
on Portugal. The republicans had unanimously supported participa-
tion in the Great War, in the belief that it would guarantee the safety 
of the African colonies. But because Britain seemed prepared to “give” 
Germany some of those colonies, the Democratic Party concluded that 
neutrality was dangerous, and became the greatest champion of military 
participation on the European front. The Democrats believed, further-
more, that Portuguese participation in the eventual peace negotiations 
would consolidate the country’s international position.
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In supporting participation, however, the Democratic Party also 
pursued its own internal political objectives. Ensuring the safety 
of the African colonies did not justify action on the European front 
per se. Great Britain did not demand intervention on the basis of the 
Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, and intervention in Africa alone, an option 
defended by conservative republicans, would have been suf`cient. As 
Richard Herr stresses in chapter 2, “What Was Meant by a Republic 
in 1910,” “the tension between the two Frances that marked the Third 
Republic was calmed by the experience of the First World War, when 
both sides worked together to defend the French patrie. No such expe-
rience smoothed the tension in Portugal and Spain, where large sec-
tors of the population did not look on the republic as their patria.” The 
Democratic Party took it for granted that the rest of the republican par-
ties would want to participate in its union sacré, but the Evolutionists, 
initially willing, soon abandoned the coalition. The Unionist Party, on 
the other hand, was opposed to intervention in Europe from the start. 
The Unionist and Evolutionist parties were both led by centrist or right-
wing parliamentary factions that had left the Republican Party in 1912. 
Both parties feared the social and political effects of participation, 
which had already led to riots in Lisbon and raids on shops because of 
food shortages and had incited more strikes led by revolutionary syndi-
calist unions opposed to the war.
2
The most appropriate way to analyze the fall of the republican regime is 
to examine civil-military relations. Appeals to the military were a con-
stant feature of postwar politics. By de`nition, the republican politi-
cal system did not have a “loyal opposition.” It was obvious to politi-
cal actors that the possibility of achieving power through elections was 
virtually nonexistent. The military coup of 1926 co-opted part of the 
liberal regime’s political elite who, like many in the military, aimed for 
the establishment of a reformed constitutional order. The coup was also 
supported by what Juan J. Linz calls the “disloyal opposition,” which 
aimed to remove the dominant party from power.4
The military dictatorship rapidly eliminated the republicans from 
the ranks of the regime, but it was unable to institutionalize itself. The 
small, pugnacious workers’ movement, under anarcho-syndicalist hege-
mony, frightened the ruling classes, who recalled the notorious failure of 
the republican regime to incorporate workers into the political system. 
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The role of the Portuguese bienio rosso (1918 – 1919) in the overthrow 
of liberalism should not be exaggerated, however.
If the processes of democratic overthrow and the rise of fascism are 
indeed characterized by “the takeover of power by a well-organized dis-
loyal opposition with a mass base in society, committed to the creation 
of a new political and social order, and unwilling to share its power with 
members of the political class of the past regime, except as minor part-
ners in a transition phase,”5 then Portugal is notable for the absence of 
a fascist movement. The crisis of Portuguese liberalism was a product 
of the complex relationship between fascism and the different political 
“families” that made up the conservative bloc during the `rst half of the 
twentieth century.
The secularization cleavage was perhaps the most important one 
caused by the First Republic. The Portuguese case shows how, cultur-
ally speaking, the emergence of a “fascist intelligentsia” becomes very 
dif`cult when “the hostile response to modern society and the concom-
itant rejection of liberalism and democratization remain embedded in 
traditional religious forms, and reactionary or conservative politics is 
linked to the defense of the position of the Church.”6 The Church and 
the CCP constituted a powerful obstacle to the “fascistization” of the 
university and intellectual elites, playing a key political role in the anti-
democratic reaction.
Another enduring cleavage, the monarchy-republic cleavage or 
“regime question,” also had an inauence. “Restorationism” inhibited 
the development of fascism; it curbed fascist tendencies within the 
Integralist movement and Sidonism’s attempts at populist mobiliza-
tion. The “regime question” also highlighted the understanding between 
Integralists and social-Catholics, as both groups defended authoritarian 
corporatism as an alternative to liberalism.
Following the mobilization of the urban working- and middle-
classes — both increasingly distant from the Democratic Party — all 
traces of populist mobilization in the conservative countryside disap-
peared. The republic had not shaken the traditional structures of dom-
ination in the north, where clientelistic pacts with local notables had 
been established. In the latifundia-dominated south, after brief periods 
of activity in 1910 and 1912 the rural unions had almost disappeared. 
They were not part of the bienio rosso of 1918 – 1919, and the social 
conaict that characterized the rise of rural fascism in Italy did not occur 
in Portugal. The nature of conservative political and social representa-
tion in the 1920s (mass parties had not yet emerged) and the existence 
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of clientelistic relationships in the political system were decisive ele-
ments in the transition to authoritarianism.
As soon as the republican regime was overthrown, the military dicta-
torship found punitive solutions for some of the problems worrying the 
conservative bloc. The Democratic Party was ousted from power and its 
leaders exiled, the working class lost its right to strike, and the unions 
were legally restricted. The republicans dominated revolutionary action 
against the military dictatorship, the only exception being the failed 
general strike of 1934, the year Salazar established the corporatist sys-
tem. The Catholic Church blessed the 1926 coup and, while suspicious 
of republican of`cers and civilians in the regime, immediately volun-
teered secular supporters for ministerial positions.
Salazarism was born out of a military dictatorship beset by a suc-
cession of conspiracies, palace coups, and revolutionary attempts, signs 
of the battle for leadership within the vast, pro-dictatorial conservative 
coalition. The consolidation of the authoritarian regime met with dif`-
culties because of the political diversity of the conservative bloc and its 
ability to penetrate the armed forces. Curiously, it was under the mili-
tary dictatorship that the fascists gained some inauence through the 
young of`cer class. They attempted to create autonomous organizations 
and played a role in driving out republicans from the ranks of the mili-
tary. This military-mediated, “limited and self-devouring pluralism” was 
overcome only by Salazar.
In the wake of a major `nancial crisis, António de Oliveira Salazar 
was named `nance minister, subsequently gaining ample powers over 
the other ministries. The institutionalization of Salazar’s Estado Novo 
(New State) was done “from above.” It was a process that depended 
more on generals and colonels than on lieutenants, and more on the 
Ministry of the Interior than on “the mob.” By 1934 liberalism had 
been eliminated and the old republican institutions replaced. The great 
republican `gures were forgotten in exile after the brief optimism gen-
erated by the Spanish Popular Front of 1936. One by one, anarcho-
syndicalist leaders went to prison or to exile, leaving the leadership 
of the clandestine opposition in the hands of the small and youthful 
Communist Party.
As Douglas L. Wheeler points out in chapter 5, “The Changing 
Historiography of the First Portuguese Republic”: “Under the Estado 
Novo dictatorship’s educational system, the history of the First Republic 
had no place in school or university curricula, and any of`cial reference 
to the Republic’s past demonized the Republican as well as the late 
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constitutional monarchy’s politicians. A major thesis of the Salazarist 
regime was that the post-1926 ditadura saved Portugal from the das-
tardly ‘demo-liberal’ Republic and that the dictatorship dominated 
by Salazar was a providential but rational response to the Republican 
catastrophe.”
The regime institutionalized by Salazar was admired by many on the 
fringes of the European radical right, but above all, given its cultural 
origin, by those of Maurrasian and traditional Catholic extraction. Its 
cultural identity was based on more than just an “order-promoting” 
program, but it did not have the “totalitarian,” “pagan” elements of 
Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy. Salazarism was based on radical right-
wing and antiliberal social-Catholicism.7
3
As chapter 7, “Coping with the Double Legacy of Authoritarianism and 
Revolution in Portuguese Democracy,” stresses, Portugal, with its neigh-
bor Spain, experienced one of the longest right-wing dictatorships of 
the twentieth century. Institutionalized under the leadership of António 
de Oliveira Salazar during the 1930s, the Estado Novo was close to 
the Linzian ideal type of authoritarian regime.8 In 1968, Salazar had 
a stroke and was replaced by Marcelo Caetano, who initiated a lim-
ited liberalization that was brought to an abrupt halt by the worsening 
colonial war that the regime had been waging in Angola, Mozambique, 
and Guinea-Bissau since 1961. The inability of Salazar’s successor to 
resolve the dilemmas caused by the war provoked the collapse of the 
dictatorship.
As Inacia Rezola argues in chapter 6, “The Portuguese Transition to 
Democracy,” compared with the other southern European “third wave” 
democracies, the most conspicuous characteristic of Portugal’s democ-
ratization during the 1970s was the nature of its rupture from the previ-
ous authoritarian regime. The singularity of the collapse of the dictator-
ship resides in the nature of military intervention by the captains, a rare 
if not unique case in the twentieth century. The war on three fronts that 
was being waged by the regime made them protagonists in the coun-
try’s political transformation. The April 25, 1974 military coup paved 
the way for the institutionalization of Portuguese democracy. Portugal’s 
transition occurred at the height of the Cold War, at a time when there 
were few international pressures for democratization. The rupture pro-
voked by the Portuguese military resulted in an accentuated crisis of 
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the state, fueled by the concurrence of democratization with the decol-
onization of the `nal European colonial empire.9 The consolidation of 
Portuguese democracy was a complex process in which the prospect of 
membership in the European Union was to play an important role.
The “revolutionary period” of 1974  – 1975 was the most complex 
phase of the transition. In these two years powerful tensions emerged 
within Portuguese society that began to subside in 1976, when a 
new constitution was approved and the `rst legislative and presiden-
tial elections were held. The disagreements concerning the nature of 
decolonization — which was the initial driving force behind the conaict 
between General Spínola and other conservative generals and the cap-
tains who had led the coup — led to the emergence of the MFA (Armed 
Forces Movement) as a political force.10 This subsequently opened a 
space for social and political mobilization that exacerbated the crisis 
of the state, and which can perhaps explain why the moderate elites 
were incapable of directing, “from above,” the rapid institutionaliza-
tion of democracy. Many analyses of the transition rightly emphasize 
the powerful “revitalization of civil society” as a factor leading to the 
process of radicalization. It is important to note, however, that this 
mobilization developed in parallel with and in the presence of this pro-
tective cover; indeed, it is dif`cult to imagine this mobilization devel-
oping otherwise.
Initiatives of symbolic rupture with the past began to evolve soon 
after April 1974, culminating in the rapid and multidirectional purges 
(saneamentos) analyzed in chapter 7, “Coping with the Double Legacy 
of Authoritarianism and Revolution in Portuguese Democracy.” 
Following a quick decision to remove the more visible members of 
the dictatorial political elite and some conservative military of`cers, 
the purge movement began to affect the civil service and the private 
sector. It became increasingly radical, affecting the lower ranks of the 
regime bureaucracy, albeit unevenly. This triggered immediate calls for 
the agents of the political police and of other repressive bodies to be 
brought to justice.
The parties that were to represent the right and center-right, the 
Social Democratic Centre (CDS — Centro Democrático Social) and the 
Popular Democratic Party (PPD — Partido Popular Democrático) were 
formed during this period.11 A great effort was made to exclude from 
these parties any persons associated with the Estado Novo and to `nd 
leaders with democratic credentials. Indeed, the CDS, which integrated 
sectors of Portuguese society that espoused conservative authoritarian 
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values, was on the verge of being declared illegal until the `rst elections 
for the Constituent Assembly on April 25, 1975.
Supported by parties of the left, but largely on its own initiative, the 
MFA moved away from Spínola both over colonial policy and because 
of his attempts to be the effective leader in the process of institution-
alizing democracy. With the appointment of the second Provisional 
Government, the MFA launched its independent organization. It was 
by its hand that Spínola promulgated Law 7/74, which gave the colo-
nies the right to independence, determined the legal framework that 
would allow decolonization, and de`ned the organizations that would 
be involved in the process.12 From that moment, the negotiations moved 
quickly. In the summer of 1974 Spínola persisted with his call for a ref-
erendum, seeking an alternative to the liberation movements and raising 
the hopes of the white population in the colonies, especially in Angola 
and Mozambique, much against the dominant view within the new 
party system and the MFA, which were calling for a swift transition to 
independence. Spínola’s alternative would only be possible had the colo-
nial administration been strong and had there been a negotiating strat-
egy anchored in military strength, but neither of these conditions was 
present. Then came what one scholar has described as “a dramatic com-
pression in the timing of the end of the empire.”13
In Portugal, the overthrow of General Spínola, along with the MFA’s 
shift to the left and the implementation of agrarian reforms and nation-
alization of large economic groups, were symbols and motors of an 
ever-worsening state crisis that was sustaining powerful social move-
ments. The MFA’s decision to respect the electoral calendar was a sig-
ni`cant factor in the founding legitimization of the democratic regime, 
and the realization of these elections as scheduled greatly enhanced the 
position of the moderate political parties.
Portuguese society began to polarize, with the emergence of an anti-
revolutionary (and anti-Communist) movement in the north of the coun-
try. The Socialist Party (PS — Partido Socialista) and the PPD backed the 
moderates, leading to mobilizations in Lisbon and Porto. In the prov-
inces to the north of the River Tejo, the hierarchy of the Catholic church 
and local notables supported parish-level mobilizations, with the local 
military authorities either remaining neutral or being complicit in the 
activities. Of`cers organized a successful countercoup that toppled the 
radicals.
Understanding the nature of the transition, and especially the state 
crisis that this unleashed, is essential for fully comprehending some of 
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its more radical characteristics, as well as some of the attitudes with 
respect to the country’s authoritarian past during this period. Both 
aowed together into a double legacy for the consolidation of democ-
racy. Although, as Rui Feijó stresses in chapter 9, “Broken Promises, 
Postponed Commitments,” “the pursuit of the ‘quality of democracy’ 
calls for an unending process of adjustment and improvement,” and 
some of its dimensions “contribute to the emergence of a perception of 
an aristocratic, if not oligarchic, elite, and undermine the political legiti-
macy of the Republic.”
With the prospect of accession to the European Community — and in 
the wake of it — new identity problems were to arise, the most impor-
tant of which was the nature of Portugal’s relationship with neighbor-
ing Spain. During — and particularly after — Portugal’s attempts to nego-
tiate accession separately, Spain regularly appeared in public opinion as 
the powerful neighbor that had “invaded” Portugal’s economy. Having 
rapidly transformed itself into Portugal’s major trading partner, Spain, 
and the “Spanish menace,” stood as a threat to the liberalization of 
the Portuguese market. As Luís Campos e Cunha develops in chapter 
8, “Portugal: An Island Comes Ashore,” an “island syndrome has to 
be fading away as Spain has taken its natural position in relation to 
Portugal. While neighboring countries naturally have greater trading 
and cultural exchange, this was not the case for Spain and Portugal 
throughout most of the twentieth century. Spain is now the major trad-
ing partner and is a major destination for Portuguese to work and study. 
The surprise is that it took so long for Spain to reach this important 
role.”
The Portuguese case provides a good illustration of the thesis that 
regards the European Community as a reference for Portugal’s develop-
ment. It also acts as a “ready symbol” the democratic elites could use 
to legitimate the new domestic order following the contested transition 
and the end of the colonial empire that had been so dear to the Estado 
Novo. On the other hand — and as it had in Spain — the European Union 
led to the successful consolidation of a “democratic tradition” that was 
based on the “synchronization and homogenization of [national] cul-
tures and institutions with those of Europe,” the social and economic 
components of which had been changing since the 1960s.14 This move-
ment was consolidated during the 1980s by accelerated social change, 
economic growth, and the inaux of Community funds.
During the 1980s, Portugal experienced a second cycle of growth 
and social change. The development of a pro-European outlook was 
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essentially a consequence of decolonization and the institutionalization 
of democracy. Following a complex transition process, the integration 
of Portugal into the EC became a strategic objective. It was the conse-
quence of signi`cant changes in domestic policy and had political as 
well as economic overtones. Democratic consolidation and Portugal’s 
insertion into the European economic space were to become insepara-
ble. In the context of a polarized transition in Portugal’s case, as in that 
of the other southern European democratizing regimes — particularly 
Spain — the idea that accession to the European Community would help 
to guarantee liberal democracy was more overtly voiced and was central 
to the strategy of the political elites during this period.
The `rst ten years of Portugal’s membership in the European Union 
were a “golden era” during which there was a large degree of pro-Euro-
pean consensus within the party system; there was economic growth 
and rising incomes and there was also real social change. Internationally, 
Portugal used its stronger position as a member of the EU to resolve the 
tensions existing between it and its former colonies in Africa. The Expo 
’98 in Lisbon is a symbol of that remarkable decade. As Pedro Pinto, 
Kristen Podolak, and Mathias Kondolf state in chapter 13, “Water and 
Environment in Portugal,” “the Lisbon Expo site is only one manifes-
tation of a growing phenomenon: urban waterways as designed land-
scapes of leisure and consumption in developed countries, reaecting a 
transition from utilitarian to recreational, from spaces of industry to 
spaces of leisure and entertainment.”
The optimism of the 1990s was also marked by Portugal’s meeting 
the convergence criteria for adhesion to the European single currency, 
the Euro, and joining it in 1999  – 2000; this contrasted with the situa-
tion at the beginning of the following decade. With the EU’s movement 
toward institutional reform, enlargement, and the eventual reduction 
of EU `scal transfers, there is some evidence of a fear that Portugal 
could be returning to the periphery. As Dana Redford argues in chap-
ter 14, “Entrepreneurship and Public Policy in Tomorrow’s Portuguese 
Republic,” citing the Eurobarometer, in 2008 “Portugal had the worst 
entrepreneurial climate index out of the twenty-`ve countries surveyed, 
as well as the highest percentage of people who agreed that there is a 
lack of `nancial support, that there are complex administrative pro-
cedures and that it was dif`cult to get information about starting up 
a business.” Nevertheless, “despite continuing high rates of poverty, 
inequality, and challenges in educational performance,” Miguel Glatzer 
stresses in chapter 10, “Welfare State Growth in the Portuguese Second 
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Republic,” “it is important to remember how far Portugal has come in 
the past thirty-eight years of democracy. High-quality healthcare; pro-
tection against the risks of old age, disability, sickness and unemploy-
ment; and access to education have been made broadly and in many 
cases universally available. Citizens have come to expect more from 
their state; the degree to which they will be able to continue to do so in 
the future is now an open question.”
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In comparative perspective, the broader signi`cance of the Republican 
takeover in Portugal in 1910 is that it was the only example of regime 
change in Western Europe during the so-called “`rst wave of democ-
ratization” in the twentieth-century world, which took place between 
1905 and 1911. This wave featured the `rst Russian Revolution (1905), 
the Iranian Revolution (1906), the great Romanian Peasants’ Revolt 
(1907), the Young Turk Revolution in Istanbul (1908), the imposition 
of a much more liberal government in Greece by military coup (1909), 
and the beginning of the Mexican Revolution (1910) and of the Chinese 
Revolution (1911). The designation “`rst wave of democratization” is 
generic and not speci`c, because the immediate goal of political democ-
racy was not necessarily the primary objective in each case, though 
democracy was frequently mentioned and in most, at least, of these 
cases was a fundamental objective, if sometimes honored in the breach.1
All the cases in this “`rst wave” had to do with countries peripheral 
to the major modernization of the nineteenth century, all of which had 
recently suffered signi`cant military or diplomatic defeat or frustration 
at the hands of more modern or stronger powers. The attempted break-
throughs were in varying ways responses to the challenges of modern-
ization and, in some cases, of the status of inferiority in which these 
countries found themselves. The second and third waves of democra-
tization affected a very large part of Europe after 1918 and much of 
Western Europe after 1945. Only the fourth wave, following 1975, was 
Chapter 1
Portugal’s First Republic in 
Comparative Perspective of Its Era
Stanley G. Payne
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somewhat more peripheral once more, but was also very extensive, con-
centrated in southern Europe, Latin America, and then Eastern Europe. 
Portugal had the distinction of leading this fourth wave, with the revo-
lution of 1974, which overcame its initial praetorian and revolutionary 
tendencies, issuing into democracy.
The `rst wave was an initial expression of the radical political 
changes that would be introduced in Europe and in other parts of the 
world during the era of world wars and violent revolution, roughly 
from 1905 to 1950. The mutations of this era were, in broader per-
spective, phenomena — and also to a considerable degree products — of 
the “axial age” of the classically modern, roughly from 1890 to 1930, 
when the major technological innovations appeared and when the con-
sequences of the rapid social, cultural, and economic changes brought 
about by modernization, industrialization, and urbanization achieved 
their most dramatic impact.
Only in the case of Portugal did the new regime survive for some 
time, despite (or possibly because of) the fact that its progressivism 
failed to introduce democracy. Though it set a European record for 
instability, the relative duration of the First Republic had partly to do 
with the fact that it was the only Western European example in this 
wave, and also with the fact that its geographic location and continued 
alliance with Great Britain provided partial shelter from the tempests 
of the era of World War I, even though the country was signi`cantly 
impacted by these storms.
As in the other cases, the First Republic represented an attempt to 
accelerate history and make up for the slow pace of modernization dur-
ing the preceding century. As the `rst new republic of the century, it rep-
resented the latest in the long string of “`rsts” in Portuguese history, all 
of them resulting from the determined leadership of innovative elites 
who found it easier to direct the affairs of a small, less complex land 
than was the case in Spain or some other larger countries.2 As in most 
(not all) of the other cases in this wave, the emphasis was not, how-
ever, on economic modernization per se but on cultural and institutional 
change, the “Jacobin” cultural revolution of the nineteenth century that 
would produce progressive modern secular institutions, from which all 
other bene`ts would supposedly follow. The Republic was directed by 
lawyers and intellectuals, common leaders in this era, who sometimes 
seemed more interested in elite education than in primary education. 
Eventually this would produce a narrowing, rather than a democrati-
zation, of the suffrage. Thus it is tempting to see the First Republic as 
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a kind of continuation of the nineteenth century in its liberal national-
ism, its limited suffrage, and its apotheosis of positivism and scienti`c or 
pseudo-scienti`c elitism, which was already being questioned in other 
parts of Europe.
But it reaected only the last part of that century, for it was a prime 
expression of the concept of a “radical republic,” a common objec-
tive of the progressive intelligentsia of that era in southern Europe 
and in parts of Latin America. Its doctrinairism demanded a predemo-
cratic regime to maintain control in the hands of radical progressives, 
founded on the concept of the “hyperlegitimacy” of one group. Thus it 
was something of a forerunner of the Second Republic in Spain, and in 
both countries radical republicans maintained that the underdevelop-
ment and conservatism of the greater society required that the politi-
cal system remain exclusionary, despite the introduction of democratic 
suffrage in Spain.
There was some irony in this, because the great model for radical 
republicans was the Third Republic in France, whose initial political 
stance had been directly opposite — democratic and counterrevolution-
ary. The founding act of the Third Republic had been the violent sup-
pression of the Paris Commune, drowned in blood with thousands of 
summary executions. Its `rst leaders, in fact, were monarchists, but the 
initial French republican chieftains were also clear that the regime had 
to maintain universal male suffrage and a system of law and order. Only 
after these things had been instituted and consolidated could the regime 
move to more progressive (and also more divisive) reforms. The argu-
ment of Portuguese and Spanish republicans seemed to be that France 
had a much larger and more democratic middle class that demanded ` rst 
stability and responsibility, but that the less-developed Iberian countries 
required the shock effect of a radical and sectarian approach, though in 
fact such tactics guaranteed that in the long run neither Iberian repub-
lic could know success, becoming transitory regimes replaced by more 
stable systems.
The First Republic did have the advantage that the country’s under-
developed structure and largely conservative rural society precluded 
major challenges from organized labor. When the `rst limited threat 
appeared in 1912 it was rigorously repressed. So narrow a system made 
it possible for the main faction of republicans to form a well-organized 
party capable of dominating an exclusionary system, but the restriction 
of politics to small sectors failed to produce stability, resulting in elite 
rivalries like no other. In this era, the result of change and moderniza-
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tion was fragmentation, among elites as much as or more than among 
society as a whole.
It quickly became an unpopular regime abroad, with scant prestige. 
As only the third republic in Europe, founded on regicide, it was an 
affront to the monarchist systems of the early twentieth century, and 
even the British ambassador referred to it in his dispatches as “this 
detestable regime,” but London decided to hold its nose and accept 
the Republic as the best that Portugal could do. British support helped 
to save the regime from potential intervention on the part of Spain or 
Germany.
Such concerns motivated the greatest mistake of the Republic’s 
leaders: their totally gratuitous participation in World War I. The 
Portuguese decision was absolutely unique in the case of any neutral 
country, insofar as Portugal was under no direct pressure or coercion 
and was offered no signi`cant bribes. By contrast, Greece, Portugal’s 
nearest southern European counterpart, was physically forced into the 
war by the Allies under the most direct coercion. (To carry the Greek 
comparison further, that country had enjoyed universal male suffrage 
since 1864  — democratic suffrage being a feature of Balkan national-
ism — as well as a genuine two-party system. But this brought no salva-
tion, and the country was as divided as Portugal, though not so politi-
cally fragmented.)
The Great War fundamentally destabilized the country’s `nances 
and momentarily threw the republican radicals out of power by armed 
insurrection, yet the Republic survived, thanks to the strength of party 
organization and the continuation of restricted suffrage. The wave of 
postwar radicalism largely passed Portugal by, due to its conservative 
rural substratum, even though it was reaected in a modest upsurge of 
urban revolutionism. The main result seems to have been further restric-
tion of the suffrage, so that by the 1920s Portugal resembled a nine-
teenth-century country more than any other in Europe, with the excep-
tion of Horthy’s Hungary. There was eventually a limited evolution of 
parliamentary alternatives by the early 1920s, but true political devel-
opment was unknown.
The First Republic was a regime of remarkable and continuing policy 
failures, without equal in its time, but the stranglehold of the misnamed 
Democrats was affected comparatively little in Europe’s most static 
political and social system. Such failures would have elicited decisive 
opposition almost anywhere else, but the worker left was the weakest to 
be found, short of Latin America, and for a long time there was no force 
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capable of developing a hegemonic opposition — with the exception of 
the abortive breakthrough of the charismatic Sidónio Pais in 1917.
The Portuguese counterrevolution would thus constitute arguably 
the most torturous process found among such phenomena in Europe 
at that time. It went through six phases: the Paiva Couceiro guerrilla 
incursions of 1911 – 1912 (which the Spanish government hesitated to 
reinforce), the brief Pimenta de Castro ministry of 1915 (overthrown 
by force), the only attempt at an alternate regime, Pais’s “República 
Nova” of 1917  – 1918 (instituted by insurrection and ended by assassi-
nation), one genuine if feeble monarchist revolt that produced a mini – 
civil war (the “Monarchy of the North” of January – February 1919), the 
attempt to organize a major parliamentary alternative in the form of the 
National Party, and `nally the successful military pronunciamento of 
1926 (though at `rst the military had no idea with what to replace the 
parliamentary system). This was the era of the most radical, violent, and 
confused politics in contemporary European history, but in some ways 
Portugal lapped all the competition.
Nationalism was stronger and more coherent in Portugal than in 
Spain, since it existed on both left and right, yet the only hegemonic 
function it exercised was that expressed within the original republican 
movement itself. All the other manifestations were too divided. Fascism 
was an impossibility, basically for structural reasons, as António Costa 
Pinto and others have explained. Portugal was on the winning side in 
the war and still had a premobilized, predemocratic society, a largely 
conservative rural social base (though without the signi`cant new polit-
ical development in that sector seen in Greece and Bulgaria), and no 
Red menace.
One result of World War I was, however, the revival of the Portuguese 
army, which, for political and other reasons, had been in a very sorry 
state in 1914. This raised the specter of praetorianism in the postwar 
years, yet for some time the army did not become a major political 
actor, as the radical republicans — in typical nineteenth-century style — 
temporarily created their own form of praetorianism in the expanded 
Republican National Guard.
The Republic, with its peculiar combination of limited radicalism 
and political exclusivism, inaugurated the era of the greatest political 
violence in the recent history of Portugal, with the sole exception of 
the civil war of 1832 – 1834. Violence was intermittent, though persis-
tent, yet also “typically Portuguese” in observing certain limits. Several 
hundred people were killed in each of the various insurrections, yet 
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no Portuguese group exhibited the bloodlust found in many other 
European countries of that time. Portugal had not really entered the 
era of modern European revolutionary violence, something happily it 
would never fully experience, and so never had to go through the total 
dehumanization of the adversary, with the concomitant goal of his anni-
hilation, found among both revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries 
elsewhere. Reprisals in Republican Portugal were surprisingly limited. 
It is a matter of speculation whether this reaected a peculiar (if fortu-
nate) Portuguese proclivity for largely “symbolic” violence. In Europe 
as a whole, there were four choke points in postwar political crises: the 
immediate postwar years, the mid-1920s (mainly 1926), the Depression 
crisis, and the subsequent crisis of the mid-1930s. The republican sys-
tem survived the `rst, thanks to the strength of party organization and 
the country’s low political mobilization, but `nally succumbed in the 
second crisis year of 1926, when the Greek system temporarily failed 
and those of Poland and Lithuania, like Portugal, underwent more per-
manent changes. If the end depended almost exclusively on the initia-
tive of a military pronunciamento, the latter could be bloodless because 
the republican parliamentary system by that time had become widely 
discredited, even among many liberals and leftists. In a predemocratic 
society, this was a dramatically different situation compared with that 
of Spain a decade later. The First Republic had been more than a mere 
continuationist regime of the preceding era, but it had also been much 
less than a democracy, despite some elements of popular participation.
As the only Western European participant in the `rst wave of twenti-
eth-century democratization, Portugal might have offered an instructive 
example for Spain when the latter introduced a republic in 1931, `ve 
years after the parliamentary system had succumbed in Portugal. The 
new Spanish leaders, however, showed no capacity for learning any-
thing from anybody, concentrating on their idée `xe that the principal 
reason for the earlier failures of the Spanish left was that it had been 
inadequately radical, intransigent, and exclusivistic, and too prone to 
compromise (even though the exact opposite was more nearly true). 
Given the fact of mass mobilization in Spain and the existence of pow-
erful revolutionary movements, the effects of republican radicalism in 
that country would be more far-reaching and disastrous. One result 
of republicanism, however, was that whereas it had been the Spanish 
right that was interested in intervention to overthrow the Portuguese 
left between 1911 and 1913, under the new regime it was the Spanish 
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left that sought to intervene to help to overthrow the Portuguese right 
in 1932 – 1933, with equivalent ineffectuality.
The only Spanish sector interested in following a Portuguese exam-
ple was the moderate right, which to some degree began to adopt the 
model of the “second Portuguese republic,” the Estado Novo, as a goal, 
though without clear internal (or for that matter, of`cial) agreement. 
The Portuguese model was the basis for political planning by the mil-
itary insurrectionists in 1936, and in August, after the civil war had 
begun, was on one occasion publicly invoked by Franco himself. By 
the time he had been elevated to the dictatorship, however, at the end 
of September, the Clausewitzian Wechselwirkung of reciprocal interac-
tion and radicalization produced by a revolutionary civil war (some-
thing far beyond the minor Portuguese scufae of 1919) induced him to 
seek a more drastic alternative, and to adopt more of an Italian than a 
Portuguese alternative.
A `nal reaection regarding Portuguese republicanism in compara-
tive perspective concerns the issue of monarchism, which made a come-
back in Spain but not in Portugal. Why was this? In both countries, 
monarchist political leadership and support had grown progressively 
weaker during the last years of the monarchy itself. Yet, if anything, 
monarchism was slightly stronger in Portugal in 1912 than, say, in Spain 
in 1933, and the Spanish military leaders were completely united in 
excluding monarchism as a banner in 1936.
The difference has to do, probably, with the great chasm produced 
by the Spanish Civil War, fortunately without counterpart in the neigh-
boring country, and the creation of a radically authoritarian and united 
opposition to a republic in Spain, which had eventually become identi-
`ed with the revolutionary left. The division was both deeper and more 
fully polarized than in Portugal, and, after World War II, with the cat-
astrophic end of fascism, the radical alternatives of left and right had 
both failed. The only real alternative for the future of the Franco regime 
was to move nearer monarchism. That the Spanish monarchy has thus 
far survived into the twenty-`rst century is due to the political judgment 
and courage of King Juan Carlos in promoting democratization, and 
to the somewhat chastened cooperation of the Spanish political elites, 
most of whom have had an understandable reluctance to return to the 
republican holocaust of the 1930s, which was a good deal more trau-
matic than the continued messiness, conaict, and failures of the First 
Republic in Portugal.
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At 9 a.m. on October 5, 1910, the Republic was proclaimed from the 
Câmara Municipal in Lisbon, replacing the constitutional monarchy. On 
January 20, 2009, Barack Obama, Democrat, was sworn in as presi-
dent of the United States, replacing George W. Bush, Republican. Obama 
promised to create a new political world. So did the Portuguese Republic. 
Can we say that the Portuguese transfer from monarchy to republic can 
be understood as a transfer from one political party to another, or was 
there something about a republic that made people look on it as funda-
mentally different from a monarchy, even a constitutional monarchy?
Republics existed in early modern Europe: Venice, Switzerland, the 
Dutch republic. It was not these examples, however, that gave birth 
to the modern meaning of a republic, but rather the ancient repub-
lics of Greece and Rome. Since Machiavelli and the Renaissance there 
was a fascination with them, but it gained momentum during the 
Enlightenment, when persons unhappy with their current monarchies 
looked to them for inspiration. Readers in France, England, and the 
British colonies were brought up on classical authors and absorbed the 
romanticized view of the early times of Sparta, Athens, and Rome found 
in Livy, Cicero, Tacitus, and Plutarch. It was less their form of govern-
ment that attracted the Enlightenment, however, than the virtue of their 
heroes and their peoples, a simple life of frugality, industry, temperance, 
integrity, and justice, so different from the corruption the readers found 
in their own day.
Chapter 2
What Was Meant by a Republic 
in 1910
Richard Herr
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Montesquieu picked up this view in his famous work, The Spirit of 
the Laws. He concluded that what distinguished a republic from a mon-
archy was the absence of social ranks and the dedication of its citizens 
to serving the community. Montesquieu called this spirit “virtue”; it 
involved morality, equality, frugality, love of country. The spirit involved 
the subordination of the individual to the well-being of his fellow citi-
zens. Rousseau would reformulate it as the “general will.”
The `rst republic to come out of the spirit of the Enlightenment was 
the United States. The British colonists were also caught in reverence for 
the republics of antiquity, but the colonists saw themselves in the shoes 
of the ancients, convinced they were a new kind of society, better than 
the Old World, destined to set up a model country, a republic where 
public virtue would displace the corruption and social pretensions of 
the British monarchy.1
What was most signi`cant of the American example, as Robert 
Palmer has argued, was the inauguration of the people as constituent 
power. The republic embodied the sovereignty of the people, expressed 
in a convention elected by the citizens of the states, to draw up a consti-
tution that then had to be rati`ed by the vote of the people. This was a 
radically new procedure that made real the idea of John Locke and oth-
ers of an original contract made by people who come together to create 
a society.2 However, the “people” did not yet mean all adults, not even 
all male adults. It would take the French revolutionary republic to add 
that element. The American constitution left it to the states to decide 
the nature of elections. Gradually the states would adopt universal suf-
frage of free adult white males, with two Southern states holding out 
until after 1850, but women did not get the vote nationally until 1920.
In the United States, and for the future, the `rst characteristic of a 
republic is that it is a state without a monarch, whether king or emperor. 
The constitution included a declaration of citizens’ rights. Two would 
be most signi`cant for the meaning of a republic. The constitution states 
that individuals may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law. The protection of property is emphasized, for pri-
vate property may not be taken for public use without just compensa-
tion. The constitution also provided for religious freedom and a separa-
tion of church and state, the basis for what liberals would come to call 
“a free church in a free state.” How far future republics would guaran-
tee the right of property and religious freedom would remain a critical 
question.
The example of the United States was clearly on the minds of the 
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members of the French Third Estate whom Louis XVI brought together 
in the Estates General in May 1789. Hardly a month later, now call-
ing themselves the National Assembly, they challenged the crown in the 
famous Tennis Court Oath, stating they had been called upon to draft 
a constitution for the kingdom, by inference not appointed by the king 
but by the French people. They began by producing a “Declaration of 
Rights of Man and Citizen.” Sovereignty, it says, resides in the nation 
(thus removing it from the monarch). Men are free and equal in rights, 
which include liberty, property, and freedom of religion. In a separate 
law, the Assembly abolished hereditary nobility and titles. The future 
legislature would have one house.
Within two years the Assembly had `nished the constitution. It 
would seem they had established a republic, but they were maintain-
ing a king. From the very beginning we `nd that there is a dif`culty in 
distinguishing between a republic and a constitutional monarchy. Louis 
XVI posed a problem, because he refused to take an oath to the con-
stitution. Instead, in June 1791 he attempted to aee to Germany with 
his family. When he was brought back to Paris, the radicals of Paris 
demanded a republic. Brought up to the Assembly, the proposal was 
rejected. A leading moderate deputy explained why:
I propose to you the true question. Are we going to end the Revolution or 
are we going to begin it again? . . . One more step will be fatal and criminal.
The next step along the road to liberty is the destruction of royalty. Along 
the line of equality it is the destruction of property.3
Fear that a republic would include a social revolution that could 
abolish private property kept the king on the throne for a year, during 
which war began with Austria and Prussia. The foreign threat to Paris 
caused the people to overthrow the king in August 1792. The Assembly 
called for the election by universal male suffrage of a Convention (using 
the American term) to write a new constitution. The `rst act of the 
Convention in September 1792 was to proclaim a republic, “one and 
indivisible.”
The republic would become famous for the guillotine and the Terror, 
but how did it differ from a constitutional monarchy? Its constitution 
was not very different from that objected to by Louis XVI. It kept the 
usual rights, including property. (The republic would have various con-
stitutions, including one drafted for General Bonaparte, but they all 
protected property. The fear of social revolution proved unfounded.)
In one major way the French Revolution differed from the American 
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one. Establishing a republic in the United States did not involve over-
throwing a monarch, but simply breaking away from his dominion. The 
Latin American republics would follow this example. Eliminating the 
king by execution or later by exile, rather than simply throwing off alle-
giance to a distant ruler, would make the transformation from monar-
chy to republic far more contentious in Europe than America, present-
ing a threat to the existing social order.
By eliminating the king, the French republic left the nation, the pat-
rie, as the focus of people’s loyalty and almost religious faith. The war 
that the republic would wage against the monarchs of Europe aroused 
the devotion and energy of the majority of the people. Raw recruits 
fought successfully against trained armies, singing the battle hymn of 
the Marseillaise: “Allons enfants de la patrie, le jour de gloire est arrivé.” 
Montesquieu had de`ned “l’amour de la patrie” as an essential fea-
ture of a republic, and the `rst French republic put it into action. The 
new spirit represented a profound difference from the constitutional 
monarchy.
The republic limped on after the end of the Terror and the fall of 
the Jacobins, until Bonaparte took it over, changed it to an empire, and 
created the modern French state. Unlike the American republic, it did 
not have a good press, with the Terror as its most notorious feature. 
One thinks of Dickens’s Tale of Two Cities. Liberal opponents of the 
Holy Alliance that dominated Europe looked across the Atlantic to 
the American republic. In 1824 Lafayette, the “Hero of Two Worlds” 
returned to the United States to celebrate `fty years of American inde-
pendence. In Europe the news of Lafayette’s triumphal progress inspired 
the opponents of the established order.4 During the constitutional crisis 
brought on by the French king Charles X in July 1830, the workers and 
students of Paris put up barricades and demanded a republic. A republic 
might be safe in America, but for many in France it still recalled 1793. 
One who felt this way was Lafayette; instead of supporting a republic, 
he gave his blessing to the Duke of Orléans on the balcony of the Hôtel 
de Ville of Paris. Orléans became Louis Philippe, king of what became 
known as the July Monarchy.
Under the July Monarchy a republic remained the goal of the work-
ing classes, joined in the 1840s by middle class liberals who wanted 
a genuinely free parliamentary government. In 1848, with much more 
formidable barricades, the workers of Paris gained their objective: the 
proclamation of a republic from the Hôtel de Ville of Paris. With the 
country in a crisis of unemployment, a provisional government estab-
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lished National Workshops to provide work for the unemployed. Most 
members of the provisional government were liberal bourgeois, but 
the socialist Louis Blanc was in the cabinet, and to the peasants and 
bourgeois whose taxes would pay for the workshops, they sounded 
like socialism. In the election for a constituent assembly by universal 
manhood suffrage, rural and bourgeois France upset the republicans by 
electing a conservative majority. In June the Assembly decreed the clo-
sure of the workshops to save money. For the workers, loss of the work-
shops violated what they called the “right to work.” In response they 
raised barricades anew and were crushed by the army only after three 
days of ferocious `ghting, which became famous as the June Days. In 
December the voters chose the nephew of Napoleon to be president of 
the Republic.
In November of the same year, a popular rising in Rome drove Pope 
Pius IX out of the city. The revolutionaries — with Giuseppe Mazzini, the 
inspirer of Italian nationalism, a leading `gure — proclaimed a Roman 
Republic. It lasted `ve months until Louis Napoleon, who astutely 
sought the approval of French Catholics, arranged for a French army to 
restore the pope. Two years later he would overthrow the French repub-
lic and set up the Second Empire.
The experience of 1848 reinforced the common image that a repub-
lic entailed a social revolution. By the time of Napoleon III, except for 
Switzerland, republics existed only in America, and those in Spanish 
America — unstable, often in the hands of military caudillos — were 
not such as to recommend the form. Torn by the question of slavery 
that would bring on civil war, the United States was losing its luster 
as a republican ideal. Brazil, with its traditional ties to Portugal, had 
an emperor. The reputation of the republic as a form of government 
reached a low point after 1850. One has to ask why Portugal would 
choose to adopt a republic in 1910.
Developments in France hold the key. Radical republicans did not 
accept the Second Empire, and the liberal republicans who wanted a 
liberal representative government in 1848 reappeared by the 1860s 
in opposition to Napoleon III’s authoritarian government. When 
Napoleon III unwisely challenged Prussia to war in 1870 and was cap-
tured by the Prussian army, a republic was again proclaimed at the Paris 
Hôtel de Ville. This one seemed to follow the pattern of 1848. With the 
Prussian army advancing through France and laying a tight siege to 
Paris, an armistice allowed France to elect an assembly to make peace. 
The French provinces `lled it with monarchists. Its members suspicious 
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of Paris, the Assembly met in Versailles. Paris, suffering the effect of four 
months of blockade, became a stronghold of working class republicans. 
The city fell under the control of a new municipal government known as 
the Commune. Dominated by radical republicans and a few socialists, 
who were violent anticlericals, the Commune entreated other French 
cities to join it in a federation. Rejecting the authority of the Assembly, 
the Communard forces, men and women, fought the armies of the 
Assembly bitterly and bravely until they were crushed. In their death 
throes, the Communards resorted to acts of violence, burning public 
buildings and executing numerous hostages, including the archbishop 
of Paris. In the aftermath the government executed and deported thou-
sands of Communards and built the horrendous Sacré Coeur church 
to atone for their acts. For moderates and conservatives throughout 
Europe the terror of the Commune again brought discredit on the con-
cept of a republic.
Events in Spain added to its discredit. In 1873 the Spanish Cortes pro-
claimed a republic, having failed to `nd a monarch who could replace 
Isabel II, exiled by the Revolution of 1868. Spain’s republicans were 
committed to a federation along United States lines, but the left wing 
took over many municipalities and declared them independent com-
munes, following the pattern of the Paris Commune and refusing obedi-
ence to the central government. Meanwhile a growing anarchist move-
ment among the workers and a Carlist rising in the north left Madrid 
with little control over the country. Military commanders took charge 
and within a year brought back Isabel’s son Alfonso as king. A republic 
seemed more than ever a regime aimed at social revolution and anarchy.
Yet the idea of a republic would soon appeal to the peasantry and 
bourgeoisie of France and, gradually, of other countries as well. The 
Assembly of 1871 had only a minority of republicans, and it would 
have restored the monarchy had the monarchists agreed on a reason-
able candidate, but the legitimist candidate made himself unacceptable 
by insisting that France give up the tricolor aag while his supporters 
blocked the Orléanist pretender. Under the sensible leadership of the 
one-time Orléanist minister Adolph Thiers, the Assembly eventually 
accepted a republican constitution that could appeal to peasants and 
bourgeois desirous of stable government and the protection of their 
property. The Third French Republic would steer a careful course resist-
ing the currents of a romantic monarchist Catholic right, a Bonapartist 
search for a strong leader, and, after 1890, the threat of direct action 
from proletarian movements on the left. With the Third Republic the 
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image of a republic as a threat to the social order became a thing of 
the past.
Something else was happening that would also make a republic 
acceptable to people of moderate outlook. Chastened by the experi-
ences of the French Revolutionary period, since 1815 the Catholic hier-
archies had regularly supported monarchs against the proponents of lib-
eral constitutions, whereas liberal regimes had weakened or closed the 
monastic orders and sold off many of the properties of the Church to 
pay national debts. After the middle of the century new developments 
fueled the antagonism, turning the conaict from one of real estate into 
one of ideology. Recent history had made European rulers aware that, 
for military as well as economic reasons, it was important to have a cit-
izen body that could read and write. The leaders of the Church found 
in education, where it could bring up young people within the faith, 
a means to recover its social and religious position. In 1850 the con-
servative assembly of the Second French Republic, seeing in religion a 
guarantee of social peace, passed the Falloux Law, which permitted the 
Church to open secondary schools and gave the clergy authority over 
primary education.
For the liberal heirs of the Enlightenment, who trusted in reason 
rather than faith to solve human problems, the clerical control of the 
education of French youth was anathema. In the 1830s Auguste Comte 
published the Course of Positive Philosophy, which taught that only 
knowledge acquired through scienti`c experiment would achieve the 
harmony and well-being of humanity. Positivism brought the ideologi-
cal clash with the Church up to date and spread widely among liberal 
intellectual sectors. In 1864 Pius IX added fuel to the `re by issuing the 
Syllabus of Errors, a catalog of modern ideas that the Church had con-
demned. Among these errors were that one could discover truth without 
reference to God, and that the Pope should come to terms with progress, 
liberalism, and modern civilization.
The cause was now joined between liberals and the Church hierar-
chy and compromise ruled out. In Catholic countries Freemasons had 
been active among liberal groups since the days of Napoleon. In 1865 
Pius IX revived the Catholic ban on freemasonry, and Masonic anticler-
icalism, which had been lukewarm before, now turned militant. In the 
next decades positivism became the ideology of the Masonic order, who 
found it compatible with their traditional deism. After 1870, Masons 
were becoming leaders of the French Republic.
The clash came inevitably over education. In 1882 the French 
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Republic adopted laws authored by Jules Ferry, minister of public 
education, that established free compulsory primary education. The 
schools would be secular, prohibited from teaching any religious cult 
but required to provide “moral and civic education.” Students would be 
taught to use the French language properly, to appreciate the national 
culture, and to love their country. The worship of the patrie would 
replace the worship of God. The clergy responded that a school that did 
not teach the catechism was teaching “required irreligion.” French soci-
ety split into two Frances, the France of the priests and the France of the 
maîtres d’école. In 1905 the republic drew an iron curtain between the 
two sides by legislating the separation of church and state. Priests lost 
the state salaries they had received since Napoleon, and they would fall 
into poverty. The concept “republic” had come to mean laic, positivist, 
and nationalist.
Among the independent countries of America, Brazil was the only 
one that had not become a republic. In 1890 that would change. The 
positivist message found a wide audience in Latin America, but nowhere 
more than in Brazil, where it was championed by the Freemasons. 
Republicanism found its most active support among military of`cers. 
In 1890 a military coup expelled the emperor and declared a republic. 
It promptly drew up a constitution that separated church and state, rec-
ognized civil marriage, and provided for freedom of religion. Inspired 
by the French Ferry laws, the Brazilian republic made public education 
secular. News of these events in Portugal provided an image of a repub-
lic that had ceased to be socially revolutionary and had become strongly 
positivist and anticlerical.
In Portugal, as in Spain, anticlericalism had a unique concern. Both 
countries had been the butt of enlightened authors, who pictured them 
as lands condemned by the Catholic Church to ignorance and back-
wardness. Remember Candide and the Inquisitors of Lisbon. Stung by 
this scorn, many Portuguese and Spanish liberals blamed the power of 
the Church for the failure of their country to modernize. This was a 
major lesson of Portugal’s generation of 1870; witness the novel of Eça 
de Queirós, O Crime do Padre Amaro.
In Portugal, as in France, the clergy were turning to the education of 
the young as the means to recover their inauence within the constitu-
tional monarchy. Liberals found a response in the positivism of Auguste 
Comte. The leading Portuguese positivist was Teó`lo Braga, professor 
of literature at Coimbra. In his writings and in his inauence on other 
writers he strove to transform Portugal into a positivist community, a 
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secular patria, venerating its past leaders and pressing for economic 
advances.5 In the 1870s the example of the French and Spanish repub-
lics inspired a growing republican movement in Portugal. Porto elected 
a republican deputy in 1878. Teó`lo Braga became convinced that only 
a republic could achieve a national resurrection. (In October 1910 he 
would become president of the provisional republican government.)
What gave a boost to the republican movement was the Mapa-cor-
de-rosa crisis of 1890, when a British ultimatum forced Portugal to 
withdraw its claim to central Africa, lands pictured in rose color on its 
school maps. This was the time of the “scramble for Africa” inspired by 
the belief that the greatness of a modern nation depended on the size 
of its colonial empire. Loss of empire con`rmed national backward-
ness. The Spanish monarchy would be discredited in 1898 by the loss 
of its last American and Asian colonies. The Japanese victory over the 
armies and navy of Russia in 1904, with the ensuing losses of territory 
to Japan, allowed the democratic opposition to force the czar to estab-
lish a parliament, a `rst step toward his overthrow in 1917. In Portugal 
the humiliation of 1890 would hang over the head of the young King 
Carlos. For liberals and positivists, Portugal’s weakness reaected its 
intellectual subservience to Catholic teachings.
The republicans stepped in as the defenders of the Portuguese patria. 
The republican cult of the patrie takes us back to the eighteenth cen-
tury and Rousseau. It had not died out; witness the French education 
system after the Ferry laws. Like the liberal monarchists the Portuguese 
republicans believed in the freedom of the individual, but the republi-
cans believed the free citizen should put dedication to the community 
above everything else. For the republicans, separation of church and 
state meant more than religious freedom and better education. It meant 
ending the hypocrisy of the clergy and inspiring virtuous citizens, the 
creation of a new kind of community based on honesty and simplicity. 
Teó`lo Braga said the republic must turn Portugal from “a melancholy 
mass of poor people” into a nation.6
Just as Portuguese republicanism revived the virtuous republic of the 
Enlightenment, one aspect of it reaected the proletarian movement of 
1848. After 1900 republicanism spread among the working class, espe-
cially in Lisbon. A radical group called the Carbonária combined repub-
lican objectives with socialist and anarchist doctrines and engaged in 
direct action.
The cause of the proletariat was not central to Portuguese republican-
ism, however. In their ideological crusade, the Portuguese republicans 
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were led by the Freemasons. Masons had been around since the 1820s, 
and many liberal monarchists were Masons, from the shopkeeper class 
up to the aristocracy. By 1890 their opposition to the Church was turn-
ing them into republicans, as it had in France and Brazil. There is no 
better evidence of the transformation of republicanism — from a revo-
lutionary cause of the lower classes to a respectable bourgeois move-
ment — than its adoption by the Masons.
What was meant by a republic in 1910 can be looked at in two ways. 
One way sees certain features that remained constant since its origin 
in the eighteenth century: the sovereignty of the people, a virtuous cit-
izenry equal in rights, the dedication of the citizens to the patria, and 
the belief that religion and the state should be independent spheres. The 
other way of looking at the meaning of a republic is to note the alternat-
ing strength of these features. Equal rights included the right of prop-
erty. The American and French revolutions protected it, but in Europe 
until after the Franco-Prussian War a republic seemed a threat to the 
established social order and the property of individuals. By the end of 
the century republics would become again defenders of property against 
threats from socialism and anarchism.
The other feature that evolved sharply was the doctrine of separation 
of church and state, which became a source of bitter conaict as coun-
tries expanded education of the young. The United States, deeply reli-
gious and largely Protestant, did not `nd religion in the schools a threat 
to freedom. In Catholic countries, however, the elimination of religious 
instruction in public schools became central to the republican ideology. 
The clash with papal infallibility and the inspiration of positivism had 
made a secular progressive patria the cardinal identity of a republic. 
Monarchy was accused of failing to defend the patria, but was opposed 
also because of its association with the Church. In 1910 all republics 
were Catholic except Switzerland and the United States. For Catholic 
countries, the uncompromising opposition to the Church provided the 
fundamental difference between a republic and a constitutional monar-
chy, and in Europe only Catholic countries had meaningful republican 
movements.
The legislation that followed the proclamation of the Portuguese 
Republic in October 1910 reveals the hierarchy of the Republican objec-
tives. The republic paid lip service to the ideal of political and social 
equality, so long as it did not threaten social order. Following republican 
ideology it provided universal male suffrage but, wary of the inauence 
of the Church, it established a literacy requirement that eliminated large 
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number of voters. The Provisional Government legalized strikes, but 
soon the government of the republic bowed to pressure from employers 
and landowners and used force to break up workers’ actions.7
From the outset, the Republic focused is attention on the Church. 
Three days after the revolution, the Provisional Government expelled 
the Jesuits. It ordered other religious orders closed; their members could 
either leave the country or don civilian clothes. Catholicism would no 
longer be the religion of the state. In April 1911, before a constitution 
was enacted, the Provisional Government declared the separation of 
church and state. The state took over the properties of the Church and 
lent them to the clergy for religious services. Marriage became a civil 
contract and divorce was made legal. This was not the “free church in 
a free state” championed by liberals, but rather an extension of regalist 
policies of the Old Regime. Portugal enacted the most severe anticlerical 
legislation in Europe prior to the Russian revolution.
The corollary of the religious policy was a drive to create a republi-
can education. The republic banned the teaching of Christianity in all 
schools, and priests and former members of the religious orders were 
prohibited from teaching. Every school got the new republican aag and 
teachers were to exalt its signi`cance. The objective was not just to be a 
literate population but the creation of “homens novos.” Under the mon-
archy public education had already in theory been made free, univer-
sal, and obligatory, but illiteracy rates remained at nearly 80 percent. 
By 1925, although the level of illiteracy remained at around 70 percent, 
the campaign for education was having an effect on the new generation: 
half the inductees in the army knew how to read.8
The anticlerical campaign of the Portuguese Republic proved coun-
terproductive. While it responded to the idealistic republican vision of 
a patriotic society, freed from the prejudices and errors inculcated by 
religion, in practice it had the negative effect of heightening the ten-
sions within the country, rousing sympathy for the clergy and awak-
ening new loyalty to the Church in conservative and rural sectors of 
society. The treatment of the Church was a major cause of the ultimate 
failure of the Portuguese Republic to establish itself in the country. The 
Second Spanish Republic of 1931 came with a similar attitude toward 
the Catholic church. Its anticlerical policy also aroused critical opposi-
tion among the sectors of society that remained loyal to the Church. A 
defense of religion was a strong motive behind the rising that led to the 
Civil War and the overthrow of the Spanish Republic.
Both republics suffered from the heritage of the ideological passions 
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that marked the nineteenth century. Until well past the mid-nineteenth 
century a republic was feared as a threat to social order and private 
property. By the end of the century it had lost this image, thanks to the 
Third French Republic, but on the other hand its espousal of a patri-
otic lay society, while winning over urban workers and the liberal mid-
dle class, produced a new threat to the social order of those sectors that 
accepted the Catholic church: devout Catholics, conservative sectors, 
and the independent peasantry. The tension between the two Frances 
that marked the Third Republic was calmed by the experience of the 
First World War, when both sides worked together to defend the French 
patrie. No such experience smoothed the tension in Portugal and Spain, 
where large sectors of the population did not look on the republic as 
their patria. Since the mid-twentieth century the experience of dictator-
ships and the coming of new generations has largely made ideological 
tension over religion a thing of the past, so that in Portugal the restored 
democratic republic can today be the patria of the broad majority of the 
Portuguese people.
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This paper presents the results of the `rst prosopographic study1 con-
cerning the deputados of the Lower Chamber of the First Portuguese 
Republic, carried within the scope of a much larger research project 
concerning parliamentary recruitment in liberal Portugal.2 The main 
source used here was the publication Parliamentarians and Ministers of 
the First Republic (1910  – 1926), edited by A. H. de Oliveira Marques,3 
information from which was checked against and supplemented with 
further data from other biographical sources. The study involved the 
751 individuals elected as deputies, in both general elections and by-
elections, between 1911 and 1926. Data regarding the socio-demo-
graphic background and political experience of the deputies have been 
grouped according to legislature and the period. In the latter case, and 
when dealing with features changing over time, the criterion for selec-
tion was the moment marking the parliamentary debut of each deputy. 
Since the initial composition of the Lower Chamber arose directly from 
the Constituent Assembly,4 the members of the latter and those who 
were elected during the `rst legislature, speci`cally in the partial elec-
tions of 1913, will be analyzed together here.
Regime Change and Elite Circulation
The abrupt change of regime that took place in 1910, with the `nal 
collapse of the monarchy and the establishment of the Republic, led 
chapter 3
The Deputies of the First 
Portuguese Republic, 1911–1926: 
A Prosopographic Study
Pedro Tavares de Almeida, Paulo Jorge Fernandes, 
and Marta Carvalho dos Santos
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to a profound removal and substitution of the “political class,” espe-
cially at the parliamentary level, along with other changes of greater 
or lesser importance. Overall, only forty-eight deputies (6.4 percent of 
total) in the Republic had held places of power in the former regime — 
most, in fact, as representatives of the Republican opposition. It was 
only in the Sidonist legislature (1918  – 1919), where the Monarchists 
and Catholics held more than a quarter of the seats in the parliament,5 
that one could observe the return of a signi`cant number of politicians 
from the ousted regime, with the proportion of those who had held 
political of`ces before 1910 reaching 17 percent.
Regardless of the actual extent of the “adhesiveness” of former mon-
archists to the new regime, a phenomenon reported at the time and 
glossed over by contemporary historiography, the truth is that the level 
of renewal of the political elite was indeed profound. Although we do 
not as of yet have a systematic, detailed prosopographic study of the 
deputies of the constitutional monarchy, certain comparisons suggest 
that the wide circulation of the parliamentary elite also had signi`cant 
repercussions in terms of its social pro`le.
The noticeable discontinuity of parliamentary members caused by 
the advent of the Republic in Portugal stands out even more when com-
pared to the impact of regime changes in the circulation of the political 
elite in Germany, where two-`fths of the members of the Constituent 
Assembly in Weimar (1919) had parliamentary experience in the impe-
rial Reichstag,6 and in Spain, where around 12 percent of the legisla-
tors of the Second Republic had held of`ce in the `nal Cortes of the 
Restauración.7
Table 3.1 Legislatures and Number of Deputies 
General Election Year Legislatures Total No. of Deputies
1911 C.A.* + 1st 1911–1915 270
1915 2nd 1915–1917 155
1918 3rd 1918–1919 153
1919 4th 1919–1921 165
1921 5th 1921 157
1922 6th 1922–1925 164
1925 7th 1925–1926 144
Total 1911–1926 751†
*The Constituent Assembly met between June 15 and August 25, 1911.
†Actual number of individuals, independent of accumulated parliamentary seats.
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Socio-Demographic Characteristics 
of the Deputies
If the center of gravity for the social and political support for the First 
Republic was located in the main cities, and the capital in particular, 
most of its “political class,” at the ministerial and parliamentary level, 
was born in the provincial areas of Portugal in small cities, towns, and 
villages. In this period 56.5 percent of the deputies came from these 
areas; if we note that information concerning place of birth is only 
known with regard to 682 deputies, the proportion rises to 62.2 percent.
This dominant pattern of geographical selection became only more 
balanced in the Third Legislature (of Sidónio Pais), which had a greater 
equilibrium of parliamentarians from provincial areas (44.4 percent) 
with those of urban origin (41.8 percent). The cities of Lisbon, Porto, 
and Coimbra supplied the largest number of individuals. A combination 
of two factors may help explain the more urban pro`le of the Sidonist 
deputies: ` rst, coming from a higher social class, and second, as we shall 
see later, having a younger age pro`le.
Examining the speci`c role of the capital, the stronghold of “republi-
canism,” it is interesting to note that members from Lisbon had a more 
signi`cant presence in the parliamentary elite of the monarchy than in 
the First Republic.8 A study of the geographical origins of a sample of 
231 deputies elected between 1851 and 1890 showed a marked over-
representation of those born in the nation’s capital (21.2 percent).9 A 
similar phenomenon occurred in Spain, at least toward the end of the 
Restauración: 24.3 percent of the deputies elected between 1914 and 
1923 came from Madrid.10
Most of the deputies of the First Republic made their parliamentary 
debut when younger than 41 years of age (54.8 percent), with the most 
popular age group being the 31 – 40 category (38.1 percent). The average 
age of newcomers throughout this period was 36.
Diachronic analysis of the data shows that in the period between 
1911 and 1921 more than half of the deputies in each legislature were 
under 41, and these legislatures also recorded the lowest average ages. 
In turn, the last three legislatures (1921 – 1926) showed an aging pro-
`le, as reaected in both the relative prevalence of those in their forties 
and the rise in average age. The Third Legislature (1918  – 1919) was 
clearly the youngest of all, indicating that Sidonism was associated with 
a generational renewal.11 It is noteworthy that one-fourth of the dep-
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uties came from the lowest age group (21  – 30). Conversely, the Fifth 
Legislature — the only one in which the Republican conservatives, then 
grouped into the Liberal Party, were the largest political force — was the 
one with the highest average age (43), showing a greater seniority. If we 
single out the oldest category by including in it those in their sixties and 
in their seventies, the highest percentage for this group (5.9 percent) was 
recorded in the Constituent Assembly.
In average terms, the young ages involved in parliamentary recruit-
ment in the First Republic can be shown more clearly when compared 
to some European examples. At that time, both in the United Kingdom12 
and in the Netherlands,13 the average age of `rst-time deputies was 
around 50. In the Third French Republic the age at which a parliamen-
tary career in the lower chamber was embarked upon was on average 
between 45 and 47.14 In the Dutch case, and indeed as in other coun-
tries,15 the impact of legal restrictions concerning eligibility to stand for 
of`ce should not be forgotten: between 1848 and 1963 a candidate for 
the post of member of parliament had to be at least 30 years of age. But 
in the three examples cited, the decisive factor that explains this delayed 
parliamentary recruitment is the importance that solid experience in the 
institutions of local government had in the political itinerary of those 
aspiring to be deputies. In Portugal — as indeed was the case in Spain — 
to enter parliament was not so much a point of arrival but rather the 
starting point for a political career that could lead to higher positions 
(minister, for example).
Figure 3.1. Average age of the deputies of the First Republic
 Average age of the Deputies  of the First Republic   
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The overwhelming majority of deputies had a high level of educational 
study, as demonstrated by a university, or equivalent, degree. Out of the 
total of 751 deputies, a little over three quarters had carried out uni-
versity-level educational studies, although for a considerable number of 
cases the educational background is unknown. If, as a result, we con-
sider the 637 deputies known to have academic quali`cations, the pro-
portion who had a college degree and/or other higher-educational insti-
tutional quali`cation was around 90 percent. This is a value similar to 
that found in a sample of deputies elected between 1851 and 1890,16 
which suggests that there was a pattern of continuity with regard to 
education of the parliamentary elite in both the monarchist and the 
republican regimes. As far as places of study are concerned, the infor-
mation we have for 471 deputies shows that 60.5 percent attended the 
University of Coimbra, 30.8 percent attended higher educational insti-
tutions in Lisbon (with an emphasis on the military school), and 7.6 
percent attended the same in Porto. There were a further `ve deputies 
(1.1 percent) who had carried out their studies abroad. Although the 
century-long monopoly of the University of Coimbra had been broken 
in 1911 with the establishment of two new university centers, one in the 
capital and the other in Porto, throughout the First Republic the role 
played by either the Faculty of Law at Lisbon or the Technical College 
in the academic training and socialization of the political elite was a sec-
ondary one.
In European parliaments of the time the weighting of university 
graduates varied. In Spain, according to a sample of deputies between 
1914 and 1923, this `gure was almost 90 percent.17 In the Third French 
Republic the prevalence was less pronounced and declined over time 
(81 percent between 1893 and 1919, 70.9 percent between 1919 and 
1940)18; in the Netherlands in the interwar period, the percentage of 
deputies with university studies stabilized at between 40 and 50 per-
cent19; `nally, in Germany, during the sunset of the Weimar Republic, it 
fell to around 30 percent.20
Turning now to the Portuguese case and examining the data regard-
ing the academic area chosen by the deputy with higher educational 
studies, three main areas can be detected, with the traditional and indis-
putable supremacy of legal training and a signi`cant presence concern-
ing military and medical training. In a study sample of 581 deputies, 
41.1 percent had an Ordinary or Honors degree in law, while those 
from the military (21.5 percent) and medical schools (20.5 percent) 
occupied an almost identical relative position.
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The weighting of jurists was greater than two-`fths in each legisla-
ture, with the exception of the Constituent Assembly, where it showed 
its lowest level (31.5 percent); the highest ratio was recorded in the 
Seventh Legislature (50.4 percent). The presence of members of the 
armed forces with higher educational studies remained constant until 
the Third Legislature and then oscillated; the highest parliamentary 
presence of this category occurred during the Sixth Legislature (25.7 
percent) and the lowest in the seventh and `nal legislature (12.4 per-
cent). Graduates in medicine had an unusually high level of involve-
ment (28.8 percent) in the Constituent Assembly/First Legislature, thus 
threatening the traditional hegemony of the jurists, and recorded their 
lowest presence during the Sixth Legislature (12.4 percent).
The academic background framework was not simply and mechani-
cally projected onto the occupational framework of a group (for exam-
ple, there were graduates in law or in medicine who were rural land-
owners and civil servants) but, obviously, there tended to be a strong 
congruence between scholarly path and professional opportunities and 
careers. Not surprisingly, therefore, the legal (lawyers, notaries, and 
judges), military, and medical professions were the principal sources of 
recruitment for deputies for the First Republic.
Over time, the “men of law” — in particular, the lawyers — have been 
ubiquitous in parliamentary life in many countries. Their natural voca-
tion (in terms of their technical competencies, rhetorical abilities, nego-
tiation skills, and availability of time) for political activity, and in par-
ticular to carry out representational and legislative functions, was long 
ago diagnosed by Max Weber and is a subject widely described in the 
literature on elites. In Portugal during the First Republic, the deputies 
originating from the world of the legal professions (in which one could 
also include some professors of law who were eminent lawyers) slightly 
exceeded one-`fth of the total, and only in the Constituent Assembly/
First Legislature and in the Third Legislature (Sidonist) were they not 
the most represented single category. The highest percentage, around 
30 percent, was obtained in the last two legislatures of the Republican 
regime.
The dominance of law professionals, especially lawyers, was much 
more pronounced in the parliaments of other countries. In France, 
between 1885 and 1936, 27 percent of the deputies came from advo-
cacy21; in Spain, they were the professional group most represented in 
parliament, both in the `nal stages of the Restauración22 as well as in 
the Second Republic23 (more than one-third of the deputies); it was the 
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same in Italy, with the percentage in the last two liberal parliaments 
being around 45 percent.24 A contrasting example was provided by the 
Reichstag, in which, as Weber had already noted and recent empiri-
cal studies have con`rmed, “the poor representation of lawyers [. . .] 
was a permanent trait of German political life.”25 Less common on the 
European scene, however, was the number of members of the armed 
forces,26 along with doctors who settled into the Lower Chamber of 
the First Portuguese Republic. The former, irrespective of their branch 
or speciality, made up about 22 percent of the total number of rep-
resentatives, thus being the most numerous professional group in the 
Constituent Assembly/First Legislature and in the Third Legislature 
(Sidonist). However, it was in the Sixth Legislature (1922  – 1925) that 
its percentage was highest (26.2 percent).27 The active role of the mem-
bers of the armed forces, both in parliament and especially in govern-
ment (45 percent of the ministers),28 provides evidence of their close 
involvement in the founding of the Republican regime and the suc-
cessive political crises that shook it. The high number of doctors (and 
some pharmacists) who were deputies, especially between 1911 and 
1918, was a relative national peculiarity in comparison with other 
Western European parliaments, with there being perhaps a parallel 
only in France.29 Though this was not an entirely new phenomenon 
(in 1890, for example, doctors had made up 12.5 percent of the total 
of those elected),30 they reached an unusual number during the initial 
stages of the Republican regime (constituting almost one-`fth of the 
deputies).31 It should also be noted that most doctors were elected on 
the lists of the Democratic Party outside the major urban centers.
With regard to the parliamentary representation of the other profes-
sional groups, we would stress the relative importance of teachers as a 
whole (about 11 percent of all deputies) and the low weighting of the 
civil service, rural landowners, and businessmen (merchants and indus-
trialists). The latter gained a reasonable size (6.3 percent) only in the 
`nal legislature, following the 1925 general election, in which the União 
dos Interesses Económicos carried out their own electoral campaign, 
electing six members. In turn, rural landowners had their greatest par-
liamentary presence (11.1 percent) during the Sidonist legislature.
The overwhelming majority of the deputies of the First Republic 
(approx. 80 percent) made their parliamentary debut without any expe-
rience in other arenas of institutional power. Unlike the situation in 
most other European countries,32 the holding of political of`ce at local 
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and regional levels was not in any way an important requirement in 
the selection and recruitment of parliamentarians. Of the 751 depu-
ties, only a small minority had served in municipalities (7.7 percent) 
or as civil governor (8.3 percent) when `rst taking their seat in the São 
Bento Parliament. In the `nal phase of the Republican regime it is, how-
ever, possible to observe a tendency toward the recovery of this “politi-
cal capital” in the cursus honorum of the parliamentarians, which had 
its highest expression in the `nal legislature, where 19.4 percent of the 
deputies had previously governed a district and 18.1 percent had been 
involved in a municipal governing body.
If it was the case that rare indeed were those who had already been 
in the government when entering the Lower Chamber for the `rst time 
(3.7 percent for the whole period), conversely a parliamentary appren-
ticeship formed part of the career path of most ministers (60 percent),33 
and in particular those who were civilians. It should also be empha-
sized that the proportion of deputies who had had ministerial experi-
ence tended to increase in the postwar period, reaching levels of 21 per-
cent and 26 percent, respectively, in the last two legislatures.
The Constituent Assembly and the Sidonist legislature, both associ-
ated with moments of “rupture” and a profound renewal of parliamen-
tary individuals, were naturally the two lower chambers with represen-
tatives possessing a greater level of political inexperience among their 
members.
The dominant features of parliamentary careers in the First Republic 
were their instability and short duration: almost two-thirds of the depu-
ties were elected for a single term of of`ce. Although some of these later 
joined the Senate, the proportion of members of the bicameral Congress 
who held of`ce for only one elected term, whether as deputy or sena-
tor, totaled 56 percent. Conversely, the “veteran” deputies who served 
three or more terms of of`ce (whether consecutive or not) made up only 
14 percent of the total number of members. This contrasts sharply with 
the pattern of stability observed in the monarchic regime between 1851 
and 1890, when only around one-third of the deputies were elected for 
a single term, with 46 percent being elected three or more times.34 It is 
also noteworthy that during the First Republic no deputy served in all 
seven legislatures.
In a brief international comparison, we can call on two well-doc-
umented examples that illustrate different situations. Thus, in the 
Third French Republic 46 percent of its deputies served only one term 
of of`ce and 33 percent served three or more,35 while in the aeeting 
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Second Spanish Republic just over two-thirds of the deputies (68 per-
cent) served in only one of the three legislatures.36 As Juan Linz has 
emphasized with regard to the Spanish experience, a high level of com-
ing and going of deputies, and — aggravated by the early dissolution of 
parliaments — the instability and brevity of their careers, are factors that 
would have inhibited the institutionalization and professionalization of 
parliamentary functions, thus negatively inauencing the effectiveness of 
the law-making process and the political ability to form stable govern-
ments and coalitions.37 This fact also helps to explain the parliamentary 
and political dynamics of the First Portuguese Republic.
Aside from the Constituent Assembly, the Third Legislature (that 
of Sidónio Pais) had the highest parliamentary turnover; 90.8 per-
cent of the deputies took their seats for the `rst time. In the Fourth 
Legislature the ratio of new deputies was still more than half (55.2 per-
cent). Conversely, the Sixth and Seventh Legislatures had the lowest 
number of deputies making their debut (30.9 percent and 37.8 per-
cent, respectively). Moreover, it should be emphasized that in interwar 
Europe, plagued by social and political upheavals, the circulation of 
parliamentary elites was intense. For example, in France in only one 
legislature was the percentage of deputies entering as newcomers less 
than 40 percent,38 and in the United Kingdom, in the six elections held 
between 1922 and 1935, turnover in the House of Commons averaged 
44 percent.39
During the First Republic parliamentary careers were generally short 
and unstable, but the spatial analysis of political representation of that 
Table 3.8 Length of Parliamentary Careers in the First Republic
No. of Terms 
of Of`ce
In the Lower 
Chamber
In the  
Senate
In  
Congress
No. % No. % No. %
1 488 65.0 205 69.1 520 56.1
2 158 21.0 48 16.2 230 24.8
3 46 6.1 21 7.1 82 8.8
4 35 4.7 9 3.0 52 5.6
5 19 2.5 8 2.7 25 2.7
6 5 0.7 5 1.7 15 1.6
7 0 0.0 0 0.0 4 0.4
Total 751 100.0 296 100.0 928 100.0
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period shows a high degree of stability and solidity with regard to the 
geographical linkage of the deputies.
Firstly, as shown by the data collected for two legislatures, a large 
majority of the members had a connection (for multiple reasons: 
birth, family ties, place of study, and occupation) to the electoral dis-
trict for which they had been elected. Thus, in the Second and Seventh 
Legislatures, they made up two-thirds and three-quarters, respectively, 
of the deputies, with the dominant tie being place of birth. In opposi-
tion to these “sons of the land” there was a large minority, but in appar-
ent decline, of “parachutist” deputies (to use present-day terminology), 
who had no consistent connection linking them to the constituencies to 
which they had been elected. At the time, both in Spain40 as in France,41 
political representation had strong local and regional roots; conversely, 
the United Kingdom, despite the general practice of small single-mem-
ber constituencies, had a low percentage of deputies with a direct link 
to their constituency during this same period (around 30 percent, both 
in 1900 and in 1918).42
Moreover, in the First Republic the spatial mobility in parliamentary 
careers was relatively weak. Of the 262 deputies who were reelected, we 
have complete information for 234: of these, over half (53.8 percent) 
always represented the same constituency and two-`fths (39.7 percent) 
represented two constituencies, generally located in the same regional 
area. True “migrant” deputies, whose parliamentary career did not have 
a stable geographical base, formed a small minority.
Table 3.9  First-Time Deputies per Legislature
Total of First-Time Deputies†
Legislatures Deputies* No. %
C.A. + 1st 270 270 100.0
2nd 155 76 49.0
3rd 153 139 90.8
4th 165 91 55.2
5th 157 70 44.6
6th 165 51 30.9
7th 143 54 37.8
* Total number of elected deputies in each legislature.
† Parliamentary experience during the Monarchy not included.
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In order to analyze the establishment of the Portuguese Republic in 
1910 and its subsequent political trajectories, we must study the rela-
tionship between the Church and the new political regime. Indeed, 
Portugal has been a Catholic country since its foundation in the twelfth 
century. The Republican experience in relation to the Church, moreover, 
represented a third phase of antagonism between the two, after the secu-
lar legislation introduced during the reign of King José I (in the person 
of Marquis de Pombal) and the initial phase of the liberal movement in 
the nineteenth century. A close look at this relationship is further war-
ranted by the fact that the Church (along with the municipalities) is the 
only institution in Portugal to have outlived all the political regimes — 
absolute monarchy, constitutional monarchy, First Republic, Estado 
Novo, and Second Republic. The situation in the Azores is the focus of 
this paper, especially in terms of how the Diocese of Angra adapted to 
the upheaval brought by the First Republic.
Ten years before the establishment of the First Republic on October 
5, 1910, the census of 1900 indicated that 99.8 percent of the Azorean 
population professed the Catholic faith and were under the leadership 
of the Bishop of Angra and the clergy appointed to give spiritual guid-
ance on the nine islands. The three districts of the Azores had a total 
of 314 pastors: Angra averaged one priest per 700 inhabitants, Horta 
one per 603 inhabitants, and Ponta Delgada one per 935. The ecclesias-
tic geography of the archipelago was similar to that of the north of the 
Chapter 4
Politics and the Azorean Church  
under the First Portuguese Republic
Susana Goulart Costa
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mainland, where Braga, for example, had one priest per 425 inhabit-
ants, Bragança one per 653, and Viseu one per 716.1
These `gures indicate how liberal criticism against the Church, 
which had generated the legal framework of the 1830s, had lost much 
of its initial vigor. Indeed, after civil unrest ended and especially with the 
Concordat of 1848, the constitutional monarchy reinforced the alliance 
between the political and religious spheres, while the change from the 
absolutist to the liberal regime was more formal than real.2 The heir to 
the crown, the president, and members of the Assembly and their royal 
counterparts, as well as university students, were all obliged to profess 
the Catholic religion. The faithful were required to marry in the Church 
and divorce was prohibited. Bishops were chosen by the state, had a 
seat in the parliament, and, along with the dioceses, were `nancially 
supported by the national budget. In addition, all ecclesiastic bene`ts 
were assigned by the state and priests were entitled to publicly funded 
retirement.
Given the status of the Church in liberalized Portugal, criticism of the 
clergy declined and organisms that promoted the faith, particularly the 
congregations, were reactivated. After the 1860s, religious orders reap-
peared in the archipelago, as they did in the mainland. By the end of 
the century, however, the movement against congregations was on the 
rise and the Diocese of Angra reacted. In 1907, the Ecclesiastic Bulletin 
of the Azores published Pope Pius X’s encyclical on the errors of the 
modernist doctrines. In 1909, the bishop of Angra, Manuel Damasceno, 
pointed to the dangers of Espiritismo, which led some Azoreans to con-
sult “gyrating tables, the plague imported from America,” and “spirits 
through mediums.”3 In truth, the Church of the Azores acknowledged 
that many members no longer fully identi`ed with Christian dogma, 
while the appearance of new values `lled a void that the Church either 
would not or could not `ll. As Manuel Clemente aptly stated, from 
1820 to 1910 Catholicism in Portugal became more and more a religion 
of the state and less and less a religion of the society.4 On the eve of the 
Republic, therefore, the political situation was particularly noxious for 
the Church. The institutional connection between the Catholic religion 
and the state, which had been fundamental to the survival of the Church 
during the liberal period, was particularly detrimental, as the moribund 
monarchy dragged the Catholic Church down along with itself.
The crippling of the Catholic Church occurred between October 
1910 and April 1911. During this period Republicans expelled reli-
gious orders from Portugal and nationalized their property; in addi-
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tion, they secularized religious holidays; permitted divorce; abolished 
the teaching of Christian doctrine in primary schools; mandated the 
civil registry of births, marriages, and deaths; enforced legislation pro-
hibiting church burials; and banned the wearing of religious vestments 
outside church buildings. This move toward secularization would cul-
minate in legislation, passed on April 20, 1911, mandating the separa-
tion of church and state; Catholicism ceased to be the religion of the 
state, religious freedom was guaranteed to all, and other religions were 
accepted in Portugal. This law went further, however. The administra-
tion of churches and chapels, once under local parishes, became depen-
dent on Cultuais, lay associations without members of the Church that 
oversaw all religious services and property. Bishops and priests were 
no longer dependent on the state for their upkeep but relied directly 
upon the generosity of the faithful, although the Republic was willing to 
award a lifelong pension to all clergy who submitted a written request. 
This would lead to a breach between priests receiving pensions, who 
sympathized with the Republican regime, and more traditional clergy, 
who remained faithful to the monarchy.5
The `rst formal reaction of the Diocese of Angra occurred about a 
year and a half after the Republic had been established. This delay was 
not due to the lack of a bishop, for the diocese was under the compe-
tent leadership of Canon António Maria Ferreira. Indeed, José Augusto 
Pereira attributed this “religious phobia,” which was particularly felt in 
Terceira, to the strong attachment this island had to the liberal cause, to 
the fact that Angra was the seat of the Bishopric, and to the hostilities 
against the congregations that pitted religious agents against the laity.
From the spring of 1911 to 1915, the Azorean diocese launched a 
strong attack against the young Republic. On May 15, 1911, one month 
after the law of separation, the clergy of Angra and the educators of the 
Angra Seminary drafted a protest against the April 20 law, which they 
considered “offensive to the rights of the Church and the freedom of 
Catholics.”6 The following months led to the support of the clergy in 
São Miguel, Faial, Pico, São Jorge, Santa Maria, Graciosa, Flores, and 
Corvo.7 In sum, 297 priests signed the motion, which corresponded to 
94.5 percent of the islands’ clergy.
The enforcement of the law of separation after July 1, 1911, brought 
renewed protests from the diocese, namely because the newly cre-
ated local commissions of Church property began to take inventory 
of the holdings. Furthermore, the Cultuais began to appear in Terceira 
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(Serreta, Raminho, and Angra).8 On July 11, Canon António Maria 
Ferreira directed a complaint to the president of the Angra Commission9 
protesting against the con`scation of the Seminary and the bishop’s of`-
cial residence; although the bishop did not live there, it was the eccle-
siastic headquarters.10 Despite this protest, the Seminary and of`cial 
residence came under state jurisdiction and an inventory of Church 
property began in the summer of 1911. Letters and telegrams attest 
to the involvement of civil authorities in this dispute, both regionally 
(governor and municipal administrators) and nationally (Minister of 
Justice), a clear illustration that opposition to the Church was, indeed, 
one of the pillars of the new regime. The persistent con`scation of reli-
gious property and collection of “mandatory” pensions11 amounted to 
a Republican strategy to weaken the Church `nancially, thereby forcing 
it to accept the bene`ts offered by Republican legislation.12
Financially speaking, the law of separation meant that, for the 
`rst time since 1534, the Diocese of Angra was no longer economi-
cally dependent on the political power.13 As a result, in 1912 the newly 
elected vicar, Dean José dos Reis Fisher,14 organized a Diocesan Council 
to Aid Worship and Clergy in order to guarantee the livelihood of the 
Church in the Azores through the monetary and food donations of the 
faithful.15 Similar to the rest of the country, this measure was meant not 
only to maintain religious services, but also to guarantee the livelihood 
of priests without pensions and of diocesan agents through the applica-
tion of 10 percent of the donations of the community’s Catholics.
Popular criticism and support of Republican measures were divulged 
in the press. When, three months after the Fifth of October, a speech 
against the monarchy caused turmoil in the town of Ribeira Grande, 
a local newspaper justi`ed the unrest by af`rming that, although the 
townspeople accepted the new regime, they would not allow “ill to 
be spoken of the monarchy.”16 Innovations in the religious realm were 
part of the debate, obviously. When, on April 1, 1911, a procession `led 
in an orderly manner through the streets of Ponta Delgada, the same 
paper, Açoriano Oriental, deemed this popular manifestation to be “a 
formal affront to those who alleged that religious faith was waning.”17 
When the governor of the district of Ponta Delgada asked the govern-
ment to clarify its position in terms of religious manifestations in pub-
lic, the response was that these were authorized as long as public order 
was maintained. For conservatives, the problem was exactly the oppo-
site: public disorder would result if traditional processions were not 
held.18
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Many other matters related to the new regime shook local society. 
Legislation permitting divorce, for example, was especially attacked by 
the traditional press. This is apparent when the Açoriano Oriental of 
February 11, 1911, lamented the position taken by Teó`lo Braga — who, 
as a philosopher, had criticized divorce but, as a politician, had legal-
ized it — and questioned how “the two Teó`los” could live together.”19 
Ecclesiastic dress, which the Church had required in religious and civil 
contexts over the centuries, was another bone of contention. On July 1, 
1911, the women of the village of Santa Bárbara, Terceira, prevented 
the priest from going outside without wearing his religious garb, which 
prompted the civil authorities to intervene and take the cleric prisoner.20 
In September of that same year, the governor of Angra asked the vicar 
general to take action against priests who continued to appear in public 
wearing their cassock, a clear breach of the Law of Separation.21
Church bells, symbols of the secular power of Catholicism, also gen-
erated conaict. As tension mounted, in São Miguel, for example, the 
administrator of Vila Franca do Campo ordered that local church bells 
were to be painted green and their clappers painted red, which caused a 
general uproar.22 Meanwhile, during a funeral that took place on June 
9, 1911, in Ribeirinha, Terceira, the women, outraged with the absence 
of the “death knell,” leveled the church doors and proceeded to toll the 
bells themselves.23
Meanwhile, in the village of Topo, São Jorge, a priest who supported 
the monarchy was prevented from assuming his new of`ce, while in 
Urzelina hostility toward the pastor led to his imprisonment. In the vil-
lage of Achadinha, São Miguel, the priest was accused of wrongdoing 
and sent to Lisbon for trial. In Feteira, Faial, the vicar was found guilty 
of promoting episcopal resistance and was forced to pay a ` ne. Whether 
strange or isolated, these situations illustrate the convulsions brought by 
the Republic. The social environment was volatile, the relative inauence 
of public `gures and popular forces varied, and Freemasonry had a role 
that must not be neglected.24
In 1913, after two tumultuous years, political and religious agitation 
subsided and the Church fared well. Despite the weakened position of 
the clergy, the division of the diocese between Terceira and São Miguel, 
and the deactivation of the seminary, the Catholic Church in the Azores 
had endured. In 1915 there were only `ve Cultuais, some of which 
lasted a mere two or three months, all located in the district of Angra.25 
That same year, the inventory of church property had been concluded 
in only the forty parishes of the district of Horta (similar to the situa-
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tion in Castelo Branco, Guarda, and Leiria in the mainland). The pro-
cess was slow in the other two districts of the Azores, where only seven 
of Angra’s forty-one parishes and four of Horta’s forty-`ve parishes had 
been completed.26 Similarly, the Civil Registry Association in the archi-
pelago had one member in São Miguel and one in Terceira, while in 
Funchal, Madeira, there were thirty-six. In other parts of the country, 
however, the Association had equally weak adherence.27 Still, the situa-
tion in the Diocese of Angra was paradoxical: while the establishment 
of the Republic was commemorated in 1911, 1912, and 1913, and the 
faithful were urged to consult foreign mediums for their horoscopes, 
religious processions were held annually, as if the Fifth of October of 
1910 had never happened.
The outbreak of World War I helped revitalize the Church in Portugal. 
The government decision to mobilize priests who were less than forty 
years of age, along with their military inspection in the summer of 1917 
as Portugal entered the conaict, lent an aura of victimization to the 
clergy. Some Azorean priests left to attend military school in Lisbon, 
while others awaited inspection or transport to the mainland. Although 
the end of the war in 1918 prevented Azorean clergy from participating 
in combat, the involvement of priests from the mainland as chaplains 
was bene`cial to the Church. These would play a role in the establish-
ment of the military dictatorship in 1926.28
The government of Sidónio Pais contributed to the renewal of the 
Church after 1918. The decree of February 23, 1918, impeded the insti-
tutionalization of other Cultuais and allowed for the participation of 
the clergy in administration activities, returned the seminaries con`s-
cated in 1911 to the Church, and authorized the teaching of theology. 
The clergy assumed renewed importance in religious activities, although 
their political inauence remained reduced.
The reinforcement of the connections between Church and state, 
which was particularly evident during the Pimentismo and Sidonismo 
periods, corroborates the fact that, as the Catholic hierarchy was forced 
to adapt to the Republican regime, the Church proved to be agile rather 
than immobile. In the Azores, this became especially evident after 1915, 
when the Catholic Union movement was promoted by Bishop Manuel 
Damasceno da Costa (1915 – 1922),29 who urged the clergy to perform 
pastoral service according to the “Social Question” outlined in the 
Rerum Novarum of Pope Leo XIII.30 Bishop Manuel wrote that “the 
social, religious, economic, and political phenomenon we observe all 
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around cannot be resolved by a clergy that is either totally unaware or 
only super`cially aware of the social question.”31 He went on to say 
that this task was not meant only for clerics, but that the participation 
of the laity was the basis of social regeneration. Clearly, this is a call for 
a lay apostolate, a pillar of Catholicism since the middle of the nine-
teenth century.
As noted, the message transmitted by the religious hierarchy deemed 
the time to be one of social decadence. The dif`culties posed by the war 
and its aftermath were felt by all (as the increase in Azorean emigra-
tion corroborated),32 including the clergy. Because monetary devalua-
tion and inaation were recurrent during the 1920s, the Diocese had to 
augment its support of Azorean churches.33 Bishop Manuel observed 
in 1919 that, with the end of the struggle in Europe, another war had 
begun, as the Church was pitted against “money and pleasure,” the only 
ideals of the time.34
In 1923, Dean José dos Reis Fisher contributed to the negative 
appraisal of Azorean society, referring to dif`culties in implementing 
a Christian revival and insisting upon the idea that, although the First 
World War had ended `ve years earlier, “the desired peace” had not yet 
arrived. He named two causes: `rst, the proliferation of modern ills 
(unbridled luxury, greed, female depravity, the horror of work . . . ) and, 
second, pride and lack of humility. He went on to criticize contempo-
rary behavior, saying that “no one wants to obey and everyone wants to 
be in charge,” and that all want to defend their “alleged rights” through 
protests and strikes.35 According to this diocesan `gure, “the fraudulent 
equality toted by Liberalism is no more than an unattainable utopia. 
That which characterizes the Universe is not equality, but inequality. No 
two men are equal.”36
Given their appraisal of contemporary society, diocesan authorities 
not only diagnosed the situation but also proposed the remedy, which 
was based on the Catholic Action movement, a single spiritual organ-
ism composed of various bodies. To perform its mission of caring for 
the well-being of Catholicism, this movement relied upon Brotherhoods 
of the Holy Sacrament, the Prayer Apostolate, the Daughters of Mary 
Congregation, the Christian Doctrine Congregation, the Saint Vincent 
de Paul Society, other orders, youth associations, parochial schools, 
study groups, unions, cooperatives, and mutual aid societies.
Along with the Catholic Action movement, the Angra diocese focused 
on promoting the rights of full citizenship (for those who were eligible), 
as it called attention to the political duties of Catholics. This was politi-
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cal pedagogy calling for Catholic action or, better still, it was Catholic 
pedagogy calling for political action. In July of 1917, the Portuguese 
episcopate decreed that political participation was one of the social 
obligations of Catholics. Many Azorean Republicans, however, looked 
askance at the interference of the Church in political matters. The more 
radical sectors felt that the Church should be restricted to spiritual, 
liturgical, and ritual matters, as advocated in 1910 and 1911.37 The 
breakdown of the Republican Party and the situation of Portugal, how-
ever, had allowed the Church to reenter the political arena.
This was the context when, in March 1918, Bishop Manuel Damasceno 
sent a pastoral letter entitled Catholic and Social Organization: A Civic 
Obligation, where he expounded on the political duties of Catholics 
and expressed approval of their having begun to break though “the 
apathy where they had been hiding.” Catholics who were registered to 
vote, therefore, should not only vote but also “vote well.” The appoint-
ment of Bishop António Augusto de Castro Meireles (1924  – 1928) was 
a clear indication that the Azores were included in the national project 
to revive Catholicism. Having been the prime deputy of the Catholic 
Center, once in the archipelago, Bishop António created a diocesan com-
mission of the Portuguese Catholic Center in Angra in 1925.38 The `rst 
objective of the new bishop was to achieve a trustworthy political rep-
resentation in the 1925 elections.39 Clearly, the ecclesiastic hierarchy did 
not long for the return of the monarchy, but accepted the Republic and 
utilized every opportunity made available by the regime. On the eve of 
the 1925 elections, for example, the “good” candidates were defended 
thus: “Because all the candidates are Republicans, all defend the same 
ideal and deserve to have a seat in Parliament.”40
Not many Azoreans adhered to the Catholic Center, however. In fact, 
Catholics did not constitute a homogeneous group, but tended to sepa-
rate into two large and increasingly disparate tendencies. The distance 
between the two became especially notorious after the second national 
congress of the Portuguese Catholic Center in 1922, when the words 
spoken by Oliveira Salazar already expressed the political ideology of 
the future dictator. On the one hand were those who saw political activ-
ity as a means of defending the interests of the Church and Catholicism 
and considered the political regime secondary, as long as the fundamen-
tal principles of morality and honesty were defended. Opposed to these 
were the Catholics who thought the monarchy was the best regime to 
uphold the interests of the Church and, consequently, wanted nothing 
to do with the republican regime.41 In reality, the issue was not that a 
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Catholic had to defend the monarchy, but just the opposite: a supporter 
of the monarchy had to be a Catholic.
These two currents would fade after the military coup of 1926. The 
Estado Novo regime, formally instituted by the Constitution of 1933, 
and the increasing impact of Oliveira Salazar, who was deeply con-
nected to the Church and the Catholic Action movement, would prompt 
the Church in the Azores to react in other ways.
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The historiography of the `rst Portuguese Republic (1910 – 1926) has 
undergone a fascinating renaissance since the 1974 – 1975 Revolution. 
Not only has there been a good deal of new historical research on 
“The Republic,” but there has been important, new historical analysis 
with substantive answers for many key historical problems of the First 
Republic. It is an interesting rebirth, too, since the roots of this changing 
historiography actually precede the Carnations Revolution and since 
not all the historical puzzles have been pieced together. If the quality 
of the work varies, in general a good portion of the historical research 
published has been more professional than much of the work before the 
late 1960s.
As Richard Robinson aptly suggested in a 1994 review article, how-
ever, one key element of this new research preceded the political changes 
of 1974  – 1975 and came during the Caetanato, 1968  – 1974, when 
Portugal was directed if not ruled by Dr. Salazar’s successor, Dr. Marcelo 
Caetano (1906 – 1974). After forty years of a polarized, politicized, and 
largely amateurish journalism and historiography on the First Republic, 
the pioneering historical analysis of Professor A. H. de Oliveira Marques 
set the stage for a fresh, more professional, more objective interpreta-
tion of the Republic’s disputed history. Though a medievalist by train-
ing who was born in the early 1930s, after the Estado Novo was estab-
lished, Oliveira Marques, in important books, articles, and reviews after 
1968, helped rescue the historiography of the First Republic from both 
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neglect as well as extremist schools of thought. He argued it was the 
duty of historians to attempt to be objective, to use rational analysis 
supported by a variety of valid evidence. In the resulting polarized his-
toriography, most ideologues found nothing to admire in Portugal’s ` rst 
genuine effort to establish a more open society and a version of democ-
racy. During the dictatorship, publications on the First Republic served 
not as scholarship but largely as either a reaection of the dictates of the 
Estado Novo or as muted, symbolic opposition to that authoritarian 
regime. Until the late 1960s the most complete study of the history of 
the Republic was not by a Portuguese but by a Spanish writer, whose 
1940s account was later translated into Portuguese. Jesus Pabón’s book, 
A Revolução Portuguesa, was little more than a list of catastrophic 
events, sad trends, and incompetent or malevolent leaders.1 Certainly 
the raw statistics of the Republic’s travails could not be ignored, even by 
former Republican stalwarts. One celebrated Portuguese poet, Guerra 
Junqueira, described that Republic as a “heroic march to the sewer.” 
Not to be outdone, another writer claimed the Republic was merely “a 
bacchanalia of bedbugs in a rotten mattress.”
The Contributions of A. H. de Oliveira Marques 
to Historiography of 1910  –  1926
Oliveira Marques’s analysis and interpretation of this subject inau-
enced several generations of students, faculty, and readers, begin-
ning especially with his pioneering short survey, A Primeira República 
Portuguesa: Alguns aspectos estruturais.2 On a personal note, when 
that Portuguese historian’s pathbreaking book was published in 1971, I 
was just embarking on my study of the history of Portugal’s `rst genu-
ine attempt at democracy, the First Republic, and I recall how Oliveira 
Marques’s brief book provided much encouragement to me as a nov-
ice scholar in this `eld. His work provided both new material and a 
new interpretation of the Republic. In a `eld of history that had been 
neglected or manipulated, this 1971 volume generated new interest in 
the 1910 – 1926 period and encouraged other scholars to enter the `eld. 
Open debate on this subject, like many others, had been directly or indi-
rectly discouraged and even penalized by the censorship system as well 
as by the rigid educational curricula enforced by the Estado Novo dic-
tatorship for more than forty years. Oliveira Marques’s work was both 
a resource and a catalyst of debate on the First Republic during the last 
phase of the dictatorship.
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The historiography in Portugal of the First Republic, or what passed 
for it, was until the late 1960s characterized by extremes. In terms of the 
quantity of works available, it was either feast or famine. Few scholars 
tackled the still largely taboo topic, and most of the writing on it was by 
amateurs, including journalists, who had ideological agendas, or of`cial 
“historians” of the dictatorship who either set or followed the regime’s 
ideological biases regarding the disputed Republic’s history. On the left, 
a handful of Marxist-Leninist ideologues viewed the Republic as sim-
ply a conspiracy of the upper and middle classes against the working 
classes. Their analysis of the hapless Republic was set in a rigid frame-
work of class struggle, and they faulted Republican leaders in social and 
economic policies for doing too little and too late to relieve the strug-
gle of the working classes. On the political right, monarchists, integral-
ists, nationalists, fascists, and pseudo-fascists berated the Republic and 
its discredited leaders both for destroying the country’s economy and 
`nances and for being followers of degenerate ideas derived from the 
terrible French Revolution, Masonry, and democratic liberalism. They 
viewed the Republic as the epitomy of disorder and the cause of nearly 
losing Portugal’s overseas empire in Africa and Asia. For religious and 
moral reasons, Catholic writers denigrated the Republic’s harsh anticler-
ical laws and actions against the Church and saw the Republic as sim-
ply an anticlerical conspiracy that by 1917 had come close to destroy-
ing the Catholic Church. Estado Novo ideologues, such as João Ameal, 
branded “the Republic” — to number it would be lending it too much 
respectability — simply a conspiracy of the worst elements of Portuguese 
society, the Masons, radical sailors, and street mobs.3
Under the Estado Novo dictatorship’s educational system, the history 
of the First Republic had no place in school or university curricula, and 
any of`cial reference to the Republic’s past demonized the Republican 
as well as the late constitutional monarchy’s politicians. A major thesis 
of the Salazarist regime was that the post-1926 ditadura saved Portugal 
from the dastardly “demo-liberal” Republic and that the dictatorship 
dominated by Salazar was a providential but rational response to the 
Republican catastrophe. That tragic experience, the thesis suggested, 
brought only disorder to the Portuguese, a people whose national char-
acter, tradition, and pre-1910 history were ill-suited to the imported 
ideas of individualism, democracy, and liberalism but were well-suited 
to “organic democracy,” which featured authoritarian rule.
New directions in the Republic’s historiography began before the 
Carnations Revolution of 1974  – 1975. They appeared toward the end 
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of the last phase of the Estado Novo dictatorship, the years 1968 to 
1974, when Professor Marcelo Caetano (1906  – 1980), like Salazar a 
career university academic, was prime minister. During the so-called 
Caetanato there was a certain relaxation of the control of discussion 
and discourse, of the censorship of media and books. In Lisbon, for 
example, many bookstores now carried elements of Marxist-Leninist 
literature, as long as this material did not discuss Portuguese politics. 
Of particular note was the publication of the four-volume Dicionário 
de História de Portugal, edited by the career historian and professor 
Dr. Joel Serrão.4 While this work covered all of Portuguese history, it 
signi`cantly included fresh, objective entries on the history of the First 
Republic.
One of the contributors on medieval Portugal was António Henriques 
de Oliveira Marques (1933 – 2007), who soon turned his attention to the 
history of the First Republic, when he was abroad teaching Portuguese 
history in the United States and after his return to Portugal follow-
ing the replacement of Salazar by Caetano. A career historian, a gradu-
ate student primarily in medieval history at the University of Lisbon, 
Oliveira Marques, whatever his early specialization, became the prin-
cipal historian of the First Republic during the remainder of his long 
academic career. His contribution was to encourage teaching and 
research about the years 1910 to 1926 and to take an objective, ratio-
nal approach, in the style of the French Annales school. In journal arti-
cles in the late 1960s and in the key monograph of 1971, cited above, 
Oliveira Marques presented a concise, factual account of all aspects of 
the Republic’s history, a narrative that emphasized social and economic 
history without neglecting the demographic, cultural, and political his-
tory of both Portugal and its empire.
As Oliveira Marques recorded in the preface of the second edition 
(1975) of his A Primeira República Portuguesa, when his `rst edition 
appeared in 1971 it was attacked by ideologues on both the left and the 
right. His explanation for such attacks was as disarmingly simple, forth-
right, and clear as was his stated philosophy of writing the 1971 clas-
sic: surrounded by a rising sea of revolutionary and counterrevolution-
ary rhetoric, his book featured “impartiality,” a virtue all too rare in the 
guerras historiográ+cas of Portugal.
His 1971 monograph was followed in 1972 and 1973 by his mag-
isterial general study, História de Portugal, and by a number of mono-
graphs, biographies, and collections of documents on the First Republic’s 
history. This work contained three themes: what the First Republic was 
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and was not; why it failed to accomplish early goals and to survive as 
a system; and which facets of the history of the Republic still required 
much more research. His writings on the once-forbidden topic inau-
enced generations of history students and teachers alike.
After the golpe of April 25, 1974, and the subsequent Revolution, the 
system of censorship and repression was ended and new generations of 
historians now in a functioning democracy had the academic freedom 
to choose many previously taboo topics. Studying the Republic’s past 
was no longer simply a symbolic act of de`ance of the dictatorship, but 
an attempt to rescue the Republic’s contested historiography from the 
amateurs, the ideologues, and the propagandists so as to write truly pro-
fessional studies.
The new cohorts, for the most part born in the 1940s, 1950s, and 
1960s, included scholars such as César Oliveira, Vasco Pulido Valente, 
Manuel Villaverde Cabral, Maria Filomena Mónica, Aniceto Afonso, 
José Medeiros Ferreira, Miriam Halpern Pereira, José Pacheco Pereira, 
Maria Carrilho, Jaime Reis, António Costa Pinto, Nuno Severiano 
Teixeira, Antonio José Telo, Pedro Tavares de Almeida, Rui Ramos, 
Fernando Rosas, Maria Fernanda Rollo, João Bonifácio Serra, David 
Pereira, Vítor Neto, Pedro Lains, Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses, Maria Alice 
Samara, Luís Farinha, Ernesto Castro Leal, Ana Catarina, Sílvia Correia, 
Ana Paula Pires, Joana Dias Pereira, Isabel Pestana Marques, Maria 
Cândida Proença, Maria Eugénia Mata, and António Reis. Foreign 
scholars on the subject include Kathleen Schwartzman, Richard A. H. 
Robinson, J. Derou, Horst Bahro, Stewart Lloyd-Jones, Hipolito de la 
Torre Gomez, and Douglas Wheeler.
Post-1974  –  1975 Historiography of the First 
Republic (1910  –  1926): General Trends
A brief survey of some fundamental facts about Portugal’s First Republic 
will serve as introduction to a survey of post-1974 historiography. As 
Portugal now celebrates the hundredth anniversary of the historic event 
of October 5, 1910, when the Bragança monarchy was overthrown 
and the Republic founded, a perspective on its signi`cance in Europe 
is appropriate. Portugal’s was only the third republic in a Europe still 
dominated by monarchies, preceded only by republics in Switzerland 
and France.
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The new, untried Republic inherited a truly deadly legacy from the 
late monarchy headed by the young King Manuel II: widespread, deep 
poverty; a population largely made up of illiterate, rural peasants; a 
population with 79 percent illiteracy; a very backward agrarian econ-
omy with only a slight industrial element; large internal and external 
(foreign) debts and a history of recent bankruptcies; increasing pub-
lic violence in late monarchy politics; government instability; and an 
inert bureaucracy. For two decades before the 1910 revolution had been 
the so-called Republican Propaganda era, when a growing number of 
Republicans railed against the troubled monarchy and promised that a 
republic would feature universal male franchise, full civil and political 
rights, the legalization of trade unions and the right to strike, and an end 
to government corruption.
The Republican leadership that emerged after October 5, 1910, 
promised much but could deliver relatively little. With the exception 
of some reduction in the national illiteracy rate, educational reforms, 
a reform and build-up of a declining navy, and some progress in agri-
culture, administration, and education in the colonies, the Republic’s 
reform schemes largely existed only on paper, despite a plethora of laws 
and statutes passed by this ineffective parliament. (I will discuss this 
more later on.) The hysterical euphoria following October 5, 1910, espe-
cially in Lisbon and the few large towns, quickly dissipated. The hopes 
for radical change of initially Republican groups — primarily the urban 
lower-middle and intermediate-middle classes and elements of the still 
small but growing working classes — were not ful`lled. (Republicanism 
had never been strong in the agrarian rural areas of much of the coun-
try’s interior.) The era did see some advances; citizens who cared to par-
ticipate enjoyed a larger measure of the freedoms of speech, the press, 
and assembly than had been the case before 1910. But Republican poli-
ticians’ windy promises of an expansion of male suffrage were not kept 
and, despite the formal legalization of unions and the right to strike, 
most workers suffered from worsening economic conditions, as well as 
repressive management practices and police action.
By the 1920s, this troubled Republic had become Western Europe’s 
most unstable parliamentary regime, as chaotic and discredited as 
the besieged monarchy in Spain and the ill-fated Weimar Republic in 
Germany. The average life of a government in republican Portugal was 
but four months. There were frequent military golpes and attempts at 
insurrection and increasing public violence — including riots, bomb-
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ings, and assassinations — against a backdrop of disastrous economic 
and `nancial conditions. The reputation of this bizarre Republic had 
become a sick political joke, to the extent that the French coined a new 
word: portugaliser, “to bring political chaos to any situation.” Portugal’s 
national image had reached its lowest point. On May 28, 1926, a golpe 
supported by much of the career army and navy of`cer corps over-
threw the parliamentary Republic and installed a military dictatorship, 
founded in part to repair the tattered national image. The dictatorship 
of 1926 to 1933 metamorphosed into the civilian-dominated Estado 
Novo (“The New State”), controlled by a former university professor of 
economics and `nance, Dr. António de Oliveira Salazar, who was prime 
minister from 1932 to 1968.
Until the scholarly publications of Oliveira Marques and Joel Serrão 
and of Vasco Pulido Valente in 1974 – 1975  — when Valente published 
the useful book O Poder e o Povo,5 an edited version of his Oxford 
University doctoral dissertation on the origins and early years of the 
Republic — there had been a dearth of serious work on the Republic. 
But in the 1980s, 1990s, and in the `rst decade of the twenty-`rst cen-
tury, scores of scholars in Portugal published their master’s theses and 
doctoral dissertations or other research, and the historiographical scene 
began to look quite different. The sources they utilized, too, reaected a 
revolution: instead of using only printed works scholars now drew on 
government records archives, mainly but not exclusively in the Torre 
do Tombo National Archives (ANTT), the military archives (Arquivo 
Historico Militar — AHM), and the Foreign Ministry archives and 
library (Biblioteca e Arquivo do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros — 
BAMNE). Rules and regulations in such archives, too, were liberalized, 
and more records were catalogued, declassi`ed, and made accessible to 
the public.
A second trend of the new historiography of the First Republic 
was an expanded scope of interest. Though some estudiosos were still 
guided by the Annales school of history from north of the Pyrenees, 
many now pursued a more eclectic selection of topics. Using municipal 
records, scholars carried out studies of events of the Republic in certain 
villages and towns. Others produced detailed works on diplomatic, mil-
itary, political-ideological, social, economic and `nancial, cultural, and 
colonial history.
But the fact that substantial research and publication carried out 
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since the revolution had produced an accurate, detailed portrait of the 
Republic did not solve all the contentious problems of the Republic’s 
history. I list here several thorny analytical issues. In the years imme-
diately preceding the Fifth of October 1910 there remained questions 
regarding the regicide’s authors and sponsors, as well as the fact that 
no of`cial report on the tragedy was ever completed. The signi`cance 
of the regicide in the decline of the monarchy and the coming of the 
First Republic was also an issue. Especially disputed has been the con-
troversy over the relative importance of the religious question in under-
mining the Republic — not to mention the not unrelated social question. 
Historians still need to study not only the extent to which Republican 
leaders held reformist ideas to address the country’s severe economic 
and `nancial problems, many inherited from a failing monarchy, but 
also `nd a credible explanation of why promised reforms did not take 
place by 1926. And historians will again debate the extent to which the 
Salazarist regime itself lacked original reform ideas and instead merely 
adapted certain Republican ones.
An additional dispute concerned the rationale behind Portugal’s deci-
sion in 1916, in World War I, to join the Entente or Allied powers and 
to intervene directly in the European theater `ghting. We have also not 
yet fully explored vigilantism under the Republic, what historian Vasco 
Pulido Valente described as the Republican “terror.” And how impor-
tant was local bossism (caciquismo) in manipulating the relatively large 
number of elections during this era? This calls into question the extent 
to which the Republic’s elections were free, honest exercises. To these 
should be added a consideration Oliveira Marques addressed in his pro-
li`c writings: whether the First Republic was the end of a political pro-
cess that began with 1820s constitutional liberalismo, or was it rather 
the beginning of something new, a premature conaicted Portuguese ver-
sion of a new mass democracy. And, `nally, we lack a de`nitive study of 
the complex history of the various factional conspiracies in May 1926 
to overthrow the Republican regime.
To follow I expand upon three of these still-controversial quandaries, 
crediting scholars who have added to each history: the 1908 regicide; 
the Republic’s abortive efforts to reform the economy and `nances; and 
the actual motives behind Portugal’s disputed intervention in World War 
I on the Allied side.
First, the case of the regicide of 1908. On February `rst, in the 
Terreiro do Paço (now Praça do Comércio), both the reigning King 
Carlos I and his heir apparent, Prince Luís, were murdered in broad 
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daylight by Republican assassins. Several curious facts about the after-
math of the tragedy only add to the mysterious, troubled political 
aura of that time. Instead of a normal, public reaction to the tragedy, 
wherein the party in of`ce would bene`t from a wave of natural sym-
pathy after the outrage, the party was shunned, blamed, and turned 
out. Further there followed a public cult of reverence for the assassins, 
complete with pilgrimages to their graves in Lisbon. Though questions 
remain about this seminal episode, recent research by Rui Ramos has 
cleared away some of the mythology surrounding the event and has 
demonstrated that prominent members of the Republican leadership 
were more implicated in the murder conspiracy than was previously 
known.6
Secondly, the heated question of the failure of the Republic to carry 
out viable economic and `nancial reforms. A deadly legacy of the late 
monarchy was heavy internal and external (foreign) debt, an unbal-
anced budget, and a weak industrial sector and chronically weak agrar-
ian sector. In an attempt to address these issues, in May 1911 the young 
Republic passed a legislative package of economic reforms, but this 
remained largely on paper only. Its execution was postponed for a num-
ber of reasons, including government instability and administrative 
chaos as well as the impact of World War I and Portugal’s later partici-
pation (1916  – 1918). It was not until 1922 that the reform measures 
concerning balancing the budget, consolidating the serious debts, and 
devaluating the currency were even addressed, but there was little time 
or opportunity to fully act on them until after the military overthrew 
the republican regime on May 28, 1926. When by 1931 the subsequent 
dictatorship tackled these issues, the basic measures they took were not 
reforms as such, but merely adaptations masterminded by Professor 
António de Oliveira Salazar, the dictator/prime minister from 1932 
to 1968. Substantial clari`cation of this complex question has come 
from the research of Professor Maria Fernanda Rollo, who utilized gov-
ernment records as well as publications of the leading economists and 
`nancial experts of the day.7
And what of the government’s motives behind Portugal’s intervention 
in World War I on the Allied side? Signi`cant, pathbreaking research 
on this topic has been done by several Portuguese scholars, including 
Nuno Severiano Teixeira and Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses.8 Recent work 
by Dr. Teixeira — who has also served in several high-level government 
posts, including as minister of defense in the prime minister’s cabinet — 
produced a full, credible explanation of the Democrats’ rationale for 
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Portugal entering into combat in the European theater. According to 
Teixeira, there were three principal motives for Portugal’s foreign policy 
decision in 1916 to join the Allies against the Central Powers. The `rst 
was the colonial question: safeguarding Portugal’s overseas colonies 
following German-armed attacks on Angola and Mozambique. These 
resulted from notorious Anglo-German diplomatic agreements to parti-
tion Portugal’s African colonies when Portugal was unable to meet all 
foreign loan payments. Lisbon also had great concern about Portugal’s 
negative international image in Europe, as highlighted by bad British 
press regarding Portugal’s colonial scandals, such as continuing African 
forced labor and other abuses.
The second motive was the so-called peninsular European thesis 
or motive, which affected an important faction of the Democrats (the 
Portuguese Republican Party or PRP). Because of both real and appar-
ent threats against Portugal’s national sovereignty from neighboring, 
larger Spain, Portugal’s leading politicians were determined to secure 
a more respected place for Portugal in Europe and to neutralize the 
Spanish threat of invasion or annexation. And the third main motive for 
entering the war: consolidation of the Portuguese Republic, the objec-
tive of elements of the Democratic party led by Afonso Costa. Britain 
pressured Portugal in February 1916 to con`scate all German shipping 
in Portugal’s neutral ports, thereby triggering a German declaration of 
war against Portugal. In response Portugal’s troubled Republic could 
then both bolster national legitimacy and gain foreign support by join-
ing the Allies, which notably included the French Republic, a kind of 
political model for the Portuguese Republic’s elite. Teixeira’s fully doc-
umented interpretation of this important foreign policy question, like 
much in any historiography, is disputable and, depending on the discov-
ery someday of new evidence, could be revised.
Conclusion and Epilogue
Although today the long, bitter war of words between monarchists and 
republicans in Portugal is largely a thing of the past, in 2008, on the 
occasion of the one-hundredth anniversary of the 1908 regicide, several 
publications by declared monarchists — including books, articles, and 
other media — generated some heated public discussions. Again a few 
writers demonized the Republic and defended the monarchy, and some 
of the arguments seemed to echo familiar propaganda of the Estado 
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Novo era. Such views aroused further debate in the run-up to the 2010 
commemorations of the founding of the First Republic.9
As for speculation as to how the historiography of the First Republic 
will develop in the future, undoubtedly the topic will continue to fasci-
nate historians despite the fact that “the question of the regime,” that is, 
whether Portugal will be a republic or a monarchy, is no longer a real-
istic political issue. In terms of the immediacy of historical precedent, 
unlike the case during 1926 to 1974, the First Republic is not the prede-
cessor of the current system — the long-lasting Estado Novo is. Therefore 
the question of the First Republic is a more remote topic for current gen-
erations. But since “History” is an unending debate about notable ques-
tions, and since all the mysteries of the First Republic have not yet been 
solved, as long as there are historians and history students in what is 
now, in effect, the third Portuguese Republic, there will be debates about 
that sixteen-year episode in contemporary Portuguese history.
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On April 25, 1974, the Armed Forces Movement (MFA — Movimento 
das Forças Armadas) rose against the dictatorial regime that had ruled 
Portugal for forty-eight years. Nevertheless, the downfall of the dicta-
torship did not provide for the immediate advent of democracy, and 
the coup d’état led Portugal into a long revolutionary process of almost 
two years.
According to Kenneth Maxwell, one of the most important features 
to emphasize when studying the Portuguese revolution is its interna-
tional impact, because “the events of the mid 1970s in Portugal also 
played a signi`cant and precocious part in the great ideological con-
aict of the twentieth century.”1 This thesis has been developed by other 
authors, such as António Telo, Bernardino Gomes, Moreira de Sá, and 
Nuno Simas, whose studies have disclosed not only the signi`cance of 
the international context for the course of events in Portugal but also 
the powerful effect of the revolution in the global balance.2
In fact, it is extremely important to notice that the downfall of the 
Portuguese dictatorship took place at a turning point in the Cold War 
after a period during which the decrease of the two superpowers’ capac-
ity to exercise their worldwide hegemony became obvious due to several 
factors: the particular weakness of the United States under the impact of 
the Vietnam War and Watergate crisis, the strengthening of the European 
Economic Community, and, `nally, the shift in Soviet Union strategy in 
Europe determined by the Détente. In short, the uprising on April 25 
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came at a time of transition between stages of the international system, 
and would provide a laboratory for international actors to explore new 
formulas. Portugal would appear as a kind of lab, but also as a nega-
tive example for all subsequent democratic revolutions. We must notice 
that, since the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP — Partido Comunista 
Português) was strongly Stalinist and Moscow-oriented, Portugal was 
the last country in Europe where an apparent attempt was made to put 
into practice a Communist regime, moreover with a model seemingly 
based on the Bolshevik revolution of 1917.
In conclusion, notes Maxwell, “the chain of events set in motion by 
the April 1974 coup” had “widespread and long-lasting international 
rami`cations.” At the end, “the triumph for anticommunist democrats” 
in the Portuguese revolution, on the one hand, “together with the initial 
victory of the communist-backed forces in Angola in the same period 
on the other, set in motion many of the forces which would help bring 
about the end of the Cold War in Europe, by reinvigorating democracy 
at the grassroots and by escalating the costs of proxy conaicts in the 
third world.”3
Even though one must emphasize the international context and 
impact of the Portuguese transition to democracy, in my opinion exter-
nal factors played a subordinate role. Many political scientists and his-
torians have noticed the original and unexpected nature of this transi-
tion, which made it dif`cult for international actors to take a broad role 
in it. Without claiming to be exhaustive, I shall point out some of these 
aspects.
1. The downfall of the Portuguese dictatorship took the international 
community by surprise. It is usually accepted that when the revolution 
took place in Portugal the United States had “gone out to lunch.”4 As 
Thomas Bruneau noticed, “relying on stereotypical views of Portuguese 
society and most of the relevant theoretical literature on state and soci-
ety in developing countries, no one could have anticipated it.”5
2. The Carnations Revolution was the beginning of the “third wave” 
of democratic transitions in southern Europe, which was followed by 
transitions in Greece, Spain, Latin America, and, at the end of the 1980s, 
in Eastern Europe.6 As “the `rst ‘surfer’” on this wave of democratiza-
tion, as Philippe Schmitter has called it, “it had no one to imitate or 
learn from” and so “Portugal unavoidably had an unusual transition.”7
3. In Spain and in some Latin America countries democracy devel-
oped from a plan or negotiation pacts between the old and the new 
elites. The Portuguese case is rather different; the de`nition of the new 
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regime took place amid tensions and battles that almost led to civil war. 
The coup d’état resulted in the collapse of authority, a breach of the sys-
tem, and the outbreak of a revolutionary process. The period of 1974  – 
1976 was the most complex phase of the country’s transition.
4. While it is impossible to ignore the importance of the military 
dimension in the Portuguese transition, nevertheless the role of the mili-
tary is rather unique. Contrary to what normally happens on such occa-
sions, Portugal was a revolution unleashed after a nonhierarchical mili-
tary coup in which the military presented a political program that led 
to a dramatic rupture with the previous regime and the beginning of a 
process of decolonization and democratization. Even more, the military, 
or more particularly, the moderate of`cers of the MFA, were essential 
in the establishment of a democratic regime in Portugal. In this context 
we can more easily understand Vasco Lourenço, one of main delegates 
of the “Captains’ Movement,”8 when trying to clarify the role played by 
the army in the revolution:
The armed forces, in any country of the world, are, or tend to be, conserva-
tive, because their main mission is to defend, to preserve. However, they can 
and must be progressive, because our greatest aim is the exaltation of the 
patria [fatherland], and the patria is the people. It is for this reason that the 
regime, any regime that takes power, wants its armed forces to be conserva-
tive. We in Portugal have to (and we want to) be progressive.9
Although no one seems to ignore the importance of the MFA in the 
Portuguese revolution, there are very many different interpretations of 
the roles played by each of the actors in the process: the armed forces, 
the political parties or movements, and the social forces. Some histori-
ans, such as José Medeiros Ferreira or Josep Sánchez Cervelló, tend to 
attribute to the military a hegemonic and leading position. According to 
them, the revolutionary process “opened the doors to the military con-
trol over society” and this “was so obvious that none of the three pow-
ers in which the democratic state is based was free from military inter-
ference.”10 According to José Medeiros Ferreira, “the strategic thinking” 
in the revolution belonged to the military institution, and the launch-
ing of the democratic regime, in 1976, was possible because of the 
armed forces’ strategic capacity to negotiate with the political parties.11 
Ultimately, this interpretative line is a return to the revolutionary mili-
tary’s own thesis, of the MFA as the engine of the revolution.
A different position is taken by those authors who, without deny-
ing the importance of either the military or the social forces, place their 
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emphasis on the role played by the political elite and, above all, by the 
parties and political movements. For instance, António Reis gives us the 
image of a process that “apparently has the military as its main actors,” 
but, in fact, will be decisively conditioned “by the positions of the dif-
ferent party forces and by the popular support that each of them can 
attract.”12 Despite acknowledging the leadership of the MFA during the 
early moments, Reis gives special emphasis to the moment at which, fol-
lowing the elections to the Constituent Assembly on April 25, 1975, the 
parties assume “a new role in politics,” leading to questioning the mili-
tary vanguard.13
Outside of the strictly historiographical stream, other authors con-
centrate on the role of the popular forces through their street demon-
strations and collective action. The sociologist Boaventura de Sousa 
Santos, for instance, believes that the popular masses were the true cre-
ators of the revolution.14
The radicalization of social movements in 1974 – 1975 is also the 
main subject of a large number of studies carried out by mainly foreign 
political scientists, sociologists, and historians. It is therefore essential to 
consider works such as those of Nancy Bermeo on the agrarian reform 
or John Hammond’s studies on urban social movements.15 From the 
perspective of this paper, one must refer especially to Durán Muñoz’s 
analysis of the dynamics of the state crisis under pressure from social 
movements and to his conclusion that the emergence of the MFA as a 
political actor is the most important factor in the state crisis during the 
period 1974 – 1975.
Because this is one of the central questions to understanding the 
Portuguese transition to democracy, my aim is to clarify the importance 
of each of its actors through an examination of the main events of the 
revolution.
The Origins of the Armed Forces Movement (MFA)
The coup of April 25, 1974, was brought about by a strictly military 
movement of middle-ranking of`cers — all of them inauenced by their 
wide experience in the colonial war — without the involvement of politi-
cal parties or organizations. The origins of the Armed Forces Movement 
are well-known and both authors and protagonists are unanimous in 
this respect: the meeting that took place in Monte Sobral, Alcáçovas, on 
September 9, 1973, signals the symbolic beginning of the conspiracy and 
the birth of the Captains’ Movement. Even though the initial mobiliza-
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tion responded to professional matters,16 the corporate concerns where 
quickly abandoned. From December 1973 onward, the main concern of 
the Captains’ Movement was the colonial question, which would lead 
to the decision to overthrow the Salazarist regime as the only way to 
end the war and to promote a democratic transition. The need to ensure 
that the process would lead to the instauration of a democratic regime 
brought the Captains to develop a minimum political program based in 
three fundamental ideas: decolonization, democratization, and develop-
ment.17 At the same time, they identi`ed the sovereign bodies to install 
in order to guarantee the transition.
No place was provided for the MFA in the new provisional consti-
tutional scheme promoted in the movement’s program. Its idea was to 
delegate the power, which was to be shared by military and civil bod-
ies (both nominated by the MFA). In this context, it mandated the cre-
ation of a National Salvation Junta (JSN — Junta de Salvação Nacional), 
which was to supervise the process until the complete establishment 
of not only a democratic regime but also a provisional government, 
responsible for the “day-to-day management” until legislative elections 
could be held and a legitimate government formed.
Their sense of authority also led the captains to decide beforehand 
who would be assigned as president and as armed forces chief of staff 
(CEMGFA) after the downfall of the dictatorship. They intended for 
the `rst position to go to General Francisco Costa Gomes, former 
CEMGFA, and the command of the military forces was assigned to 
the army’s second-in-command and former commander of Portuguese 
forces in Guinea-Bissau, General António de Spínola. However, as 
Philippe Schmitter notes, a change of regime always involves its promot-
ers in necessary risks.18 Despite all of the precautions, the MFA’s of`cers 
could not guarantee a smooth transition. The situation was complicated 
by the emergence of a set of unforeseen factors that changed their initial 
plans. One of the most import elements in this context was social agi-
tation: after the coup “hundreds of labour conaicts erupted throughout 
the country . . . the scale of popular response to the coup, the mobiliza-
tion of workers, and the chanting crowds in the streets took the military 
by surprise.”19 One must also take into account the impact of a collapse 
of discipline within the armed forces and, above all, the position taken 
by António de Spínola.20
Even before the coup, heated debates with Spínola forced the cap-
tains to make some changes in their program.21 Its `nal version was not 
`nished until the evening of April 25, when, to the surprise of the MFA, 
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Spínola made new demands. It the end, the program was a precarious 
compromise between two different visions of the road to follow. Other 
factors conditioned the captains’ decision not to abandon the politi-
cal process, above all, the way in which the JSN was constituted and 
the fact that Spínola assumed its presidency (and as a result would be 
named president of the Republic). Aware of his ideas of how the transi-
tion ought to be carried out, the captains decided to remain active.
António de Spínola versus the MFA  
(April  –  September 1974)
Spínola had his own political project that was well-known after the 
publication of his book Portugal and the Future. He called for a presi-
dential regime, an emasculated and gradual transition that would take 
place in an atmosphere of social order, and a federal solution for the 
colonies (following a referendum). These proposals clearly contra-
dicted the principles of the MFA’s program, which called for elections 
to a constituent assembly within one year, and for the “people’s right to 
self-determination.”
In this context, the captains’ initial idea of handing over the power 
after the coup was abandoned. Its early confrontations with Spínola 
established the ground for the MFA to progressively transform itself 
into a political agent. Initially the hegemonic strength of Spínola was 
clear and his attacks and attempts to dissolve the MFA’s Coordinating 
Committee seemed almost successful. Nevertheless, at the beginning 
of the summer of 1974 the committee gradually took control, forcing 
Spínola to recognize the people’s right to self-determination and inde-
pendence.22 This process culminated in the events of September 2823 
and in Spínola’s subsequent resignation. In conclusion, it is impossible 
to describe the `rst months of the Carnations Revolution without mak-
ing a special reference to the role played by the armed forces, as they 
were dominated by the struggle between António de Spínola and the 
MFA.
During this time, the weakness of the political forces was obvious. 
Decolonization was not only the ` rst great challenge for the new regime 
but also one of the main issues that gave way to the dispute between 
the president and the MFA’s Coordinating Committee. Nevertheless, the 
colonial question was just a small part of a much larger political project. 
Judging by Spínola’s `rst proposals for changing the MFA Program, in 
which he called for the formation of a military government during the 
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transition, the possibility of a regime that was not just presidentialist 
but also militarist remained present. Thus Spínola’s position led to the 
MFA becoming more interventionist and taking a strong military tute-
lage over the civilian authorities. The second Provisional Government 
was a reaection of this, revealing not only the predominance of the mili-
tary, but also the signi`cant ground won by the MFA.
MFA’s Strategy to Consolidate its Leading 
Position (September 1974  –  March 1975)
António de Spínola’s resignation introduced a new phase in the revolu-
tion. He was replaced by Costa Gomes, who had been the MFA’s origi-
nal choice and whose political aexibility was reaected in his nickname 
“The Cork.” As the decolonization problem was already resolved, the 
MFA promoted the creation of a commission led by one of its most 
prominent representatives, Ernesto Melo Antunes, to prepare and 
present a Social and Economic Policy Program. At the same time, the 
MFA’s policy was to bring the revolution “out of Lisbon,” by promot-
ing the campanhas de dinamização cultural24 in order to explain the 
revolution’s aims. Some of these “missionaries” encouraged the rural 
workers to take control of the lands and traditional power structures. 
Finally, MFA’s strategy concerning the political power was to not take 
further chances; after the confrontations with Spínola MFA’s main 
concern was now its institutionalization. It became urgent to clarify 
Table 6.1  Composition of the First and Second Provisional 
Governments
 
1st Provisional 
Government
2nd Provisional 
Government
Ministers % Ministers %
Military 1 7 8 47
PS (Socialist Party) 3 20 3 18
PCP (Portuguese Communist Party) 2 13 1 6
PPD (Popular Democratic Party) 2 13 1 6
Independent 6 40 4 24
MDP/CDE (Portuguese Democratic 
Movement/Democratic Election 
Committees)
1 7 - -
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the reach of military power and the effective attributes of the other 
political power centers.
The `rst step toward the MFA’s institutionalization was the cre-
ation of an informal structure — the Committee of Twenty (Conselho 
dos Vinte, October 1974), all military of`cers with political and mili-
tary responsibilities25 — whose main goal was to coordinate and super-
vise MFA’s activities. This Committee assumed the position of supreme 
manager of politico-military life. A little later, the creation of the MFA 
Assembly (Assembleia do MFA, November 1974), with two hundred 
representatives from the three branches of the armed forces, sought to 
give the process a greater stamp of “democratization,” emphasizing the 
tendency toward the “collegialization” of military authority.
It is often said that the institutionalization of the MFA was part of a 
wider process of growth of the gonçalvistas26 in the military apparatus 
and in the state structure. This thesis, however, needs to be questioned. 
Our understanding is that the institutionalization of the MFA through 
the creation of the Council of the Revolution (Conselho da Revolução) 
was the result of a metamorphosis of the movement caused by the revo-
lution’s development. What were decisive were not the gonçalvist’s pre-
tensions, but rather the political parties’ weakness and the perception 
of the need for a period of transition that was guided by the military, 
which could guarantee compliance with the MFA program and avoid 
the sacri`ce of the revolutionary process.
In fact, the institutionalization of the MFA was quite consensual. The 
debate was started by the political parties, and generically led to the 
conclusion that it was necessary to guarantee the MFA a place in the 
future constitutional settlement. With the exception of some extreme-
left organizations and the Portuguese Communist Party, which hesitated 
over the convenience of immediate elections, the belief that it was neces-
sary to join revolutionary and electoral legitimacies, as soon as possible, 
was then almost unanimous. The leaders of the main political forces, 
from the PCP to the Social Democratic Centre (CDS), openly defended 
the celebration of a preconstitutional agreement that ensured the MFA’s 
presence in the political structure. There was also an agreement on the 
weakness of the political parties (which even they recognized) and, 
therefore, on the need for a period of transition guided by the military.
On December 31, after almost three months of debate, the decision 
to institutionalize the MFA was announced. The MFA was to continue 
as the supervisor of Portugal’s democracy after the adoption of the new 
constitution. This decision aroused a debate within the movement con-
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cerning the shape of the institutionalization. In the meantime, a num-
ber of conversations aimed at reaching a preconstitutional agreement 
between the MFA and the political parties took place during the `rst 
months of 1975.
The Revolution in Crisis  
(March  –  November 1975)
The Spinolists’ attempt to regain power, on March 11,27 was used to 
speed the already anticipated institutionalisation of the MFA and the 
celebration of the MFA-Party pact, which clari`ed matters of authority 
and of military intervention in national life. This was the beginning of 
the last and most complex stage of the revolution.
The main measures taken after the March 11 events, revealing the 
new political moment, were the creation of the Council of the Revolution 
(CR), the nationalization of the banks and insurance companies, the 
government’s reorganization,28 the celebration of a Constitutional 
Agreement Platform (April 11, 1975), and the `rst free elections.
As the body representing the MFA, the CR was placed in the top 
spot of the revolutionary constitutional structure. Conceived as an 
instrument for intensifying the MFA’s participation in political and mil-
itary life, the CR inherited the competences that were previously attrib-
uted to the JSN, the Council of State, and the Committee of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (Law 5/75, dated March 14). Its extensive constitutional, 
military, and supervisory powers consolidated the institutionalization 
of the MFA’s political leadership that no one at that moment would 
publicly challenge. If any doubts remained concerning the actual reach 
of the CR’s authority the position was soon clari`ed, as one of its `rst 
measures was to decree the nationalization of the banks and insurance 
companies.
The CR’s presence in national life and its powers were both recog-
nized and consecrated in the Constitutional Agreement Platform of 
April 11, 1975.29 Despite the polemic surrounding the real motivations 
of some political leaders at the moment the pact was signed, the truth 
is that it consolidated the military supremacy and provided a guarantee 
that, independent of the election results, the CR would keep its leader-
ship during the transition and that it would be consecrated as a sover-
eign body in the future constitution. The idea behind this new political 
moment was that of a different military regime. It was not a military dic-
tatorship, but rather it was a regime in which the military took an active 
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part as conductors and agents of change. The MFA assumed, openly and 
clearly, its vanguard mission as the “driving force of the revolution.”
The Breakup of the MFA’s Cohesion
With the CR’s role de`ned as the “driving force of the revolution,” it 
became urgent to determine its political project: the prosecution of the 
“revolution” demanded new clari`cations concerning the road to take. 
By May 1975 the word “democracy,” present in the MFA program, 
had already been replaced by “socialist path,” an expression that from 
March 11 onward came to dominate the national political lexicon. The 
main problem was how to de`ne this term, mainly since socialism is a 
political expression that incorporates many possibilities. Then, it was 
rather dif`cult to clarify the role of the political parties — one of the 
main topics after the elections to the Constituent Assembly on April 25, 
1975, and the following confrontations between supporters of the revo-
lutionary and the electoral path (particularly in relation to the May Day 
celebrations30 and the Caso República31). In fact, the elections, which 
had one of the highest turnouts recorded, were an event of huge politi-
cal importance that provided the apologists for the electoral path with 
new perspectives, which apparently pointed toward the creation of a 
pluralist democracy. The main question then being posed was up to 
what point was the MFA’s presence in political life compatible with 
this model of democracy. This question and the many suggestions for 
the de`nition of the Portuguese socialist path dominated almost every 
major political debate that took place in May 1975.
Despite the agreement on the necessity of establishing an MFA-
People’s Alliance (MFA – Aliança Povo), which was conceived as a cen-
tral and structural element of the “path” to be taken, the boundaries 
and parameters of this alliance were not yet de`ned. The June 1975 
Political Action Programme (PAP — Programa de Acção Política) rep-
resented an attempt to reach an understanding, as it was suf`ciently 
vague so as to embrace all of the tendencies de`ned. Nevertheless it 
was a weak and precarious agreement that could not provide a satisfac-
tory solution for all of the problems in de`ning the authority and areas 
of competence of the different agents in the transition — the MFA, the 
political parties, and popular power. So the PAP was very quickly left 
behind. From the beginning of July onward, Portugal witnessed the pro-
liferation of political projects. These gave the illusion of Portugal as a 
kaleidoscopic theater of politics. In fact, this “epidemic of plans” was 
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the practical translation of the ruptures taking place within the MFA (as 
well as among the political forces).
At the risk of oversimplifying the MFA spectrum, one can say that 
the rupture produced three factions. (1) The `rst one, presenting a plan 
for an MFA-People’s alliance in which the political parties were com-
pletely marginalized,32 brought together the followers of Prime Minister 
Vasco Gonçalves. In political terms they are often considered close to the 
Communist Party, and their sympathies lay with Soviet-style commu-
nism. (2) Originally associated with this `rst group, the copconistas, or 
otelistas, was the group that supported the commander of Continental 
Operations Command (COPCON), Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho. They 
supported calls for popular power and direct democracy,33 and under-
took some joint initiatives with the extreme-left political parties. (3) 
Finally, those who defended a gradual transition through political 
democracy to a socialist society,34 known as the moderates (moderados) 
or “Group of Nine” (Nove), whose main leader was Melo Antunes.35 
They were in favor of a rapprochement with the political parties and 
worked toward the establishment of a democratic system in which the 
armed forces could play an important role.
By August 1975 the MFA had become deeply divided and its author-
ity was weakened. The creation of the Directorate (Directório or Troika, 
which included Costa Gomes, Vasco Gonçalves, and Otelo Saraiva de 
Carvalho) was no more than an indication of the deep crisis within 
both the MFA and the CR. This state of crisis was a unique opportunity 
for the political parties, which during this “Hot Summer” of 1975 had 
already organized a civil front (led by the Socialist Party) that took to 
the streets to demand greater respect for electoral legitimacy and plu-
ralist democracy.
The Increasing Influence of Political Party 
Forces and Their Demands
The political parties had been in a very weak position during the `rst 
moments of the transition. Some, such as the PCP, which had long expe-
rience of clandestinity, had to adapt themselves to the new circum-
stances of legality. Others, like the PS, had to overcome the internal 
problems that were to lead to the `rst schisms. Yet others, such as the 
Popular Democratic Party (PPD  — Partido Popular Democrático) and 
the Christian Democratic Party (CDS  — Centro Democrático Social), 
which were not formed until after the coup, faced dif`culties caused 
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by their youth. All of these parties, and the many others that emerged 
at this time, suffered from organizational and `nancial de`ciencies, 
staff shortages, and weak party machines. After decades of dictator-
ship, these challenges proved to be far from easy. The turning point 
came in the elections for Constituent Assembly in April 1975. Although 
the creation of the CR represented an important gain of power for the 
military, after the elections the behavior of the political parties changed 
substantially. The image of them as subordinate to the military authori-
ties, which had been typical during the early months of the revolution, 
disappeared. Gradually some parties such as the PS, or even the PPD, 
emphasized their individuality and demanded an active role in the tran-
sition process. It was clear that the CR could no longer ignore the politi-
cal parties’ growing strength.
The removal of Prime Minister Gonçalves and the restructuring of 
the CR in September 1975 provided an important pause for clari`cation 
that catapulted the moderates into leading positions within the military 
and state apparatus. However, in this process we cannot underestimate 
the intervention of the Socialists after the elections to the Constituent 
Assembly, nor can we neglect the role of the civil front making its voice 
heard with public demonstations demanding electoral legitimacy and 
pluralist democracy. This “street pressure” associated with the increas-
ing dissatisfaction of some groups within the MFA and the armed forces 
was ultimately decisive not only in ensuring Vasco Gonçalves’s vertig-
inous fall but also in assigning a new role for political parties in the 
revolution. When the sixth Provisional Government was established, in 
September of 1975,36 the moderates took into account the importance 
of the mechanisms of representative democracy, and the composition of 
the new government reaects the result of the April 1975 elections. The 
political parties’ strength could no longer be ignored.
Nevertheless, we must notice that the removal of the gonçalvistas 
from the main centers of power did not mean the end of their interven-
tion. Seeking new alliances with the military and civilian left-wing radi-
cals, they promoted insurrection in the streets and within the barracks. 
From that time on, and until November 25, no one seemed to be able 
to control “the streets” — daily street incidents and political quarrels 
(mainly in Lisbon). The specter of civil strife became real. One of the 
most dangerous episodes of the period was the attack and destruction of 
the Spanish embassy in Lisbon, on September 27. Then, on November 
12, construction workers surrounded the São Bento Palace (National 
Parliament), taking hostage the Constituent Assembly deputies and the 
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prime minister inside the building. A few days later (November 20), 
Pinheiro de Azevedo’s government (the sixth Provisional Government) 
announced it would suspend its activities due to the lack of necessary 
security conditions.37 This tension leads us to November 25, 1975 — the 
last armed confrontation of the revolution.
The End of the Carnations Revolution
Despite all of the unknowns that exist, even to this day, November 
25 represents a fundamental moment in the transition to democracy, 
enabling the clari`cation of some aspects of the revolutionary process. It 
represented the moment of clari`cation within the MFA, which resulted 
in not only the de`nitive defeat of the radicals, but also the progressive 
weakening of military authority and its subordination to civilian rule. In 
conclusion, the events of November 25 open the ` nal stage of the transi-
tion process, which was consolidated with the creation of the conditions 
needed for the complete “bestowal” of authority upon the party politi-
cal forces. In fact, after these events the defeat of the pro-Gonçalves 
and pro-COPCON forces was undeniable. Not only did they lose what 
remaining positions they had within the state structure and the military, 
but they also lost any chance of pushing through their political projects. 
This was a particularly delicate phenomenon, since it led to a certain 
degree of right-wing triumphalism. Aware of the dangers inherent in 
the situation, the moderates managed to prevent the countercoup that 
would have banned the PCP. Adopting this position may have brought 
them some inconvenience at a time when, despite the progress they had 
made, the politico-military situation was not yet entirely clear.
Melo Antunes’s proposal for a “viable left-wing project,” which reas-
serted the leading role of the military and proposed a national reconcili-
ation that would allow all parties to be involved, met with a great deal 
Table 6.2 Composition of the Sixth Provisional Government
 Ministers %
Military 6 40
PS (Socialist Party) 4 27
PPD (Popular Democratic Party) 2 13
Independent 2 13
PCP (Portuguese Communist Party) 1 7
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of resistance — even from some of those who, such as the PS, had been 
on the side of the moderates against the gonçalvistas, especially during 
the “Hot Summer” of 1975. The debate intensi`ed until the moment 
the terms of the constitutional agreement were reviewed. Increasingly 
strengthened and aware of their electoral legitimacy, the PS, PPD, and 
CDS openly questioned the compatibility of political democracy and 
military power. The negotiations were dif`cult, making obvious not 
only the resistance of the CR to leaving the political scene but also 
the increasing authority and negotiating ability of the political parties. 
Nevertheless in the second pact, signed in February 1976, the CR man-
aged to remain one of the organs of sovereignty, functioning as the pres-
ident’s council — guaranteeing compliance with the constitution and 
`delity with the spirit of the 25th of April — and as a political and legis-
lative body in military matters.
With the approval of the new constitution and the realization of leg-
islative elections on April 25, 1976, and presidential elections on July 
27, 1976, the new institutions were de`ned. The phase of uncertainty as 
to the nature of the political regime ended and with it, the transition to 
democracy. The period between 1976 and 1982 was no longer one of 
transition, but one of democratic consolidation.
Notes
1. Kenneth Maxwell, The Making of Portuguese Democracy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 180.
2. António José Telo, “De Marcelo Caetano ao Portugal democrático: as 
relações internacionais da transição,” in Espacio, Tiempo y Forma, series V, 
Historia Contemporánea, 19 (2007), 247 – 85; Bernardino Gomes and Tiago 
Moreira de Sá, Carlucci vs. Kissinger: Os EUA e a Revolução portuguesa (Lis-
bon: Dom Quixote, 2008); Nuno Simas, Portugal Classi+cado: Documentos 
Secretos Norte-Americanos 1974 – 1975 (Lisbon: Aletheia, 2008). 
3. Maxwell, Making, 180 (see note 1 above).
4. See Gomes and Moreira de Sá, Carlucci vs. Kissinger (see note 2 above).
5. Thomas Bruneau, “Portugal’s Unexpected Transition,” in Portugal: 
Ancient Country, Young Democracy, eds. Kenneth Marwell and Michael H. 
Haltzel (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1989), 9. 
6. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 
Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
7. Philippe C. Schmitter, “The Democratization of Portugal in Its Compara-
tive Perspective,” in Portugal e a transição para a democracia (1974  – 1976), ed. 
Fernando Rosas (Lisbon: Edições Colibri, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 1999), 
337.
8. First designation of the of MFA. 
The Portuguese Transition to Democracy  |  97
9. Diário de Notícias, January 23, 1976.
10. Josep Sánchez Cervelló, A Revolução Portuguesa e a sua in-uência na 
transição espanhola (1961 – 1976) (Lisbon: Assírio & Alvim, 1992), 430 – 31.
11. José Medeiros Ferreira, Ensaio histórico sobre a revolução do 25 de 
Abril: O período pré-constitucional (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional Casa da 
Moeda, 1983), 212 – 14. 
12. Antonio Reis, “O processo de democratização,” in Portugal: Vinte anos 
de democracia, ed. Antonio Reis (Lisbon: Círculo de Leitores, 1994), 19. 
13. Reis, Portugal, 31 (see note 12 above). 
14. For this author, the relationship between the armed forces and society 
was a “revolutionary relationship: the popular classes were called to participate 
collectively in the improvement of their living conditions and to do so in col-
laboration with the politico-military forces at their side against the previously 
dominant classes” (Boaventura de Sousa Santos, O Estado e a sociedade em 
Portugal [1974 – 1988] 3rd ed. [Porto: Afrontamento, 1998], 64).
15. Nancy G. Bermeo, The Revolution within the Revolution: Workers’ 
Control in Rural Portugal (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); John 
L. Hammond, Building Popular Power: Workers’ and Neighbororhood Move-
ments in the Portuguese Revolution (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1988). 
16. The MFA originated in response to professional grievances and concerns 
with status and privilege. 
17. To de`ne which parts of the transformation process to carry out, the 
program stipulated the dismantling of the organs and institutions of the over-
thrown regime, amnesty for all political prisoners, the reestablishment of basic 
freedoms, the launch of a new economic and social policy that would take into 
account the need to defend the interests of the working class, the call “within 
twelve months of a national constituent assembly, elected by direct and secret 
universal suffrage,” and, `nally, determined the “launching of a colonial policy 
that will lead to peace.” We must note that the `nal version of the program 
was the result of a long negotiation process that culminated, on the night of 
the coup, in a heated argument between the captains and some members of the 
newly appointed JSN.
18. Philippe C. Schmitter, Portugal: Do autoritarismo à democracia (Lisbon: 
Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, 1999), 232. 
19. Maxwell, Making, 61 (see note 1 above). 
20. See Maria Inácia Rezola, António de Spínola (Lisbon: Círculo de 
Leitores, 2002), 117. 
21. The Program has been published in several places. English version in the 
electronic archive Centro do Documentação 25 de Abril, www1.ci.uc.pt/cd25a/
wikka.php?wakka=programaingles.
For Spínola’s amendments see also Diniz de Almeida, Ascensão, apogeu e 
queda do MFA (Lisbon: Edições Sociais, 1976), 306 – 370. 
22. Law 7/74 of July 27 declaring that Portugal would begin an immediate 
transfer of power in its colonies. 
23. Spínola and his supporters planned a mass demonstration in order to 
reinforce the president’s powers. Nevertheless, the MFA aborted the demonstra-
tion on the night of September 27.
98  |  The Second Republic
24. Cultural campaigns, carried out by MFA’s members (Fifth Division), 
throughout the country. The campaign’s aim was to “ful`l the MFA pro-
gram” and “place the Armed Forces at the service of the Portuguese People’s 
development.” 
25. This included the seven members of the JSN, seven from the Coordinat-
ing Committee, and `ve members of the MFA who, until then, had performed 
political duties (e.g., as a minister or High Commissioner), and the COPCON’s 
commander (Continental Operations Command).
26. The name by which the military wing close to Prime Minister Vasco 
Gonçalves was known. Vasco Gonçalves was head of the second, third, fourth, 
and `fth provisional governments (June 1974 – September 1975).
27. Attempted coup, carried out by right-wing sectors of the armed forces, 
who wanted to change the course of the revolutionary process. On the morn-
ing of March 11, there are several military moves, such as an attack on the 
Light Artillery Regiment (RAL1) in Lisbon, the assault on the issuer’s Portu-
guese Radio Club, in Porto Alto, and an attempted uprising of the Republican 
National Guard (GNR). The coup failed and António de Spínola and another 
eighteen of`cers were obliged to escape to Spain. 
28. Fourth Provisional Government in which the radicals gained positions in 
a clear demonstration of the sharp left turn that was going on. 
29. See Plataforma de Acordo Constitucional com os partidos, IAN/TT, CR, 
no. 84, folder “Pacto MFA–Partidos parte I,” doc. 16. 
30. The incidents took place in Lisbon during the May Day celebrations 
of 1975. The differences were clear from the outset and were expressed in the 
divergences over aspects of the event’s organization, such as the disagreements 
over who should lead the march, who should address the crowd, etc. However, 
the moment of greatest tension occurred when, at the height of the event, the 
socialist leader, Mário Soares, was prevented from accessing the podium at the 
May Day stadium where the prime minister, president, and leaders of other left-
wing parties were. The socialists interpreted this as an attempt to exclude them 
from the revolutionary process at the very moment at which their power had 
been strengthened by their victory in the elections to the Constituent Assembly. 
The tension between the supporters of electoral legality and the supporters of 
revolutionary legitimacy was increased a few days later as a consequence of the 
Caso República (the República Case; see note to follow). 
31. The República was a newspaper founded in 1911. From its earliest days, 
and especially during the dictatorship, República had adopted a moderate-left 
position. The crisis surrounding the newspaper that became known as the “Caso 
República” began on May 19, 1975, when the newspaper’s typesetters dismissed 
the editor, the socialist Raul Rego. The occupation of the newspaper’s of`ces by 
members of extreme left-wing groups, an occupation tolerated by the Council of 
the Revolution, provoked a strong reaction from the PS, which accused the PCP 
of being behind the actions and suspended its participation in government. The 
later reopening of the newspaper by COPCON without the administration’s 
presence led to the PS withdrawing from the fourth Provisional Government 
on July 10, 1975. The Caso República soon assumed a signi`cance that tran-
scended national borders. Was it a labor conaict? Was it an ideological prob-
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lem? Or was it a labor problem that assumed political contours? This is without 
doubt a complex question that soon transcended its narrow aspects and was 
transformed into an ideological confrontation. 
32. The MFA–People’s Alliance Guide (Documento guia de aliança povo-
MFA), dated July 8, 1975.
33. COPCON’s revolutionary self-critique (Autocrítica Revolucionária do 
COPCON), dated August 13, 1975.
34. The Document of the Nine (Documento dos Nove), dated August 7, 
1975.
35. The “Group of Nine” were Major Ernesto Melo Antunes, Captain Vasco 
Lourenço, Brigadier Pedro Pezerat Correia, Brigadier Franco Charais, Air Force 
Major Canto e Castro, Air Force Major Costa Neves, Captain Rodrigo de Sousa 
e Castro, Major Vítor Alves, and Commander Vítor Crespo.
36. This last Provisional Government is headed by Admiral Pinheiro de Aze-
vedo (September 19, 1975, to June 23, 1976).
37. See Maria Inácia Rezola, Os militares na revolução de Abril: O Conselho 
da Revolução e a Transição para a democracia em Portugal (Lisbon: Campo da 
Comunicação, 2006). The November 25, 1975, armed confrontation is prob-
ably one of the more obscure episodes of the Portuguese revolution. There is 
an agreement that the military operations were triggered by the paratroopers 
(who seized a number of airbases and the national radio and television station). 
Nevertheless there is no consensus in interpreting their motivations. Were these 
actions purely defensive? Were they trying to seize power? Who lead the coup: 
the radicals or the moderates? Was it a revolutionary or a counterrevolutionary 
coup?
Although the left-wing military and political parties deny it, one of the most 
consensual theses maintains that November 25 was a radical leftist putsch eas-
ily neutralized because of its lack of organization and the last-minute retreat of 
the PCP. The fact is that, at the end, the moderate forces won this last “battle” 
and, by neutralizing the radicals, succeeded in putting an end to the revolution.
Further Reading
Cruzeiro, M. M. Melo Antunes: O sonhador pragmático. Lisbon: Circulo dos 
Leitores, 2004.
Gonçalves, Vasco. Discursos, Conferências de Imprensa, Entrevistas. Porto: 
Grá`ca de São Brás, 1976.
Muñoz, Rafael Durán. Acciones colectivas y transiciones a la democrácia: 
España y Portugal, 1974 – 1977. Madrid: Instituto Juan March de Estudios e 
Investigaciones, 1997.
Simas, Nuno. Portugal Classi+cado: Documentos Secretos Norte-Americanos 
1974 – 1975. Lisbon: Aletheia, 2008.
100
Portugal, with its neighbor Spain, experienced one of the longest right-
wing dictatorships of the twentieth century. Institutionalized under the 
leadership of António de Oliveira Salazar during the 1930s, the Estado 
Novo was close to the Linzian ideal type of authoritarian regime.1 In 
1968 Salazar was replaced by Marcelo Caetano, who initiated a lim-
ited liberalization that was brought to an abrupt halt by the worsen-
ing colonial war the regime had been waging in Angola, Mozambique, 
and Guinea-Bissau since 1961. The inability of Salazar’s successor to 
resolve the dilemmas caused by the war provoked the collapse of the 
dictatorship.
Compared with the other southern European “third wave” democra-
cies, the most conspicuous characteristic of Portugal’s democratization 
during the 1970s was the nature of its rupture with the previous author-
itarian regime.2 With a transition marked by an attempt at the radical 
elimination of the legacies of authoritarianism, the process of regime 
change resulted in a signi`cant state crisis in the wake of the April 25, 
1974, military coup. The simultaneity of the processes of democrati-
zation and of decolonization was one factor in the crisis. The latter 
was the main reason for the conaict, which broke out in the immediate 
wake of the regime’s collapse, between some conservative generals and 
the Armed Forces Movement (MFA — Movimento das Forças Armadas) 
that had planned and executed the coup. This conaict was at the root 
Chapter 7
Coping with the Double Legacy of 
Authoritarianism and Revolution 
in Portuguese Democracy
António Costa Pinto
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of the military’s intervention in political life following the overthrow of 
the dictatorship.3
Portugal’s democratization was characterized by an intensive break 
with the past, facilitated by the state crisis and political radicalization 
in which the new political elite pushed for punishment and account-
ability. The process of transitional justice that developed during the two 
years following the coup affected the institutions, the elite, the collabo-
rators, and civil servants and extended to the private sector.4 Many of 
the measures adopted during this period were based on a “revolutionary 
legitimacy” and therefore stood outside normal and democratic legal 
procedures. Most of the punitive measures taken against the more vis-
ible and better-known collaborators took place prior to the establish-
ment of the democratic institutions, and with the judiciary playing a 
minor role. These included the criminalization of the repressive appa-
ratus — particularly the political police, a strong public denunciation of 
the dictatorship, purges, including “wildcat” purges, the dissolution of 
institutions, and the dismissal of managers in private `rms — these last 
two being symbols of a powerful anticapitalist wave. The entire process 
represented a milestone in civil society activism that counted on the par-
ticipation of the trade unions and workers’ commissions, small political 
parties of various left-wing and extreme-left ideologies, and segments 
of the MFA.5
The “revolutionary period” of 1974  – 1975 was the most complex 
phase of the transition, and was characterized by a heightened degree 
of uncertainty and the conaictual nature of the regime change. During 
this period powerful tensions emerged within Portuguese society, ten-
sions that began to subside only after the holding of legislative and pres-
idential elections in 1976. Sections of the military elite, the leaders of 
some interest groups, and the moderate parties represented in the `rst 
Provisional Government sought the swift establishment of a democratic 
regime; however, the institutionalization of the MFA had transformed it 
into the dominant force behind the provisional governments. The main 
point of disagreement during this period was between General António 
de Spínola, Portugal’s `rst postauthoritarian president, and the MFA, 
with the former seeking to delay the decolonization process and the lat-
ter calling for the colonies to be given their independence as quickly as 
possible. The subsequent overthrow of General Spínola, the MFA’s shift 
to the left, the implementation of agrarian reform, and nationalization 
of large economic groups were both symbols and motors of an ever-
worsening state crisis sustained by powerful social movements.6
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In 1974 the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP — Partido Comunista 
Português) emerged as a legal organization with a powerful political 
structure and very quickly exerted signi`cant inauence over the gov-
ernment, civil society, and, most importantly at this time, the military. 
The PCP’s initial success faced in no small measure a growing chal-
lenge from Mário Soares’s recently formed Socialist Party (PS — Partido 
Socialista). It was also at this critical juncture that the parties represent-
ing the right and center-right — the Social Democratic Centre (CDS — 
Centro Democrático Social) and the Popular Democratic Party (PPD-
PSD — Partido Popular Democrático-Partido Social Democrata) — were 
formed. Much effort was made to exclude from these parties anyone 
who had been associated with the Estado Novo and to `nd leaders 
with democratic credentials. Indeed, the CDS was on the verge of being 
declared illegal up until the April 25, 1975, elections to the Constituent 
Assembly.
At this time the manifestos of all the political parties exhibited a shift 
to the left, with the CDS declaring itself to be a party of the center and 
the PSD with a program that placed it on the center-left. As has been 
noted elsewhere, “the Portuguese revolution constrained political elites, 
particularly those of the right . . . to present themselves during the `rst 
elections as parties much further to the left than their subsequent behav-
iour would justify.”7
The MFA’s decision to respect the electoral calendar and the real-
ization of elections for a constitutional assembly as scheduled greatly 
enhanced the position of the moderate political parties, since the PCP, 
which was increasingly powerful within the state apparatus, the armed 
forces, and the social movements, received only 12 percent of the votes 
cast in the April 1975 election. The attempt by the PCP and its mil-
itary allies to ignore this result led to the outbreak of political con-
aict between them and the moderate parties. Portuguese society began 
to polarize, with the emergence of an anticommunist movement in the 
north of the country. It was in this context of increasing radicalization 
that on November 25, 1975, moderate MFA of`cers organized a suc-
cessful countercoup that toppled the radicals. This anticommunist and 
antileft mobilization, which was led mainly by the socialists and moder-
ate military of`cers in coalition with the parties of the right, represented 
a decisive shift in Portugal’s transition.
As comparative research on democratization suggests, political space 
for the immediate punishment of previous dictatorships depends on the 
type of transition and the correlative power-sharing and veto capacity 
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of the political actors and institutions.8 It will be argued below that the 
type and diversity of transitional justice in Portugal’s democratization 
must be correlated not only with the absence of any veto capability by 
the former authoritarian elites and institutions due to the their collapse 
but mainly with the postauthoritarian cleavages opened by democrati-
zation and the military intervention in politics. It is also argued that the 
nature of the transition is superimposed on the nature of the authoritar-
ian regime and the extent of its legacy in the type of transitional justice, 
and that the transition’s powerful dynamic served to constitute another 
legacy for the consolidation of democracy, strongly counterbalancing 
those of the authoritarian regime.
Democratization and Transitional Justice 
in Portugal
The `rst laws promulgated by the National Salvation Junta (JSN — 
Junta da Salvação Nacional), a group of senior military of`cials who 
assumed power after the April coup, legitimized the dismissal of the 
regime’s president, cabinet, civil governors, and the leaders of the single 
party. By offering senior regime of`cials the option of external exile, the 
new government avoided the consequences of any popular demand for 
criminal trials that would have arisen had they remained in Portugal. 
The military sent the president of the Estado Novo, Américo Tomáz, 
to Madeira on April 26, from where he and his family soon thereafter 
went to exile in Brazil for the next four years. Similarly, the prime min-
ister and Salazar’s successor, Marcelo Caetano, was put on a plane to 
Madeira, and from there to Brazil.
During the `rst days following the overthrow of the dictatorship, the 
regime’s most important political and repressive institutions were closed 
down. These included the National Assembly, the Corporatist Chamber, 
the single party, the militia organizations (the Portuguese Legion 
[LP — Legião Portuguesa] and Portuguese Youth [MP — Mocidade 
Portuguesa]), the censor, and the political tribunals. In some cases the 
legislation was preceded by political action, for example, in the case of 
the regime’s of`cial trade unions (sindicatos nacionais) and the censor, 
through the occupation of their headquarters.
One of the landmarks of Portuguese criminal transitional jus-
tice was the removal of collaborators with the political police (PIDE/
DGS — Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado/Direcção Geral de 
Segurança) from the state apparatus and from within the private sec-
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tor.9 In 1975 legislation criminalizing both of`cers of and collaborators 
with the political police was approved. This law stated that all mem-
bers of the political police from 1945 onward would be prosecuted and 
tried according to their position within the hierarchy, declaring “the 
political police to be an organization of political and social terrorism” 
that committed acts of which “no of`cer or collaborator can claim to 
have been unaware.” The law’s preamble also declared that the political 
police had committed “systematic crimes against the Portuguese peo-
ple by using arbitrary and inhumane practices that were nationally and 
internationally condemned by public opinion.” The law declared itself 
to be based on a “revolutionary legitimacy . . . in order to punish those 
accountable.” The authors of the law promoted it as a response to “the 
overwhelming demand coming from the collective consciousness of the 
Portuguese people for the punishment of those responsible for fascist 
repression. This is the only way to redress the historic injustice their 
criminal actions produced” (Law 8/75).
The imprisonment and punishment of former PIDE/DGS of`-
cials and informants was one of the main popular demands, the pur-
suit of which became in some cases a “PIDE-hunt.” The arrests were 
made by the military through the Continental Operations Command 
(COPCON — Comando Operacional do Continente) led by Otelo 
Saraiva de Carvalho, who was soon to became the main leader of the 
populist left-wing faction within the MFA. In order to proceed with 
the dismantling of the political police structures and bring its members 
before a judge, in June 1974 the military created the Commission for 
the Abolition of the PIDE and LP (CEPL — Comissão de Extinção da 
PIDE/DGS e LP). While many former PIDE agents remained prison-
ers, many others aed the country within days of the coup. In July 1975, 
Constitutional Law 8/75 used “revolutionary legitimacy” to provide 
for the trial in special military courts of members of PIDE and govern-
ment of`cials who were considered directly responsible for repression. 
The law also provided sentences of two to twelve years, with no stat-
ute of limitations; however, the lack of coordination and the existence 
of more urgent matters resulted in the postponement of the trials.10 
Finally, controversy grew around the PIDE’s archives and its alleged 
appropriation by left-wing parties in the immediate aftermath of the 
coup.
One of the `rst institutions to be purged was the armed forces. 
Immediately after the coup, the MFA handed General Spínola the names 
of the sixty generals who had pledged their allegiance to the authori-
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tarian regime and who were subsequently placed on the reserve by the 
JSN. The purge of the armed forces was part of the MFA’s political pro-
gram and, against General Spínola’s wishes, the process was extended to 
affect an increasing number of of`cers. In the months following the 1974 
coup, special military commissions administered the purges demanded 
by the MFA. Incompetence became the of`cial criteria for removal, as 
it became impossible to sustain political criteria such as “collaboration 
with the old regime,” given that the whole defense establishment had 
collaborated with the Estado Novo during the colonial war.
Civil servants were probably the most affected by the radicalization 
of popular action. Unfortunately, reliable `gures are not available in the 
majority of cases, and the ` gures that do exist do not always match. The 
minimum punishment was to be transferred to another post, while the 
maximum was immediate and compulsory dismissal. All former of`-
cials of the political police were to be dismissed. Maximum penalties 
were applied according to priorities de`ned a little later by the govern-
ment: membership of the dictatorship’s governing elite; PIDE collabora-
tors; leading members of the MP, LP, or the single party; and the heads 
of the regime’s censorship board. The law also determined the creation 
of an interministerial purge and reclassi`cation commission (CISR — 
Comissão Interministerial de Saneamento e Reclassi`cação) to under-
take this mission. This commission was linked directly to the council of 
ministers and was charged with coordinating the purge commissions in 
each of the ministries.
Following an attempted coup by right-wing military forces loyal to 
the ousted president, General Spínola, on March 11, 1975 — the failure 
of which forced the general to aee into exile — the military was granted 
greater autonomy (`rst from the JSN, and after March 1975, from the 
Council of the Revolution) and the authority to open or reopen any 
case and to apply any measures deemed necessary in any particular 
situation. From the `rst version of the law (June 1974) to the second 
(March 1975), “revolutionary legitimacy” was reinforced and the pro-
cess of purging civil servants made easier.11 This law de`ned the previ-
ous dictatorship as a “fascist regime” and determined that purges could 
be administered on the basis of an individual’s political behavior prior 
to the fall of the authoritarian regime.
By the end of 1974 about 4,300 civil servants had been subjected to 
a purge process (see table 7.1). In February 1975 of`cial reports on the 
purge process stated that approximately 12,000 people had been either 
permanently removed from their posts or suspended,12 while it is esti-
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mated that between March and November 1975 the number of remov-
als and suspensions increased signi`cantly.13
The action of the various ministerial purge commissions was very 
uneven and depended upon the party to which the minister belonged 
and the shape of public opinion and extent of trade union pressure. In 
the ministries of labor and education removals were frequent, while one 
of the least affected ministries was that of justice, with magistrates of 
the regime’s political courts largely being left untouched. Institutional 
factors, the moderation of the Socialist minister of justice, and the 
strong culture of judicial independence were important factors coun-
teracting the drive to purge the legal profession and the ministry of jus-
tice.14 Nevertheless, of a body of 500 magistrates, forty-two judges were 
submitted to a purge process in 1974 – 1975 — most for participating in 
Table 7.1  Number of Prosecutions Instituted by the Ministerial Purge 
Commissions (May 1–December 31, 1974)
 
Number of Prosecutions 
Number of 
Civil 
Servants*
On the Initiative 
of the Purge 
Commissions Total
Number 
Implicated
Presidency of the council of 
ministers
1,470 6 37 43
Interterritorial coordination 2,000 205 278 278
Internal affairs 7,000 — 737 737
Justice 5,000 59 59 59
Economy 8,000† — 891 891
Finance 12,000 — 191 191
Foreign affairs 523‡ — 87 87
Environment 80,000 10 303 303
Education and culture 65,000 25 1,029 1,029
Labor 5,270 237 317 317
Social affairs 27,171 — 219 329
Information 610 12 29 29
Total 208,044 954 4,177 4,293
Source: A. Maurício and Gonçalo Castelo Branco, Saneamento na Função Pública (Lisbon: Diabril, 
1975), 90. 
* Approximate numbers.
†Estimated numbers from CIR, with possible errors or omissions.
‡Does not include salaried employees and locally hired staff.
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political courts or for holding government posts or positions within 
censorship.15 While most of those purged had occupied senior posi-
tions within the administration, in some cases lower ranking civil ser-
vants were also affected, particularly for collaborating with the PIDE. 
However, long delays in the proceedings reduced the overall scope of 
the process.
Portugal’s democracy inherited a complex “para-state” system of 
economic regulation that was associated with the corporatist appara-
tus, the dissolution and purging of which will not be analyzed here. 
However, the overall process of nationalization, state intervention, land 
occupation, and agrarian reform had a very signi`cant impact in impor-
tant sectors of the Portuguese social and economic elite. It is estimated 
that around 244 private enterprises were directly nationalized in 1975 
and another 300 small- to medium-sized enterprises came under pub-
lic management as the government “intervened” to rescue them from 
bankruptcy following their takeover by workers or their abandonment 
by management.16
The economic elite was hit hard by the process of nationalization 
and state intervention, as well as by the aight of industrialists and 
entrepreneurs from the country. Strike movements and a strong drive 
toward state intervention led to the `rst wave of self-exiles. Some of 
the most important illegal purge processes were also initiated against 
members of the economic elite. The purge of the boards of public and 
private companies was rapidly transformed into a component of collec-
tive action that increasingly assumed anticapitalist traits. These wildcat 
purges were concentrated mainly in large enterprises in the industrial 
area around Lisbon and in the recently nationalized banking and insur-
ance sectors.
It is not always easy to disentangle purges from workers’ occupa-
tion of factories and the self-exile of owners and managers. According 
to Harry Makler’s follow-up surveys of 306 enterprises, conducted in 
July 1976 and again in June 1977, only 15 percent of the industrial-
ists in small enterprises had quit compared with 43 percent in larger 
enterprises, while more than half of those in the largest `rms had quit. 
Makler’s calculations show that the higher the socioeconomic class 
origin, the greater the likelihood the industrialist had left the `rm in 
1975. He also notes that “the more upwardly mobile also were more 
likely to have quit than those who were downwardly socially mobile.” 
Signi`cantly, a much larger percentage of professional managers (52 
percent) compared with owners of production (i.e., founders — 18 per-
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cent, heirs — 21 percent, and owner-managers — 32 percent) had left 
their enterprises.17
Portugal did not experience the establishment of any truth-seeking 
type mechanisms as a component of transitional justice, but it is worth 
mentioning the existence of two state initiatives established with the 
goal of denouncing the authoritarian past: the cultural action cam-
paigns (acções de dinamização cultural), and the publications by the 
Commission for the Black Books on Fascism.
The cultural action campaigns were developed by the MFA in collab-
oration with left-wing civilians and parts of the Student Civic Service 
(SCE — Serviço Cívico Estudantil). One of the goals of the program was 
to “put the military closer to the population, in the belief their pres-
ence will allow for the clari`cation of the reasons leading this country 
to the regretful condition in which we `nd it”).18 The main goal was to 
democratize the rural world through cultural initiatives dedicated to 
denouncing the repressive past and promoting civic participation. Faced 
with strong reactions in the rural north fueled by conservative priests 
and local elites, the cultural action campaigns were brought to an end 
in 1975.
The state body that came closest to the classical “truth commission” 
was the Commission for the Black Books on Fascism. Created in April 
1977, it appeared after the purges and criminal proceedings, at a time 
when Portugal was seeking reconciliation with the past and overcoming 
its legacies. This was a government body established to denounce the 
abuses of the authoritarian regime. The commission, which comprised 
socialist and left-republican politicians and intellectuals, was responsi-
ble to the presidency of the council of ministers. Using the dictatorship’s 
archives as its source, the commission published twenty-two books con-
taining primary documentation that, among other issues, denounced the 
regime’s repression, the treatment of political prisoners, censorship, and 
the collaboration between economic groups and the PIDE.
As we have seen above, the military, political, administrative, and 
economic elite were all deeply affected — albeit to different extents — by 
the measures introduced during the `rst two years of the transition as 
a means of punishing them for collaborating with the previous regime. 
It is also worth noting that the two main parties legitimized by the `rst 
democratic elections, the PS and the PSD, maintained moderate posi-
tions and did not offer particular support to the purges, despite of`-
cially being in favor of the process.19 When at the end of November 
1975 the radical-left within the military and their allies were removed 
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from the political scene, the ensuing process of democratic consolida-
tion marked the end of the period of purges that soon became associ-
ated with a “period of exception” dominated by Communists and the 
populist left. However, the main legacies of the transition had in the 
meantime been written in the constitution.
The Dual Legacy and the Consolidation 
of Democracy
The military intervention of November 25, 1975, marked the begin-
ning of the process of democratic consolidation, although one that was 
still under the tutelage of the Council of the Revolution until 1982. 
Following the countercoup that neutralized the radical left-wing mili-
tary, a new settlement between the parties and the military followed: 
the so-called Second Pact. This included the direct election of the pres-
ident of the republic by universal suffrage, but under stringent condi-
tions imposed by the moderate military that had now gained control of 
the reins of power. Among those conditions was the imposition upon 
the major parties to endorse a particular candidate (General Ramalho 
Eanes) in the `rst presidential elections (held in 1976). In the economic 
sphere, a heavily nationalized sector and extensive state intervention-
ism, along with the introduction of severe austerity measures following 
the `rst Portuguese agreement with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), became symbols of recession.
During the years of democratic consolidation, Portugal could be 
characterized as having a multiparty system with endemic cabinet insta-
bility. There were minority PS governments, coalitions with the PS and 
the right-wing CDS, independent governments appointed by the presi-
dent, and center-right-wing coalitions of the PSD and CDS. In 1976, 
by imposition of the moderates within the military and with the accep-
tance of the main political parties, General Ramalho Eanes was elected 
president. From that moment the two main parties, both separately and 
together, governed under the tutelage of both the military and the presi-
dent. Meanwhile, the parties of the right and center-right, followed with 
some hesitancy by the PS, refocused their political programs and imme-
diately placed on the political agenda the need to eliminate some of the 
“socialist” legacies of the transition contained in the constitution and 
in the pacts with the military. The Communists, meanwhile out of gov-
ernment, became the only party defending the “socialist” legacies of the 
transition.
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The Portuguese case is an illustration of the dominant process of 
democratic consolidation in southern Europe: “consolidation through 
parties.”20 The legacy of the cleavages introduced by the transition was 
visible in two dimensions: the exclusion of the PCP, which was now per-
ceived to be an antisystem party; and the cooperation between the PS, 
PSD, and CDS, “forming an implicit democratic coalition with the aim 
of establishing a liberal democracy.”21
The of`cial position of the `rst two constitutional governments led 
by the Socialist prime minister, Mário Soares, and of the `rst demo-
cratically elected president, Ramalho Eanes, favored reconciliation and 
paci`cation. According to the of`cial position of Mário Soares’s PS and 
that of the center-right democratic parties, Portuguese democracy was 
shaped by a double legacy: the authoritarianism of the right under the 
Estado Novo and the authoritarian threat of the extreme left in 1975  — 
which they of`cially considered to be an attempt by the Communists to 
seize power. Through this position, they sought to establish a particu-
lar “institutional memory” on the origins of contemporary Portuguese 
democracy that has survived the consolidation of democracy, albeit with 
minor differences, within both the PS and the PSD.
The purges were soon brought to an end and their role reevaluated 
in light of the claim they were an excess of the early transitional period. 
At the same time, a number of Communists and extreme left-wing civil-
ians and military `gures were removed from their positions within the 
civil service and state-owned companies in a kind of counterpurge that 
was particularly evident within the armed forces. However, a climate 
of political reconciliation predominated during the last years of the 
1970s, shaping the way in which the government dealt with the legacy 
of the dictatorship. This was particularly true with the trial of members 
of the PIDE/DGS. Their trials were conducted according to the new 
postrevolutionary political ethos, and as a result those who had not 
taken advantage of their bail to aee the country received only light sen-
tences from the military courts (normally they were sentenced to time 
already served). Those who had good military active service reports 
from the colonial war period received especially benevolent treatment.22 
Although there were public demonstrations against and criticism of the 
sentences meted out, they did serve as notice that judicial legality and 
the rule of law had been reestablished following the “excesses” of the 
turbulence of 1974 – 1975.
Between 1976 and the early 1980s, steps were taken to reintegrate 
those who had been victims of the purges. New legislation was passed 
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and measures were quickly adopted to normalize the situation in the eco-
nomic arena in which the wildcat purges had been most severe. The gov-
ernment followed this up with a series of measures designed to facilitate 
the return of exiles (mainly business managers and entrepreneurs) who 
had been forced out of the country by the radicalization of the social 
movements. The purge commissions in the ministries ceased to operate 
in 1976 and the Council of the Revolution, which took on the role of 
these commissions as well as the leadership of the CEPL, reinforced legal 
mechanisms to ensure a process of rehabilitation took place. A moder-
ate member of the Council of the Revolution, Captain Sousa e Castro, 
was given responsibility for the entire process.23 The Commission for the 
Assessment of Purge Appeals and Reclassi`cations (CARSR — Comissão 
de Análise de Recursos de Saneamentos e de Reclassi`cação) was then 
created under the auspices of the Council of the Revolution and con-
tinued in operation until the mid-1980s, rehabilitating the vast major-
ity of appellants who came before it. This commission was composed 
of legally quali`ed military of`cers and civilians who had no links with 
the dictatorship. According to a report into its activities, the commis-
sion expressed the view that “it is necessary to repair the damage that 
was done” during the 1974 – 1975 period when many of the purges were 
“merely arbitrary.”24 Most of those who had been dismissed during the 
purges had their punishment changed to compulsory retirement.
In the case of PIDE/DGS agents, the CARSR followed the precedent 
established by the military tribunals. These courts had heard the cases 
against political police agents and had decided “the fact that those being 
tried were former agents of the PIDE/DGS is irrelevant because it was 
not illegal in the past to be a member of the political police.” This prin-
ciple restored to them their rights as public employees, but only if they 
had not “taken part in illegal activities.”25
It was during this period that the “historical memory” of the politi-
cal parties that was to dominate Portugal’s democracy was `xed and 
developed in the of`cial discourses for the ritual commemoration of the 
anniversary of April 25, 1974. Throughout these years there was a com-
mon denominator for the CDS, PSD, and PS, albeit with some minor 
differences between them — the `rst democratic elections of 1975 as the 
founding event of Portuguese democracy and its role in the resistance 
to “the totalitarian perversion” of the Communists. The PS stressed the 
idea that the events of November 25 represented “democracy’s recon-
ciliation with itself” and not the anticommunist revanchism that some 
on the populist right would have desired.26
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As noted above, the CDS — which was the most right-wing of the 
democratic political parties, and which had been subjected to several 
violent attacks during the early years of the transition — embarked on 
a dif`cult process in order to establish itself legally. Its political legiti-
macy eventually came about through the celebration of the defeat of 
the Communists in 1975 and by its being the only party that refused 
to approve the 1976 constitution. The CDS also sought to symbolically 
equate the events of November 25, 1975 (the defeat of the radical left) 
with those of April 25, 1974.
Created by reformist-dissident elements within the dictatorship and 
led by Francisco Sá Carneiro, the PSD — which initially attempted to 
become a member of the socialist family — established itself as the main 
center-right party. For the PSD, the elections of 1975 and the “popular 
resistance” to communism were an element of its celebration speeches 
on the foundation of Portuguese democracy. Despite this, and particu-
larly during the early years of democratic consolidation, the record of 
resistance to the dictatorship of some of its leaders was an important 
element in separating the PSD from the CDS. Throughout the entire 
democratic consolidation period, the PSD also differentiated itself from 
the PS by speaking out against the military and economic legacy of the 
transition.
Heir to the political culture of anti-Salazarist republicanism and 
formed in 1973, the PS almost immediately used the strong antiauthor-
itarian record of its leaders against the parties of the right. However, 
the PS was also the key party in the struggle against the Communists 
in 1975, transforming it during the early years of Portugal’s democracy 
into a party that was very close to the center of the political spectrum. 
The role of the PS in the anticommunist struggle of 1975 has been a cen-
tral element of its political identity, and it was not until thirty years after 
the fall of the dictatorship that it began to show signs it was abandoning 
that “double legacy” approach in its of`cial discourse.
The PCP, the only party to refer systematically to Salazarism as a 
“fascist dictatorship,” became the only supporter of the legacy of the 
April revolution contained in the 1976 constitution — particularly the 
agrarian reform and the nationalizations the `rst constitutional govern-
ments set about reversing.27
By 1985, on the eve of Portugal’s accession to the European Economic 
Community (EEC), the heritage of the double legacy was practically 
extinct in institutional terms. There was no party of the right of parlia-
mentary or electoral signi`cance that represented the old elite or that 
Authoritarianism and Revolution in Portuguese Democracy  |  113
acted as a carrier of the authoritarian values inherited from Salazarism, 
while the legacy of military tutelage and state socialism had also disap-
peared following the constitutional reforms of 1982 and 1989.
The “Politics of the Past” in Democratic 
Portugal
Research on the impact of transitional justice on the quality of democ-
racy, both in theoretical terms and, to a lesser extent, in empirical `nd-
ings, underlines its association with the break with the past that bene`ts 
democracy by ending impunity, celebrating regime change, and fostering 
a new sense of democratic community.28 At the elite level, Portuguese 
political institutions developed a strong antiauthoritarian “politics of 
the past,” associating themselves with the legacy of political opposition 
to the dictatorship.
The semipresidential nature of the political system and the fact that 
the `rst two civilian presidents (Mário Soares and Jorge Sampaio) had 
been active members of opposition movements during the dictatorship 
were important symbolically. During the `rst thirty years of democ-
racy successive presidents have posthumously rehabilitated many of the 
dictatorship’s victims and awarded members of the anti-Salazar oppo-
sition awards such as the Order of Freedom. Streets and other pub-
lic places were renamed after famous opposition `gures — republicans, 
communists, and socialist alike — while Salazar’s name was removed 
from all public monuments and squares and from the bridge over the 
Tejo, which was swiftly renamed Ponte 25 de Abril (25 April Bridge).
Another aspect of the attempt to symbolically delegitimize the 
authoritarian past was the alteration of national holidays. The date 
of the republican revolution, October 5, 1910 (the republic had never 
been abolished by the dictatorship), assumed greater signi`cance, while 
the May 28 holiday, which celebrated the military coup of 1926, was 
replaced with a new holiday on April 25, celebrating the foundation 
of the new democratic regime. Another dimension of the legacy of the 
transition concerns the presence of a strong program in civic, or citizen-
ship, education in public schools. Although changing the more ideologi-
cal left-wing orientation of the manuals written during the transition, 
in this respect “Portugal seems to follow, albeit at a distance, the exam-
ple of the Europe’s prime post-revolutionary republican democracy — 
France, the world leader in citizenship education.”29
Attempts to compensate those activists who had struggled against the 
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dictatorship were also made from the 1970s onward, although some of 
the proposals did not initially receive parliamentary approval. Members 
of the opposition to the dictatorship had to wait until 1997 for the 
introduction of the PS government’s legislation enabling them to seek 
compensation, in terms of social security and retirement pension entitle-
ments, for the years they remained clandestine or in exile.30
At the political elite level the “double legacy” was still very much 
present right up until the turn of the century. An example of this was the 
of`cial exhibition — sponsored by the of`ce of President Jorge Sampaio 
and the Socialist government of António Guterres and directed toward 
both students and the general public — that celebrated the twenty-
`fth anniversary of Portuguese democracy. In this exhibit thousands 
of visitors traveled through the dark passages of Salazarism; through 
the torture chambers of the political police and corridors lined with 
photographs of political prisoners, while opposition `gures and the 
prodemocratic press were celebrated. There was a threatening corridor 
dedicated to the colonial war that ended in a well-lit area celebrating the 
fall of the dictatorship. Signi`cantly, the exhibition ended where democ-
racy began. The turbulent period of the `rst years of the transition were 
omitted, represented symbolically by thematic panels that portrayed the 
process of social and political change that had taken place during the 
twenty-`ve years since the fall of the Salazar regime. It would have been 
very hard for an of`cial exhibition to deal with the transitional period 
given the complex legacy of the `rst two years of the transition.
How does contemporary Portuguese society perceive both the 
authoritarian past and the transition to democracy? Scholars Hite and 
Morlino recognize the dif`culties in making the legacy of the previous 
dictatorships operationalized as an independent variable in the analy-
sis of attitudes concerning the new democratic regimes.31 In Portugal, 
although there are very few surveys to support it, the coexistence of the 
assessment of April 25, 1974, as a positive break with the past and the 
distrust of democratic institutions seem to be very much present.
As part of the celebrations for the thirtieth anniversary of democracy 
in 2004, several opinion polls were commissioned seeking the views 
of the Portuguese concerning the nature of the country’s transition. Of 
those questioned in one survey, 77 percent stated they were proud of 
the manner in which the transition took place,32 while the majority of 
Portuguese (52 percent) believe the April 25, 1974, coup was the most 
important event in the country’s history. Some disagreement is evident 
when the responses are broken down by party support, with those on 
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the political right more likely to believe membership of the European 
Union (EU) or achieving independence from Spain in the seventeenth 
century were more signi`cant events. The Estado Novo is negatively 
perceived, while April 25 is viewed positively, with a minority of 17 – 14 
percent believing the dictatorship was a good thing and April 25 a bad 
thing (see table 7.2).
Are the cleavages of 1975 still present in Portuguese society after 
more than thirty years of democracy? With the partial exception of 
PCP supporters, the response is that they are not. If the 1976 constitu-
tion is perceived to have reaected the left’s overwhelming domination 
of the transition process, subsequent revisions of the constitution have 
reaected the inauence of the right. The end of empire, democratic con-
solidation, and accession to membership of the European Union (EU) 
have all served to seal many of the cleavages caused by the transition.
Democracy appears to be the preferred regime type for 72 percent 
of Portuguese, independent of their age or political beliefs. The events 
of April 25 are positively associated with improvements in the popula-
tion’s general standard of living, with 68 percent of Portuguese believ-
ing Portugal is a better place because of the transition to democracy. 
Nevertheless, these same polls indicate the Portuguese have a low opin-
ion of the operation and “quality” of their democracy. Comparative 
studies show that of all European nations, the Portuguese have one of 
the lowest levels of con`dence in their system of government.
Portuguese society has had little more than sporadic public debates, 
parliamentary initiatives, and “eruptions of memory” within civil soci-
ety related with the authoritarian past. A few episodes have brought the 
past back to the public sphere — a secret interview in Lisbon with the 
former head of PIDE who had been tried and convicted in absentia; a 
Table 7.2  Attitudes in 2004 Toward the Authoritarian 
Regime and April 25, 1974 (percentages)
Characterization Estado Novo 25 April 1974
More positive than negative 17 58
As positive as negative 26 23
More negative than positive 50 14
Don’t know/no reply 7 5
Total 100 100
Source: Portuguese Catholic University Opinion Poll, Commission for the 
Commemoration of the Thirtieth Anniversary of April 25, 1974.
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pension awarded to a former of`cial of the political police for “services 
to the nation”; and a television show in which the former dictator was 
named as the greatest Portuguese of the twentieth century. Nonetheless, 
it remains true that none of these episodes has been particularly divisive 
within Portuguese society.
Conclusion
Transitional justice encapsulates a variety of measures adopted during 
a democratization process that extend beyond the simple criminaliza-
tion of the authoritarian elite, its collaborators, and repressive agents 
and involve a wide range of extrajudicial efforts to eradicate the legacy 
of the previous repressive rule — including of`cial investigations of the 
authoritarian repressive record, purges, reparations, and the dissolution 
of institutions.33 In southern Europe in the 1970s, as in Latin America 
in the 1980s and Central and Eastern Europe in 1990s, the pressures 
for the criminalization of the authoritarian elites and repressive bod-
ies were present from the very earliest moments of the transitions, but 
only in transitions by rupture did the opportunity for this to happen 
actually arise. Other forms of transitional justice, such as reparations or 
truth commissions, were the only options available in democratizations 
in which the former elites exercized direct or indirect veto power in the 
process of regime change.34
Portugal and Spain are paradigmatic cases of democratic transition. 
In the former there was a sweeping policy of purges intended to cleanse 
the state and society of the authoritarian past, while in the latter, by 
contrast, “letting bygones be bygones became a foundation for demo-
cratic consolidation.”35 However, the variety of transitional justice in 
Portugal must be correlated not only with the absence of the veto capac-
ity of former authoritarian elites and institutions but is mainly due to 
the process of state crisis and to military intervention in politics after 
the breakdown of the dictatorship. If, for example, the dissolutions and 
punishment of the repressive bodies of the dictatorship — mainly the 
political police — was, as in Greece, an immediate consequence of the 
nature of the transition, the dissolution of the antiriot unit of the police, 
the occupations of the headquarters of many of the of`cial unions, or 
the quasi-immediate process of purge before any legal framework had 
been developed are precocious symbols of a different pattern.
Another characteristic of the attempt to make a radical break with 
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the past during Portuguese democratization — one that is visibly associ-
ated with the radicalization of social movements — was the strong anti-
capitalist overtone that existed during 1975. Nationalizations, urban 
and rural property occupations, and purges in private companies were 
in many cases legitimized by a political language stressing the need 
to eradicate the legacy of the economic and social elite power that 
had been associated with the previous regime, in a kind of “collective 
socio-economic dimension of authoritarian abuse,”36 making Portugal 
the only example of “redistributive” transitional justice in southern 
Europe.
The main political actors of this process were the extreme-left parties 
and the Communists, under the umbrella of the MFA, while the mod-
erate parties were still undergoing a process of institutionalization and 
their political priority was the realization of elections. To a large extent 
these parties complemented the radicalization of social movements, 
which simultaneously helps explain its diffuse nature and lack of use for 
the judicial system. Furthermore, I have also illustrated above how in 
Portugal the more radical dimensions of transitional justice were never 
on the agenda of the main political parties: as soon as they gained legiti-
macy in the 1975 elections, they quickly dropped the theme in favor of 
a global appeal for a return to order and the rule of law.
The new political cleavages opened by what many analysts character-
ized as the “revolutionary juncture” of 1975 were so overarching — to 
the extent that consolidation of democracy was much more concerned 
with coping with the legacies of transition and much less with the previ-
ous authoritarian regime.37 In this way, while it was mainly concerned 
with overcoming the legacy of the transition, a language of “reconcilia-
tion” also marked this `rst phase of Portuguese democracy. The nature 
of the `rst governments was also propitious, based on both formal and 
informal anticommunist coalitions of socialists with parties of the right 
and center-right. Nevertheless, even when the `rst right-wing coalition 
took power, the PS never considered the possibility of making electoral 
or political gains by bringing the past to the political agenda at a time 
when the right included a small number of people who had been mem-
bers of the authoritarian elite. The consolidation of Portuguese democ-
racy thus represented, in terms of the “politics of the past,” the insti-
tutionalization of a discourse and of a praxis regarding the origins of 
Portuguese democracy as a result of success in coping with the legacy of 
authoritarianism and revolution.
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Introduction
Throughout the twentieth century, the social values of the Portuguese 
population have remained similar to those of other European coun-
tries.1 The culture, art, music, and tastes of the Portuguese were shaped 
in earlier periods in France, Germany, and England. Their ethics are 
based on the same widely shared Christian values that have prevailed 
throughout Europe during this period. Most of the differences found 
have to do with different levels of education and income rather than 
intrinsic differences in views of the world and life. In this respect, the 
best example of this apparent difference is the fatalistic and nostalgic 
sentiments that still remain important in the Portuguese psyche.
Nevertheless, the Portuguese are proud of leading the trend to abol-
ish the death penalty and to end life sentences, although they lagged 
behind others for some time in governing the country liberally and 
democratically. In fact, today it is widely asserted that the monar-
chy after the mid-nineteenth century was more liberal than the First 
Republic (1910) and certainly more than the Salazar regime (1926), 
which together encompass most of the twentieth century. As Rui Ramos 
observes, “If the public freedoms had been a central issue for the repub-
lican left, the Republic never would have come into being in Portugal, 
because the constitutional monarchy guaranteed freedom even to its 
open enemies, as some republicans later came to recognize.” And Ramos 
adds, “Parliamentarism thus ended up as a pseudonym for the political 
monopoly of the Republican Party.”2
Chapter 8
Portugal:  
An Island Comes Ashore
Luís Campos e Cunha
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In any case, since the 1920s, as nationalism became rampant and 
widespread, all European countries started a trend toward more closed 
societies.3 That said, the nationalism of the Salazar regime was no excep-
tion, nor should it come as a surprise. But the extreme lack of openness 
of Spain had important effects on Portugal. In Spain, after a long period 
of instability and being on the verge of a revolution, a bloody civil war 
took place in the 1930s and the country remained a very closed society 
until, basically, the 1980s, when Spain started to prepare its accession 
to the European Community in 1986. And “very closed” means much 
more closed than other European countries, including Portugal, at the 
time.
Unlike Spain, and given the historical European context of the time, 
Portugal remained much more open to the world. Even the often-quoted 
expression of “orgulhosamente sós” (“proudly alone”) had to do with 
the Portuguese presence in Africa. Unlike the leaders of other European 
colonial powers, Salazar was determined not to “abandon” Africa to its 
fate and, unlike France and England, Portugal remained in Africa until 
1975. The idea of abandoning Africans was seen as a sign of giving in 
to the imperialism of the United States (and later the Soviet Union), and 
Salazar decided to remain “proudly alone” in Africa. Given the African 
history since then, one may say that history did not prove Salazar 
wrong, only highly unrealistic. But all that did not prevent Portugal 
from participating in world developments, nor did it prevent the aow 
of people and ideas.
This paper concentrates on the consequences of the Portuguese island 
syndrome behavior — itself the spinoff of Spain’s absurd lack of open-
ness throughout most of the last century. The remainder of the paper 
is organized as follows. First, the degree of openness of Portugal and 
Spain is compared using the indicators available. After that the paper 
addresses the consequences of the island syndrome. Before the conclud-
ing remarks, I emphasize that in the last two decades Spain has opened 
to the world and Portugal has become an “island coming ashore.”
Portugal and Spain
The relative openness of Portugal and the very closed nature of Spain 
have to be illustrated. This idea that Spain remained more inward look-
ing than Portugal can be revealed by membership year of international 
organizations of different sorts. (See table 8.1.)
In all cases Portugal joined before Spain. With one exception — in the 
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case of the United Nations they joined in the same year, 1955—often 
Portugal joined many years before Spain. These were the cases regard-
ing the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). And in several circumstances, Portugal was even a found-
ing member of international bodies—OECD, EFTA, and NATO—which 
was never the case for Spain.
Spain’s lack of openness was reinforced by the distance that Salazar 
always kept from Franco. The fear of an invasion by Spain was at its 
peak in the early 1940s, as the Falange had a Nazi-Fascist wing seek-
ing to annex Portugal. This permanent suspicion dates back many cen-
turies but was particularly important during the mid-twentieth century. 
Naturally this only compounded Spain’s exclusion.4
In 1970, the openness of each economy was drastically different. 
Measured by the ratio of exports plus imports to gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP), Portugal’s ratio was 45 percent, while that of Spain reached 
Table 8.1 Year of Membership
UN OECD EFTA WTO NATO IMF
Portugal 1955 1947* 1959* 1962 1949* 1960
Spain 1955 1959 1980 1963 1982 1985
* Founding member.
Figure 8.1. Exports plus imports (percent of GDP) 
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only 22 percent (see `  gures 8.1 and 8.2). The two Iberian countries were 
worlds apart in terms of internationalization until the 1980s.
Portugal Was an Island
 Spain’s overshadowing lack of openness isolated Portugal from the rest 
of Europe, making the country an “island.” Spain was a passage by 
which to reach “Europe,” and that means that Spain was only that: a 
passage to France or England and Germany, in the same way that for 
islanders the sea is something that must be crossed in order to reach 
the continent. In this sense the Portuguese were islanders, or grew up 
as such.
I do not mean to say the Portuguese felt or were closed to the world, 
much to the contrary. But in rather the same way that the British do 
not feel isolated per se, but nevertheless think and feel like islanders, 
the Portuguese experienced something akin to this island mentality. It 
is important to note that if Portugal had closed itself the effects would 
have been rather different and independent of the Spanish political 
stance. Following John Edward Terrell, “it is not a good idea to think 
of islands as isolated places.” But furthermore, “various social, mental, 
and physical factors can ina uence the degrees of interaction and isola-
Figure 8.2. Index of exports plus imports (percent of GDP; 1971=100)
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tion that occur through time and which inauence how societies oper-
ate.”5 There is a vast literature on the island syndrome in biology and, 
to some extent, in anthropology. However, I have been unable to `nd 
relevant studies in psychology or sociology. Exploring that literature, I 
`nd the studies in biology remarkably interesting.6
This paper does not intend to portray a mechanical or determinis-
tic view of the social behavior of the Portuguese, but rather to see the 
“island” condition as a drive that feeds into social values, which are in 
turn reinforced through social behavior.
The Island Syndrome
As Eric Smith explains clearly, “environment can shape cultures” and 
“culture comes from culture,” in the sense that cultures do tend to per-
petuate themselves.7 This paper does not follow a deterministic view of 
the environment, that is, it does not claim that this “directly determines 
features of human behavior.” Nor does it rest on the view of “possib-
lism.” The “essence of the ‘possiblist’ view is that the environment may 
limit, but not directly cause” the human social and cultural behavior. 
Instead, this paper follows the approach of “cultural ecology.” In this 
approach, “cultures interact with their environment settings via a pro-
cess of adaptation.” Environment presents “adaptative problems and 
opportunities not just limits or simple determinants”; cultural ecology 
argues “that adaptive process shapes cultures to achieve patterns that 
are best suited to a given environment.”
The `rst trace of this island syndrome, borrowed from biology, is 
related to degree of sedentary behavior. Islanders tend either to be very 
sedentary or they move away from the island: they are either settled 
or great travelers. In Portugal we `nd an inclination for low degrees of 
internal geographical mobility coupled with very high levels of inter-
national mobility. Throughout the twentieth century the only internal 
mobility was due to seasonal labor employment, which rapidly faded 
away, and to urbanization, which took place everywhere. However, 
once located in a major city, people tend to be rather immobile. In 
contrast, emigration was a major phenomenon — until the early 1960s 
mainly to Brazil, but also to Argentina, Venezuela, and the United 
States. During the 1960s emigration toward France and Africa became 
more important. A worker from the north of the country is more likely 
to relocate to Paris than move with his family to the Algarve. This 
characteristic certainly remains true until the present day: low inter-
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nal mobility coupled with easy international mobility, whenever it is 
necessary.
Another trace of island syndrome is that islanders have wider eco-
logical amplitude when compared with their continental counterparts. 
That is, they are forced by nature and by relative isolation to be more 
adaptive to conditions and new circumstances. They cannot afford to 
be choosy. Interestingly enough, this is one of the few positive traces the 
Portuguese claim for their behavior: the capacity to adapt and impro-
vise in new and unplanned circumstances. Mario Bunge also claims that 
the Portuguese are pragmatic. Though he did not think much of it, one 
could trace this pragmatism, as well, to the island syndrome due to the 
need to adapt to changing circumstances within the island.8
Moreover, there are two features of the behavior of the Portuguese 
people — a high degree of hospitality to foreigners and the marriage of 
emigrants to spouses outside the Portuguese community — that seem 
unrelated to typical islander behavior but can be linked to it. Anyone 
visiting Portugal remarks upon the sense of hospitality to visitors, and 
this lack of xenophobic sentiment is in large degree extended to immi-
grants. At the same time one observes that after some time Portuguese 
emigrants quite often marry outside the community. In Africa and Brazil 
and more recently in France, Portuguese emigrants tend to fade away. 
After one or two generations the Portuguese mix with locals, whether 
African or French, building mixed communities integrated into the 
local societies, an outcome not seen in other histories of colonization or 
migration inside Europe.
In fact, in Paris there are no Portuguese quarters and the Portuguese 
immigrants are dif`cult to identify, despite having been the largest for-
eign group in that city just thirty years ago. And the political participa-
tion of Portuguese descendents is very high, not only in the Paris region 
but throughout the country as well. This illustrates the high level of 
assimilation in France. Furthermore, this intermarriage is also well seen, 
if not praised, inside Portugal, where foreign family names are proudly 
exhibited.
These tendencies for hospitality and for intermarriage can be rational-
ized or understood as a consequence of the island syndrome. Islanders 
face the issue of inbreeding, and the openness to foreigners and inter-
marriage outside the community is fundamental in preventing the prob-
lem of consanguinity.
A last important trace of islanders is lack of aggressiveness. More pre-
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cisely, aggressiveness is ritualized and rarely actually realized. This cer-
tainly is reminiscent of the contrast between Portugal and Spain in terms 
of domestic aggressiveness throughout the last century. More interest-
ingly, in the period following the April Revolution of 1974 Portugal 
became a lawless country. But for the eighteen months that followed, 
the political violence was essentially ritualized and rarely materialized.
Moreover, the large inaow of refugees from Africa after the indepen-
dence of the colonies during 1975 never led to violence, unlike simi-
lar (but less important in terms of numbers) devlopments in France, 
for instance. The return of refugees from African colonies — then called 
retornados — increased the local population by around 8 percent, almost 
overnight. After a decade had passed no sign of retornados remained — 
not even the expression survives in today’s speech. This is in sharp con-
trast with the pied-noirs in France from the late 1950s, who are until 
today easily identi`ed and ostracized by the local communities. All these 
examples show a lack of effective aggressiveness, something that is also 
characteristic of islanders.
Again, I am not proposing that social behavior is determined by biol-
ogy, but only that biology creates conditions to adapt social behavior to 
the actual circumstance of islanders. The adapted social behavior feeds 
into social values of the islanders and is reinforced by these values over 
time. 
Portugal Comes Ashore
This sense of isolation or, perhaps better, a sense of “equal distance” 
from Lisbon to Brazil, or France, or the United States, is now fading 
away. The cause of this change resides mainly, once again, in Spain. In 
the early 1980s Spain started to open itself not only to Europe, but also 
to the rest of the world. Along with this trend, it has opened to Portugal 
as well.
For lack of other indicators, one can measure the increasing degree 
of openness by the ratio of foreign trade (exports plus imports) to 
GDP since 1970. In 1986 both Portugal and Spain became European 
Union members; the resulting increasing globalization of foreign trade 
had to play a more important role in each country’s openness (see `g-
ures 8.1 and 8.2). However, since 1970 Portuguese foreign trade has 
increased by 60 percent, that of Spain by more than 100 percent. Note 
that for contemporary Spain the importance of foreign trade is similar 
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to that for Portugal in 1970 (see `  gure 8.2). In any case, the relevance of 
Portuguese trade with Spain was insigni  `cant in the 1970s, while today 
Spain is Portugal’s major trading partner, as should be expected from 
the only neighboring country. This shows that, at least from the eco-
nomic viewpoint, Portugal is no longer an island (see  `gure 8.3).
Another indicator that shows the “island coming ashore” is the 
importance Spain has gained as a destination of doctoral students and 
postdocs (see  `gure 8.4). It was not possible to obtain data for the years 
prior to 1994, but even from the  `gures thereafter it is abundantly clear 
that Spain has become a major partner for post-graduate studies among 
Portuguese scholars. If in 1994 the weight was very small, it is easy to 
claim that in 1970 it was even lower. Furthermore, Portuguese students 
have become eligible in recent years for Spanish fellowships. Therefore 
that evolution is certainly stronger, and Spain becoming a destination 
for graduate students is much greater than what appears in  `gure 8.4.
In short, the ina uence of accession to the European Union by the 
Iberian countries was very important for Portugal, but the era of open-
ness with Spain that it ushered in was of major impact, reinforcing the 
effect of decolonization in the mid-1970s—an impact worthy of being 
singled out for attention. Portugal ceased to be an island and became a 
Continental country once again.
Figure 8.3. Portuguese external trade (percent of total imports plus exports)
Spain Germany France UK USA
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Conclusions
Portugal was a relatively open country for most of the twentieth century 
and participated regularly in several international organizations, since 
their inception. This openness has to be assessed within the international 
historical context, where countries had been devastated by a tsunami of 
nationalism since the beginning of the century. Only during the 1950s, 
and at a slow pace, has internationalism become more important. Unlike 
Portugal, Spain remained throughout the century and until the mid-
1980s a remarkably closed and isolated region. Spain’s lack of open-
ness had a huge impact on Portugal, making it something of an island in 
the international arena. This island effect, or “island syndrome,” created 
conditions that favored certain types of behavior among the Portuguese 
people: lowered aggressiveness, greater pragmatism, higher adaptibility, 
low internal mobility, and high international mobility.
This paper follows an approach in line with the Cultural Ecology, 
where environment does not determine culture but creates an adap-
tive behavior of its people best suited for the actual environment — in 
this case the “island” of Portugal.9 This island syndrome has to be fad-
ing away as Spain has taken its natural position in relation to Portugal. 
While neighboring countries naturally have greater trading and cultural 
exchange, this was not the case for Spain and Portugal throughout most 
of the twentieth century. Spain is now the major trading partner and is a 
major destination for Portuguese to work and study. The surprise is that 
it took so long for Spain to reach this important role.
Figure 8.4. Portuguese Fellowships to Spain (Index of percent of total students with 
Portuguese fellowships to study abroad. [1994=100]) Source: Fundação para a Ciência e 
Tecnologia
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The feats and achievements of the Portuguese First Republic are numer-
ous, far-reaching, and enduring. They more than deserve this volume’s 
centennial celebrations, which combine academic scrutiny, rigorous and 
dispassionate analysis, and civic jubilation. As the grandson of a foot 
soldier who fought with the insurgents of 1910 and was a volunteer in 
Flanders in 1918, an active low-ranking of`cer against the monarchist 
insurrection of 1919 and a lifelong Republican who opposed the author-
itarian regimes, I am proud to be associated with this celebration.2
The Provisional Government’s creation of the universities of Lisbon 
and Porto in March 1911 can be singled out as an example of a myriad 
of reforming acts that together composed what Hermínio Martins calls 
the “Great Culture War,” acts that have since been challenged, criticized, 
sometimes put on hold, nearly overruled in later regimes, but fortu-
nately never completely reversed. The Republic itself would be shelved 
for forty-eight long years without giving way to a restoration of the 
monarchy, only to resurface, reinvigorated, in
Chapter 9
Broken Promises,  
Postponed Commitments
The Political Elite’s Contempt for Popular Democratic 
Participation in the Portuguese First and Second Republics
Rui Graça Feijó
To the memory of Teresa B 
Mother of my daughters
Portugal, an ongoing discussion with myself 
my regret 
my regret of us all
 — Alexandre O’Neill1
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. . . the dawn I waited for
The new day clean and whole
When we emerge from night and silence
To freely inhabit the substance of time
 — Sophia de Mello Breyner Andresen3
Attempts have been made to dissociate the experience of the First 
Republic from its symbolism as a herald of a new century. My genera-
tion and the previous one witnessed attacks on the memory of those six-
teen years, grounded in currents of opinion that `nd their roots in the 
ideological combat against modernity.
João Ameal is credited with the utterance “In the last century, the 
History of Portugal was not done, but undone.” This implies that the 
Republic was the last phase of what was a national disgrace that begin 
with the French invasions or the 1820 liberal revolution, only to end in 
1926. In the opposite ideological camp, a well-known public `gure wit-
tingly countered: “The nineteenth century in Portugal ended in 1926 — 
and was followed by nothing” (Cutileiro).
These are nice sound bites, no doubt — but wrong ideas. In my view, 
the Republic — be it considered as dating from the Fifth of October 1910 
or from the day that Porto proudly celebrates every year as the `rst 
proclamation of the Republic (January 31, 1891)4 — represents the fresh, 
early light of the new century’s dawn. As such, I shall concentrate on the 
Republic’s branching forward to its later years. I will take up the recur-
rent theme of political legitimization and the resilient attitude of con-
tempt that I sense in political elites, an Ariadne’s thread that runs from 
the First well into the mature Second Republic of our day, an attitude 
that diminishes the importance of popular participation and shows con-
tempt for it as a means of acquiring political legitimacy.
2
The political regime to which we attribute the responsibility for a bold 
reforming program that had considerable implications in the shaping of 
our twentieth century lasted a mere sixteen years and, paradoxically, was 
a fragile political entity. The catalog of shortcomings, dif`culties, and inca-
pacities bears comparison to Leporello’s aria in Mozart’s Don Giovanni: 
seven parliaments, nine presidents, forty-`ve governments, countless 
coups, political violence on a signi`cant scale, almost endemic civil unrest. 
The First Republic was no “brief shining moment,” no Camelot.
Why then did the Republic, armed with a strong reforming agenda 
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that found such a deep echo in the aesh of the nation that has endured 
beyond the Republic’s breakdown, fail to stabilize and, in the end, to 
survive? I shall pick one critical aspect from among the many that I 
cannot review here: once it had become the power of the land, the 
Republican leadership recanted on its promise — going as far back as the 
Republican program of January 11, 1891, if not before — to adopt “uni-
versal suffrage,” whatever meaning this expression might have at that 
particular historical juncture, a progressive measure that would seem `t 
for what was then only the third republic in all of Europe.
The history of electoral rights in Portugal in the liberal period, as Pedro 
Tavares de Almeida has noted, is “complex and contradictory, not follow-
ing a linear path of more or less regular movement toward universal suf-
frage.”5 Along this winding road, mapped in table 9.1, two milestones are 
to be pointed out: in 1878 the censitary male suffrage in force since the 
`rst formal elections was extended to so many men that the Republican 
press claimed that “the 1878 Law introduced universal suffrage under 
another name”6 — although only 68.2 percent of all men aged 21 or older 
were given voting rights. This was, however, one of the highest proportions 
ever achieved under this form of suffrage. But in 1895 the Regenerador 
government redressed the situation restricting voting rights once again, 
and the number of voters fell from more than 900,000 to fewer than half 
a million, slightly less than 40 percent of the adult male population.
As a result of this brutal change, “universal suffrage” became a polit-
ical banner for the Socialists and, mainly, for the Republican Party, 
which had fared quite well under the 1878 law. When they took power, 
however, the Republicans lowered the suffrage banner and dropped the 
claim. With an electoral code slightly adjusted for the 1911 elections for 
the Constituent Assembly the number of voters rose from 696,171 in 
the last election under the monarchy to 846,801 (an increase of about 
20 percent but still short of the number of voters eligible under the 1878 
legislation). However, Afonso Costa’s Electoral Code of 1913, destined 
to live a long life, disenfranchised voters on a large scale and sealed off 
the loophole that allowed one woman, Carolina Beatriz Ângelo, to vote 
in 1911. Women were explicitly excluded from suffrage, and the eligi-
bility of male voters was severely reduced. The electoral register again 
dropped below 400,000 voters, in line with what it had been back in 
1869, even though the population had grown from 4.3 million to more 
than 6 million. In 1915 the proportion of population allowed to vote 
had reached the level of . . . 1861!
One brief exception came in 1918: Sidónio Pais decreed that presi-
dential elections would be held by direct voting and suffrage extended 
Table 9.1 Evolution of Population and Registered Voters
Year Population Adult Males
Registered 
Voters
Percentage of 
Registered 
Voters in 
Population
Percentage of 
Registered 
Voters among 
Adult Males
1864 4,188,410 350,145 8.35%
1877 (4,550,699) 478,509 10.51%
1878 4,550,699 1,208,266 824,726 18.12% 68.25%
1890 5,049,729 1,315,473 951,490 18.84% 72.33%
1894 5,131,205 986,233 19.22%
1895 5,237,280 493,869 9.42%
1910 (5,960,056) (1,472,908) 696,171 11.68% 47.47%
1911 5,960,056 1,472,908 846,801 14.21% 57.49%
1913 (6,130,892) (1,494,558) 397,038 6.47% 26.57%
1915 6,130,892 1,494,558 471,557 7.69% 31.55%
1918 (6,130,892) (1,494,558) 900,000 14.67% 60.22%
1925 6,032,991 1,535,651 574,260 9.52% 37.40%
1928 6,634,300 1,092,591 16.48%
1933 7,057,400 1,238,224 17.55%
1934 7,147,000  588,957 8.24%
1942 7,830,026 772,578 9.87%
1945 8,045,774 992,723 12.34%
1949 8,333,400 1,128,198 13.54%
1958 8,926,400 1,294,779 14.50%
1965 9,122,000 1,357,495 14.88%
1969 9,074,700 1,794,239 19.77%
1973 8,978,200 2,096,020 23.35%
1974 9,218,000 6,231,372 67.60%
Sources: Philippe C. Schmitter, “The ‘Régime d’Exception’ That Became the Rule: Forty-Eight Years 
of Authoritarian Dominance in Portugal,” in Contemporary Portugal, eds. Lawrence C. Graham and 
Harry M. Makler (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), 3–46, at 36; Manuel Braga da Cruz, O 
Partido e o Estado no Salazarismo (Lisbon: Editorial Presença, 1988), 196, 204; José Manuel Quintas, 
“Eleições para a Assembleia Nacional,” in Dicionário de História do Estado Novo, eds. Fernando 
Rosas and José Maria Brandão de Brito (Lisbon: Bertrand, 1996), 1:290; Pedro Tavares de Almeida, 
Legislação Eleitoral Portuguesa, 1820–1926 (Lisbon: Presidência do Conselho de Ministros, Imprensa 
Nacional/Casa da Moeda, 1998), 233; Teresa Rodrigues, ed., História da População Portuguesa 
(Porto: CEPESE/Afrontamento, 2008), 329, 340; Luciano Amaral, “New Series for GDP per Capita, 
per Worker and per Work-Hour in Portugal, 1950–2007” (Faculdade de Economia da Universidade 
Nova de Lisboa Working Paper Series 540, 2009), 31.
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to all males aged 21 and older, regardless of literacy status. The elec-
toral register jumped to more than 900,000, allowing 513,958 electors 
to cast their vote — a `gure higher than the electoral register of 1915.
With the assassination of the “President-King” (Fernando Pessoa’s 
famous sobriquet), this legislation was repealed in favor of the 1913 
Code. By 1925 there were 574,260 electors, less than 10 percent of the 
entire population, barely more than one-third of all adult males.7
This short survey suggests that the majority of the Republican elite 
that dominated between 1910 and 1926 held a conservative, aristocratic 
conception of the nature of their regime, downplaying the importance 
of involving citizens in public life and opening their political organiza-
tions to the emerging pattern of mass parties. Let us honor the minority 
within the Republican movement that kept alive the aame of universal 
suffrage in the face of mounting dif`culties.8
The reliance on “revolutionary legitimacy” was a prominent feature of 
mainstream Republican thinking (the most radical measures were adopted 
before the elections for the Constituent Assembly). But “revolutionary 
legitimacy” tends not to be eternal and to wear thin if not refreshed or 
supplemented by other forms of political legitimization. Recent literature 
on changes of regime, namely, on the processes of transitions to democ-
racy, emphasizes the importance of regular, free, and fair elections, with 
wide franchise as a key element in the consolidation of the new political 
landscape. I suggest that we might `nd a parallel in this situation.
The motive that has often been put forward as an explanation for 
the Republican leaders’ recanting of their earlier positions, that is, 
that they feared the conservative rural vote as having been inauenced 
by the clergy and as being opposed to the reformist, secular republic, 
can be considered only a half-truth. The `eld was open for Portuguese 
Republicans to follow known examples. For instance, the promotion 
of schooling and literacy — so high on their agenda — and the ensuing 
emergence of the village schoolmaster as a counterpoint to the priest, 
could have resulted in a kind of République au village along the lines of 
what had happened in France.9 Excuses and short-sighted views do not 
replace the consideration of the full scope of opportunities.
To disenfranchise one’s opponents, whatever the argument — be it the 
need to have a “Republican Republic” or because “universal suffrage 
cannot be adopted in Portugal at present not only because of the threat 
to the stability of the current institutions but also because of the very 
autonomy of the country itself”10 — is both a quick way to win elections 
and an expedient way to turn opponents into enemies of the regime. By 
recanting their promises, Afonso Costa and his followers were compro-
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mising the legitimacy of their republic and hastening its end. Keeping 
the promise of universal suffrage might not have brought stable gov-
ernment, but it would have likely produced a regime with a more solid 
base.
Of course, extended voting rights do not always go hand in hand 
with democratic rights, which the Republic generally upheld, as the 
events following the demise of the First Republic were to demonstrate. 
Without public liberties and basic political rights, and with censorship 
and administrative or political manipulation of the census and voting 
procedures, the meaning of elections and formal voting rights takes on 
a different light. The consideration that “it is good policy to interest as 
many Portuguese as possible in the affairs of public business”11 exhib-
its the post-Republican authorities’ understanding that a wider elector-
ate was a powerful means of political legitimization; and the authori-
ties acted accordingly. First, on the question of women’s voting rights, 
the Ditadura Nacional would grant women the right to vote, provided 
they were “heads of family” and had obtained secondary or university 
degrees,12 a limited right later broadened twice under the Estado Novo: 
once in 1946,13 and again under Marcello Caetano. Law 2137, dated 
December 26, 1968, proclaimed the equality of men and women for 
electoral purposes, except for Juntas de Freguesia. Second, the electoral 
census could be enlarged by altering legislation or manipulating the reg-
istration process. The history of the authoritarian period was one of 
meandering back and forth according to the circumstances: for the pleb-
iscite of 1933, the register was enlarged; it was then severely curtailed 
until after World War II, when it was gradually enlarged. However, the 
peak that had been achieved in 1933 would be surpassed, in terms of the 
percentage of the population registered, only under Caetano in 1969 — 
that is, when a new leader sought to establish the basis of his power by 
combining the legitimacy of his old career inside the regime with a per-
sonal triumph at the polls.
After the First Republic, in the periods of Ditadura Nacional and 
Estado Novo, changes of power inside the regime were associated with 
a tendency to enlarge the electoral census and to call elections (in 1928, 
1933, and 1969) — if only again to limit the census or other progres-
sive measures once the new leader had been installed. This indicates 
that the authoritarian elite saw a link between voting rights and an 
expected consolidation of their power, which we may consider as an 
expression of some sort of populism, or Caesarism,14 but which seems 
to have eluded most Republican, democratic leaders after 1910.
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3 
The dawn of the Second Republic would be marked by the political 
will to match the new institutional solutions with the stances and proc-
lamations of the opposition to the authoritarian regime. In this light 
we might recall the insistence on having direct, popular elections for 
the President of the Republic (a key point since Salazar changed the 
Constitution of 1933 in the wake of the popular mobilization that sur-
rounded General Delgado’s 1958 campaign); the reluctance to enshrine 
the referendum in the Constitution of the Second Republic (for fear of 
the antidemocratic use it had suffered in the 1933 constitutional plebi-
scite, the referendum was inscribed in the Constitution only in 1989); 
and, of course, the outright defense of modern universal suffrage.
In the wake of Law 3/74, issued by the Junta de Salvação Nacional 
in early May 1974, a committee was established to prepare a new elec-
toral framework. This resulted in approval of two diplomas by the 
Third Provisional Government in November 1974, which established 
universal suffrage in its modern sense in Portugal. As a result, the num-
ber of registered voters grew nearly threefold, from 2,096,020 in the 
1973 legislative elections to 6,231,372 in the 1975 constituent election. 
This sudden increase ranks among the highest rises in the electoral body 
between two successive elections in Europe in the twentieth century.
The importance of this bold decision became evident when the path 
of the Carnations Revolution brought face-to-face those who claimed 
“revolutionary legitimacy“ and those who claimed “democratic, popu-
lar legitimacy,” based on the results at the polls. Any electoral arrange-
ment based on restricted voting rights could not have produced the tre-
mendous impact that the adoption of universal suffrage had in 1975.
After the confrontation of November 25, 1975, the demise of the 
radical left-wing camp paved the way for `nalizing the transition and 
later for consolidating the Second Republic in Portugal as a democratic 
regime. However, the question of universal suffrage was no longer the 
central issue in the construction of a democracy in the last quarter of the 
twentieth century.15 New challenges had surfaced, and the Portuguese 
revolution brought to the fore the issue of public participation in civic 
and political life. Many observers and scholars who have analyzed the 
Portuguese experience have noted the high degree of popular mobiliza-
tion that marked the “hot years.”16 In a way, the presidential candidacy 
of Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho in 1976 (who earned 16.5 percent of the 
national vote and won in the district of Setubal) was the swan song of 
140  |  The Republic and Its Citizens
the grassroots popular movement that had erupted in the form of work-
er’s committees or neighborhood commissions, among others.
The members of the Constituent Assembly were well aware of that 
genuine drive at the grassroots level and made room for the survival of 
those forms of political expression.17 Their aim, however, was to sub-
ordinate those bodies to the macrostructure of the state, which pre-
ferred more classical forms of organization and representation. The 
new political-administrative landscape designed to meet the require-
ments of Article 48 (“All citizens have the right to take part in political 
life and in the direction of public affairs of the country, either directly 
or through freely elected representatives”) adopted a new mix of insti-
tutions: it created from scratch two autonomous regions in the archi-
pelagoes of Azores and Madeira (Title VII), borrowed from historical 
tradition the local political level of municipalities and parishes, and 
passed on from the technocratic inheritance of Caetano’s more progres-
sive advisors the promise of a regional level of political administration 
(Title VIII).
The Constituent Assembly’s general purpose was, thus, to consolidate 
and enhance the quality of Portuguese democracy by facilitating public 
participation and creating a multilevel system in line with the principle 
of subsidiarity. The Council of Europe de`nes the term as meaning that 
“the responsibility for carrying out tasks should be held at the lowest 
level of government competent to undertake them, and where neces-
sary higher authorities should give support to enable them to ful`ll the 
responsibilities that are appropriately theirs.”
4
I would like to provide a view from below, as it were, gained in my 
time as vereador in Porto’s Câmara Municipal (1994  – 1998) to empha-
size the importance of subnational levels and forms of government. The 
eagerness with which the early constitutional authorities faced the ques-
tion of municipal power can be grasped from this anecdote. The `rst 
municipal elections were held on December 12, 1976, in accordance 
with a bill passed in September. However, the bill de`ning the compe-
tences of those municipal bodies was passed only in October 1977 (Law 
79/77); and the one that `xes the terms and limits for local `nances 
would not be published until 1979 (Law 1/79). The local government 
born in this peculiar way owed a great deal to the “municipalist tradi-
tion,” whose roots historians trace to preindependence times and whose 
modern form was crafted in the revolutionary 1830s.18 Apart from the 
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rhetoric of “municipalism,” the new municipal government represented 
a substantial break with the past once it became fully inserted into the 
world of democratic representation through universal suffrage. In this 
sense, it can rightly be claimed that “Portuguese local government . . . in 
its modern form, has been built up from scratch.”19
Much hope was placed on these new authorities, deemed to invert 
the Salazar inheritance of “a system that actively encouraged the popu-
lation’s political apathy”20 where local authorities “essentially played a 
role as units of administration of the [central] state.”21 These hopes were 
grounded on the apparent adoption of the most commonly accepted 
principle of local government in continental Europe: “general compe-
tence.” In 2003 the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the 
Council of Europe issued a statement in which it “welcome[d] the fact 
that the Portuguese municipalities have general competence to under-
take activities affecting the interests of their citizens in accordance with 
each municipality’s own decisions.”22 In precise terms, “the general com-
petence that municipalities possess in most European countries [consists 
of] the right to intervene and take initiatives with respect to any matter 
relating to the local community in so far as the law does not explicitly 
provide otherwise. . . . It bolsters the conception of the municipality as 
a general political authority which acts in its own right.”23 The other 
side of the coin, alas, comes in the form of a much narrower de`ni-
tion of legal functions and the fact that resources are made available in 
close relation to the legally de`ned functions. The Portuguese system of 
local government comes close to the British alternative principle of ultra 
vires, “whereby local authorities may only carry out such responsibili-
ties as are speci`cally assigned to them by parliament.”24
Although it has been generally agreed that “Portugal is one of the 
European countries which follows a more neutral policy regarding the 
`nancial transfers from the center to the local authorities,” having set up 
a model of “relative autonomy,” 25 and thus assuring “the preservation of 
local independence in decision-making with respect to budgetary consid-
erations and spending . . . [and] . . . reducing central government’s mar-
gin for manoeuvre and manipulation,”26 the amount of resources chan-
neled to municipal authorities is quite poor in comparative European 
terms. These conaicting realities are the source of a great deal of tension 
between the expectations placed on the shoulders of local mayors and the 
municipalities’ capacity to deliver and respond effectively to its electors.27
The idea that Portugal has decided, since the revolution, to follow so-
called European patterns in most political domains has long been estab-
lished. It is therefore relevant to assess how the adoption of a European 
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model has affected subnational structures of government and their par-
ticipation in public spending.
5
The trend in post – World War II Europe is to diversify and increase the 
complexity of territorial administration in response to public pressures 
toward self-government.28 We can grasp the extent to which the trend 
to adopt a variety of subnational forms of government has encompassed 
Europe from table 9.2, which refers to the current 27 member countries 
of the European Union (EU 27).
This table shows that the mix of three subnational levels of govern-
ment enshrined in the Constitution of the Second Republic is not actu-
ally in place: Portugal instead appears as a two-tier system. The sec-
ond tier consists of the Autonomous Regions of Azores and Madeira; 
the parish level has insuf`cient power or resources to be considered an 
independent level. As a matter of fact, the implementation of a form of 
regional level of government was defeated in a national referendum held 
in November 1998, but it was not removed from the Constitution. For 
most practical purposes, however, Portugal should be compared with 
countries that have only one subnational level of government, because 
the two autonomous regions comprise only 3.4 percent of the nation’s 
territory and only 4.6 percent of its population.
With this in mind, we may now compare the percentage of public 
spending channeled through subnational governments in the EU 27 (see 
table 9.3). This exercise offers a glimpse of the extent to which subna-
tional governments have resources (and indirectly, competences) that 
allow them to respond to their citizens’ requirements. The `rst conclu-
sion we can draw from table 9.3 is that Portugal is among the poorest 
EU nations in spending for subnational government. EU nations spend 
an average of 33.5 percent of their total budget, but Portugal spends 
only 13 percent. Only Greece, Malta, and Cyprus allocate smaller shares 
of their budget. And our closest neighbors — Mediterranean, Catholic, 
Napoleonic, centralist, statist, bureaucratic, patrimonial (to use a vari-
ety of attributes often applied to this group of countries deemed to bear 
structural historical similarities) — are much more generous: France, 
20.2 percent; Italy, 31.2 percent; Spain, 54.1 percent.
If one splits the €9.3 billion that Portugal allocated in 2007 to all sub-
national forms of government, the two autonomous regions absorbed 
about 20 percent of that sum (Madeira, 11.1 percent; Azores, 8.3 per-
cent), leaving 80.6 percent to the other level.29 Broadly speaking, the 
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autonomous regions receive 2.6 percent of national public spending (20 
percent of 13 percent), and the local authorities receive 10.4 percent of 
the grand total. The “transfers to local authorities” are of two kinds: 
92.4 percent of these transfers go to municipalities, and 7.6 percent go 
to parishes (State Budget for 2009). Thus, parishes receive less than 0.8 
percent of the nation’s public spending, and municipalities grab some 
9.6 percent. Converting these rates to euro amounts per capita in 2005, 
we see that the average EU expenditure through local governments is 
€3,337 per capita, compared to Portugal’s €656 (less than one-`fth of 
the EU average). Figures for total subnational public spending per cap-
ita are €4,114 for the EU nations and €885 for Portugal (that is, 21.5 
percent of the EU 27 average).
What may appear as a picture of Portugal consistently channeling 
fewer than average resources to local government or to the subnational 
system does not, however, hold true for the two autonomous regions. 
Let us compare the average per capita expenditure for the subnational 
system across the EU with what happens in Azores and Madeira. The 
EU’s spending of €4,114 for the subnational system in 2005 would 
compare to about €3,300 in Portugal for the autonomous regions 
alone: Madeira, €3,806; Azores, €2,885. Dominique Hoorens shows 
that those countries with the highest “regional” spending (including fed-
erated states) are all below the level for Madeira. Spain spends €3,100; 
Germany, €3,150. Even the Azores receive more than Austria’s regions, 
€2,800, or Belgium’s €2,500.30 Clearly, Portugal remains a very central-
ized state, limiting the resources it makes available to local self-govern-
ment, though it exhibits advanced forms of political devolution to the 
two autonomous regions. We can conclude that Portugal combines a 
Table 9.2  Levels of Subnational Government in the European Union 
(As applied to the 27 EU member nations, 2007)
 Member Countries
Number of 
Countries
Countries with one level Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Slovenia
8
Countries with two levels Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden
12
Countries with three levels Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, 
Spain, United Kingdom
7
Source: Dominique Hoorens, ed., Sub-National Governments in the European Union: Organization, 
Responsibilities and Finances (La Défense, France: Dexia, 2008), 37–39.
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very generous treatment of the autonomous regions with a very parsi-
monious, even stingy attitude toward the vast majority of the territory 
and its inhabitants.
A fundamental question remains: Does this imbalance of resources 
and competences affect the well-being of the population? To cut short a 
long discussion, let me present table 9.4, which shows the evolution of 
Table 9.3  Sub-National Public Expenditure in the EU 27 (2007)
Country
Percent of 
GDP
Percent of Public 
Expenditure
Austria 17.3 35.1
Belgium 21.0 42.9
Germany 19.6 43.2
Bulgaria 6.8 18.3
Cyprus 2.1 4.7
Czech Republic 12.0 27.4
Denmark 33.4 64.7
Estonia 8.4 25.4
Finland 19.6 40.2
France 11.1 20.8
Greece 3.1 6.7
Hungary 12.9 24.9
Ireland 6.8 19.9
Italy 15.6 31.2
Latvia 10.2 27.4
Lithuania 8.5 25.1
Luxembourg 5.2 13.2
Malta 0.6 1.5
Netherlands 15.4 33.3
Poland 13.5 30.8
Portugal 6.0 13.0
Romania 8.4 24.0
Slovakia 6.6 17.6
Slovenia 8.8 19.5
Spain 20.9 54.1
Sweden 25.0 45.0
United Kingdom 12.9 29.0
Total EU 27 15.7 33.5
Source: Hoorens, Sub-National Governments in the European Union, 31 and 77.
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regional wealth, as measured by gross domestic product (GDP) per cap-
ita in Purchasing Power Parities from 1995 to 2007.31
In those twelve years, the country as a whole progressed from 75 
percent of the EU 27 average to 76 percent. At the regional level, the 
North lost 3 percent its purchasing power. Other regions made mod-
est gains: the Center and the Algarve, 1 percent; Lisbon and Alentejo, 2 
and 3 percent, respectively. But the autonomous regions gained 8 per-
cent (Azores) and 30 percent (Madeira). This very substantial difference 
casts doubts on the putative ef`ciency of centralization in the creation 
of wealth and promotion of development, and it points to the need for 
both further inquiry and discussion of the underlying prejudices that 
have militated against the process of creating constitutional regions in 
continental Portugal.
6
Many academics and politicians stress the imminent failure of the 
Portuguese Second Republic. Talk of impending doom tends to catch 
the audience’s attention. Although I do not believe that such a break-
down is imminent, it is impossible to ignore the evidence of a severe 
decline in public approval of the current form of democracy in Portugal. 
The question of democratic legitimacy looms on the horizon once again.
Figure 9.1, borrowed from André Freire and José Manuel Leite 
Viegas, shows a rapid decline in the rate of satisfaction with the perfor-
mance of democracy in the current regime, from nearly 80 percent sat-
isfaction less than two decades ago to about 30 percent in 2010. This 
puts Portugal at odds with most of its partners in the European Union 
and elsewhere in the developed democratic world.32 Compared with a 
group of solid democratic countries, whose inhabitants’ rate of satisfac-
tion was around 65 percent from 2002 through 2006, Portugal in 2005 
exhibited a rate of 47.6 percent. Scandinavian countries had rates above 
70 percent (reaching 93.4 percent in Denmark); our neighbor Spain 
Table 9.4  Evolution of Portuguese Regional GDP per Capita in 
Purchasing Power Parities (EU 27 = 100)
 Portugal North Center Lisbon Alentejo Algarve Azores Madeira
1995 75 64 64 104 70 79 60 67
2007 76 61 65 106 73 80 68 97
+1 -3 +1 +2 +3 +1 +8 +30
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estatística, Contas Regionais, 2008—Preliminar, 9, www.ine.pt. 
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rated 77.7 percent; and the United States 78.4 percent. Having fallen 
faster than the rate of satisfaction with democracy in other nations, the 
rate in Portugal is at a worrisome level today. These bare `gures from 
opinion polls match a diffuse +n de partie atmosphere that has been 
captured by this line of graf`ti seen on a Porto wall: “Queremos menti-
ras novas” (We want new lies).
The current republic and the last years of the First Republic are both 
plagued by the frailty of their legitimacy, but our contemporaries seem 
to combine a critique of the current state of affairs with a defense of the 
principle of democracy; they are very far from espousing an ontologi-
cal critique of democracy itself, as was common in the 1920s. Indeed, 
the main thrust of complaints in our time is the limited scope of politi-
cal participation.33 This reaction can be understood both by the over-
whelming presence of political parties that suffocate the popular voice 
and also by the limited scope for subnational organs of power, in line 
with the principle of subsidiarity.
However, political regimes evolve and change. The pursuit of the 
“quality of democracy” calls for an unending process of adjustment 
and improvement. The scope of changes can be of different magnitudes 
and may or may not imply a change of regime. The Portuguese Second 
Republic may survive for decades, or a more or less peaceful, substan-
tial revision of the Constitution may bring a Third Republic. Much 
depends on how the Second Republic confronts the shortcomings it 
has so far exhibited. Among those is what I regard as an Ariadne’s 
thread that runs from the First Republic’s curtailing of voting rights 
rather than ful`lling its promise of universal suffrage, to the Second 
Republic’s vague and insuf`cient moves toward developing the condi-
tions and institutional instruments for the people to exert their con-
stitutional right to participate in the political process in ways other 
than mere regular voting for national organs of power or impover-
ished, weak municipalities. Both processes contribute to the emergence 
of a perception of an aristocratic, if not oligarchic, elite, and they 
undermine the political legitimacy of the Republic. Some of the First 
Republic’s acknowledged “errors” were aptly overcome later in the 
century, but the persistence of a conservative intellectual attitude that 
tends to downplay and disregard political participation at the grass-
roots and the contribution of the many, in countercurrent to recent 
developments in democracy in Europe and elsewhere, is particularly 
disturbing. Manifestations of contempt or disdain for what is closer to 
the bottom of the political and administrative ladder, or farther away 
from the capital, are so abundant as to make a choice of examples 
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quite dif`cult; and conservative intellectuals sing in chorus Salazar’s 
tune of the people’s “unpreparedness” for democracy.
In the pressing quest for solutions to shrinking political legitimacy, 
it is worth listening to some voices that echo in our memory, voices of 
some of our egregious ancestors that may bring surprising contribu-
tions, addressing in a fresh and inspiring way the models of territorial 
administration and self-government that pertain to the broader issue 
of the “quality of democracy.” I refer to a minority current within the 
Republican movement: Federalism.
Hermínio Martins distinguishes three branches of Federalism: 
“imperial and postimperial,” of which Spinola’s program contained 
in Portugal e o Futuro was perhaps the last example; “Iberian and 
European Federalism,” partly overcome by the process of European 
integration but quite alive in this very context; and “Federalism at 
home” — precisely the one that may be useful insofar as it covers what 
is perhaps wrongly termed “regionalism.”34 Alves da Veiga, the veteran 
republican leader of the 1891 uprising in Porto, proposed in 1911 a 
federal constitution modeled on his book Política Nova. That constitu-
tional document suffered the same fate as the constitutional draft later 
prepared by Sebastião de Magalhães Lima and a committee of assem-
bly members, which has been labeled “a Republic of Municipalities,” 
for the extended decentralized powers it offered to local organs of self-
government. This occurred long before Fernando Venâncio’s writing 
of the political-`ction novel El Rei no Porto (2001), an ironic story 
about the power of municipalities in the northern, monarchical part 
of a divided Portugal. The legacy of those leading early Republi-
cans was later taken up, among many other examples, by the Nucleo 
Figure 9.1. Rate of satisfaction with the performance of democracy. Source: André 
Freire and José Manuel Leite Viegas, Representação Politica — O caso português em 
perspectiva comparada (Lisbon: Sextante, 2010).
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Republicano Regionalista do Norte led by Eduardo Santos Silva in 
Porto in 1924.35
My point is not to demonstrate the existence of this current in the 
Republican tradition before and after 1910. Rather, I would stress the 
emphasis that federalists of all currents always placed on decentralized 
self-government for the territorial units, which would join together in 
the formation of the nation in a non-unitarian state. The suggestion I 
present to you is that republican federalism and regionalism offer perti-
nent thoughts and merge with the cause of those who call for the ful`ll-
ment of yet unrealized constitutional principles of popular participation 
and enlarged self-government as part of the quest for a better democ-
racy; they are increasingly resentful of the ways the Second Republic has 
performed in this regard.
Some, like Fernando Marques da Costa, have openly argued that 
Portugal requires a Third Republic.36 This new polity would replace 
the unitarian character of the state, a core de`ning value of the current 
constitution (whose pertinence is under dispute due to the strength of 
the autonomous regions and the notion of “progressing” or “evolving” 
autonomy), embracing a federalist-inspired new model that would not 
change the substance of present-day arrangements but would instead 
call, as we say in colloquial Portuguese, “the oxen by their names.” This, 
however, could entail other constitutional changes such as the accep-
tance of regional states and political parties, a bicameral parliament, 
and a rede`nition of the status and role of the president of the Republic.
Portugal may, and most likely will, stay short of becoming an open 
federalist state. Spain is a model to bear in mind, having broken away 
from the very same mold of centralist tradition to achieve levels of devel-
opment and political responsiveness that have no parallel in Portugal. 
Although Spain has not established an openly federalist state, its struc-
ture is quite close to that model, which three of our European partners 
have adopted (Austria, Belgium, Germany) and which is hotly discussed 
elsewhere (for example, in Italy).
The core political elite that has dominated the Second Republic may 
still be persuaded that what its members wrote in the 1976 Constitution 
(and have found no reason or no strength to change in the years since), 
what they have been so critical of in the “European example,” if actually 
implemented, is indeed compatible with the Second Republic and the 
Republican tradition and need not remain a postponed commitment. 
Their stubborn attitude in keeping Portugal one of the most centralized 
states in the European Union, their reluctance to implement a regional 
level of government, their preference to keep the scope of competences 
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of municipalities at the current low level, on the fallacious argument 
that the country cannot afford the `nancial lack of discipline that those 
reforms would entail (as if centralism would spare us the costs of `nan-
cial irresponsibility . . .), is no less patronizing than nor substantially 
different from Afonso Costa’s recanting on the promise to grant open 
suffrage to illiterate men on the basis that they were “people without 
any clear idea about anything whatsoever” — just to be reminded that 
the Republican leadership had not asked for proof of literacy from those 
who fought and died in Rua de Santo António or in the Rotunda.37
The evolutionary capacity of the Second Republic — an idea that 
the experience of constitutional adaptation to new realities since 1975 
seems to support — is currently under observation. Should it persist with 
the current trend of megalomaniac investments in the Lisbon area, the 
much-delayed process of institutional creation and political devolu-
tion to the regions, the restraints it places on the competences of local 
government, the semipermanent state of conaict with the autonomous 
regions, in a clear challenge to the respect due to the principles of equal-
ity and participation enshrined in the core values of modern democ-
racy — then either Jose Mattoso’s bitter remark that Portugal “is becom-
ing a country of bits and pieces that nothing holds together”38 imposes 
itself, or a Third Republic may actually be in the making.
Finale
A `nal word on the future seems in order. The future, as Sir Karl Popper 
would say, is open39 — and I have no greater insight than anyone else 
about what will actually happen in the days ahead. However, because 
this paper is presented in the San Francisco Bay Area, on the campus 
of the University of California, Berkeley, I cannot escape the resonat-
ing echo of words by two illustrious men of the twentieth century who 
walked these very same streets and pathways, heard the Campanile bell 
toll, sat in the tranquility of these libraries or under these trees, and were 
inspired with eloquence to reveal fundamental aspects of their, and our, 
society, writing words I have carried in my memory for years and repeat 
now with great respect.
Allen Ginsberg, who is said to “see with the eyes of angels” (William 
Carlos Williams), perhaps further than most of us, opened his epic poem 
“Howl”40 with this stanza:
I saw the best minds of my generation destroyed by madness, starving 
hysterical naked,
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dragging themselves through the negro streets at dawn looking for an angry 
`x
Ginsberg’s lines brutally remind us all that rational behavior is far 
from being the only door opening up to the future. Other considerations 
do shape the agency of men. Among those, even if only as a worst-
case scenario, one can recall Carlo Maria Cipolla’s Third (and Golden) 
Rule on Human Stupidity: “A person is stupid if they cause damage to 
another person or group of people without experiencing personal gain, 
or even worse, causing damage to themselves in the process.”41
History, therefore, is about contingency, largely shaped by our beliefs, 
our choices, our actual deeds, more or less rational, more or less impul-
sive. In other words, history is shaped by the use we give to our rights of 
citizenship, so intimately related to the very essence of the Republic as 
a `eld of combined liberties that in my daily life I endeavor to preserve, 
but whose fate I am unable to predict.
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A central consequence of Portugal’s transition from authoritarian rule to 
democracy is a massive transformation in both the size and scope of the 
Portuguese state. Despite much lower GDP per capita, the Portuguese 
state has levels of public spending that frequently rival or exceed 
those of the more developed states of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) or of the European Union 
(EU). As in the wealthier countries, the bulk of this spending consists 
of social transfers, education, and health. Concerned with social pro-
tection, access to education, and the right to healthcare, the Portuguese 
state is primarily a welfare state. These efforts are extraordinary, on 
several levels. The vast majority of the growth in expenditure occurred 
post-1974, a period marked initially by high levels of economic vola-
tility, both domestically and internationally, but above all by a slowing 
of average economic growth rates. This is a welfare state built after the 
golden age of postwar European growth. Following the deep divisions 
and policy reversals of the revolutionary period, it reaects a relatively 
strong consensus among the major political parties concerning the func-
tions of the state. Finally, it represents a substantial organizational and 
technocratic achievement. The state was able to erect institutional struc-
tures with wide scope and universal coverage that have been broadly 
popular. Democracy, in other words, was not only a formal achieve-
ment, but also changed the expectations citizens had of their state.
Nonetheless, outcomes have been decidedly mixed. While improve-
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ments in health have been dramatic, success has been only partial in 
the education sector. Poverty and economic inequality also remain high. 
More broadly, the growth of the state is in part a reaection of the uneven 
performance of the economy and of the private sector labor market. 
This is particularly the case when the measures used are expenditure 
relative to GDP (gross domestic product) or the creation of public sec-
tor jobs relative to private sector ones. The last decade has been in many 
ways a lost one, where economic convergence with rich countries’ GDP 
per capita has actually reversed. Despite very substantial increases in 
taxation since 1974, budget de`cits and the inability to control expen-
diture have been a chronic problem. Of greater concern, tools used to 
paper over or temporarily close these de`cits have steadily vanished, 
leaving few options. The current crisis is thus long in the making. Even 
if the sovereign debt crisis gets resolved, low economic growth, prob-
lems of competitiveness, and population aging are likely to place con-
tinual pressure on the major achievement of Portuguese democracy: its 
welfare state.
This chapter proceeds in several sections. After providing a broad 
overview of changes in the Portuguese state, the paper examines the 
growth of social transfers and public involvement in health and educa-
tion. Middle sections focus on employment and labor market change 
and the continuing problems of poverty and inequality. The chapter con-
cludes with a discussion of taxes, budget de`cits, and current challenges.
The Changing Size and Scope of the State: 
1974 to the Start of the Current Crisis
On the eve of the Portuguese revolution, Portugal was `ghting three 
wars in its African colonies of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-
Bissau. It is thus not surprising that its military expenditure was large. 
At 6 percent of GDP, it was the largest single item in the government 
budget. Today, military expenditure has declined to 1 percent of GDP. 
But the state budget overall has grown tremendously, from 23 percent 
of GDP in 1974 to 46 percent in 2008.1
Four areas account for the bulk of the growth of the Portuguese 
state: social transfers, education, health, and public employment (princi-
pally in the areas of education and health). In 1972, health expenditure 
was only 0.2 percent of GDP; by 2008 it was 5.6 percent. Education 
expenditure was 1.4 percent of GDP in 1972; by 2008 it was 4.4 per-
cent.2 Separate from the state budget but still part of public spending, 
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the social security system accounted for 5.6 percent of GDP in 1974 
but 16.1 percent in 2008.3 Education, health, and social security thus 
increase from about 7.2 percent of GDP on the eve of the revolution to 
26.1 percent of GDP in 2008.
Another way of looking at the growth of the state is through the 
number of people it employs. In 1974 200,000 people were on the pub-
lic payroll. Today it is about 800,000.4 This increase far outstrips the 
rise in population, which grew by 25 percent, from 8.5 million residents 
in 1973 (low because of emigration) to 10.6 million (higher recently 
because of immigration) in 2008.5 Health care and education are labor-
intensive activities and it is these two sectors that account for most of 
the growth in public employment. Because teachers, university profes-
sors, doctors, and nurses have higher than average levels of education, 
the share of government employment that is highly skilled has grown 
quickly. As a result, the government wage bill has grown faster than the 
already substantial increase in public employment.
Democracy has brought with it a tremendous transformation in the 
state, both doubling its size and massively expanding its scope while 
greatly reducing the proportion of national resources devoted to the 
military. From a budgetary perspective at least, the principal function 
of the state is social protection and social services. The welfare state has 
replaced the warfare state.
The tax increases required to `nance this state have been consider-
able, and only on rare occasions have these met with public protest. 
In fact cuts in expenditure are much more likely to elicit protests than 
increases in taxation, suggesting at least at one level that the increase 
in the social protection function of the state has been met with broad 
approval. The two principal political parties have each overseen expan-
sions of social expenditure, and polls suggest the Portuguese broadly 
agree that the state has important responsibilities in health, education, 
pensions, and the struggle against social exclusion.6 For many of these 
areas there is broad consensus that they should be viewed as social 
rights.
Social Transfers
One way to measure the growth of the welfare state is to look at the 
growth in the number of people receiving social transfers. The num-
ber of bene`ciaries of the social security system has expanded by more 
than `fty times since 1960.7 The number rose from a mere 56,000 in 
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1960 to 800,000 by 1975, 2 million by 1985, 2.5 million by 2000, and 
is approaching 3 million today.8 Notable in these data is the fact that 
social transfers start during the Salazar dictatorship, though they grow 
at only a moderate pace during the early to mid-1960s, accelerating in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. The low numbers reaect a variety of 
factors. As late as 1970, life expectancy was 67.9 There were thus rel-
atively few elderly as a proportion of the population. The proportion 
of the elderly who met eligibility requirements was low, both because 
the system was relatively new and thus few quali`ed for bene`ts, and 
because large segments of the working population remained uncovered. 
This explains why disability pensions constitute the largest proportion 
of pensions in the early 1960s.
The rapid rise in the number of people receiving transfers in the dem-
ocratic period reaects political decisions to both increase the number of 
risks covered as well as decisions to extend the pension system to previ-
ously unprotected segments of the population such as rural workers or 
domestics. Expansion of the system of social transfers predated the call 
in the 1976 Constitution for the establishment of a comprehensive social 
security system. The year 1974 saw the introduction of a social pension 
for elderly or disabled who had not contributed to the system; 1975 
saw the introduction of unemployment assistance. Sickness, old age, 
and disability insurance for the self-employed would follow. As a result, 
the Law on Social Security (Lei de Bases da Segurança Social) of 1984 is 
as much about reorganizing an existing system as about establishing a 
new one from scratch. Nonetheless coverage of new risks continued to 
be added to the system of social transfers. In the mid-1990s, for exam-
ple, two programs designed to combat deep poverty, the Rendimento 
Minimo Garantido and the Rendimento Social de Inserção, were added. 
A broad range of risks is thus now covered by the Portuguese welfare 
state. These include old age, survivors, disability, sickness, child, and 
poverty transfers. Although the monthly social pension remains small, 
the noncontributory scheme ensures virtually universal access to pen-
sions by the elderly.
With the establishment of a comprehensive social protection system, 
the number of recipients increases virtually automatically as a result of 
demographic change associated with the aging of the population, lon-
ger life expectancy, or deterioration in the labor market. Steep drops in 
fertility rates (now below replacement level) combined with increased 
life expectancy have led to an ever greater proportion of the population 
that is elderly and thus eligible for a pension. Population aging places 
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great pressure on pay-as-you-go systems where outlays come largely 
from current revenues, not from savings. In 1974, the ratio of pension-
ers to the labor force (employed and unemployed) was 1:5. Today each 
pensioner is supported by only 1.7 people in the labor force.10
The cost of providing these bene`ts is large. From 1995 to 2008, 
social transfers increased from 11.2 percent of GDP to 15.6 percent.11 
By contrast, the weight of social transfers in the Euro Area 12 declined 
during this period from 16.9 percent to 16.1 percent of GDP. Portugal, 
the poorest country in the Euro Area 12, devotes a comparable share of 
its wealth to social transfers.12 Recent reforms have discouraged early 
retirement, altered indexation to inaation, and changed the bene`ts for-
mula to reduce the weight of the more recent (usually high-earning) 
years of contribution and to better take into account longer life expec-
tancy. These changes will reduce bene`t amounts compared to the ear-
lier calculus.
Health
Democratic Portugal has also seen very substantial increases in state-
funded health care. As noted above, public spending on health increased 
from 0.2 percent of GDP in 1972 to 5.6 percent in 2008 (some ana-
lysts place it at over 7 percent).13 The National Health Service, created 
in 1979, is dominant. Although Portugal has a private-public mix, with 
private insurance available and with doctors able to practice in the pri-
vate system, the overwhelming majority of visits to the doctor take place 
in the public system. This is especially true for primary care and general 
practitioner visits. Doctor’s visits per person per year have increased 
`vefold since 1960, from 0.9 then to 4.4 in 2008.14 A similar level of 
increase is found in the number of doctors in this period, which rose 
from 7,000 (most of them not on the public payroll then) to 39,000, 
and in the number of people per doctor, which fell from 1,253 per doc-
tor to 273. Similar trends apply to nurses. Budgetary outlays are not 
restricted to medical personnel. New hospitals and health centers have 
been built and diagnostic equipment purchased. In addition, the state 
pays for the vast bulk of pharmaceutical prescriptions. Health expen-
ditures account for about 15 percent of public expenditure, which is 
higher than the EU 15 average. This percentage has been relatively sta-
ble since 2000, but some of this is illusory and cost pressures are likely 
to rise for several reasons. First, demographic pressures, again in the 
form of population aging and longer life expectancy, will inevitably 
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translate into greater demand for services. Second, technological inno-
vation in the health sector can increase costs quickly. (It should be noted 
that these `rst two sources of pressure are shared with other developed 
societies.) Third, the Portuguese state already runs large de`cits in the 
medical sector, most famously with respect to pharmacies but also to 
other providers. This means that expenditure hasn’t kept up with costs. 
Finally, low economic growth and pressure on the budget will exacer-
bate the need to control costs.
Nonetheless, the outcomes have been very substantial indeed. These 
large investments in health correlate with large increases in life expec-
tancy, from 67 in 1970 to 79 in 2008.15 Infant mortality has fallen from 
51 per 1,000 live births in 1970 to 3 per 1,000 in 2008, among the 
lowest in the world. Deaths in childbirth have also fallen dramatically, 
from 116 per 100,000 births in 1960 to 4 in 2008. A number of rea-
sons beyond public investments in health are cited for this tremendous 
success in health outcomes. These range from greater level of education 
and knowledge among the population at large, health seen as a right 
(as stated in the Portuguese constitution), and improved material condi-
tions in housing, diet, water, and sanitation. Luciano Amaral notes the 
important point that the Salazar dictatorship saw major improvements 
in these indicators without corresponding public investments in health. 
Life expectancy increased from 38 in 1930 to 67 in 1970 and infant 
mortality declined from 144 per 1,000 live births to 51, for example.16 
This raises the interesting question of how much health indicators 
would have improved as a result of economic growth and improved 
living standards, irrespective of public investments in health. Perhaps it 
is fair to say that the low-hanging fruit of better diet, warmer homes, 
and improved sanitation systems are likely to have already made their 
impact. Improvements in health are certainly the result of a multiplicity 
of factors, but it is likely that the availability of modern health care at 
very low cost to the user plays an increasingly important role in recent 
improvements. Nonetheless, the point remains that large investments in 
a publicly provided health care system have been accompanied by major 
improvements in health outcomes.
Education
Education is another area in which massive investment by the state has 
taken place. Public spending on education rose from 1.4 percent of GDP 
in 1972 to 4.4 percent in 2008,17 though some analysts place public 
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spending on education currently at over 6 percent. This considerable 
expenditure, amounting to about 12 percent of public outlays, is visible 
in a number of indicators that demonstrate much greater access to edu-
cation under democratic rule.
The Salazar regime had made steady progress against illiteracy. In 
1930 illiteracy was 60 percent; forty years later in 1970 it was still 26 
percent.18 Compulsory education had increased during the last ten years 
of the dictatorship, to 6 years in 1964 and 8 in 1973, but enrollment 
lagged. In 1974 only 20 percent of children were enrolled in middle 
school. In 2007 that number was 87 percent. Under democracy years of 
compulsory education increased further, to 9 years in 1986 and to 12 
in 2009, but enrollment lags continued to be a problem. High school 
enrollment rose from a paltry 9 percent in 1974 to a much improved 
but still unsatisfactory 60 percent in 2007.
Improvements have been most dramatic at the beginning and the 
end of the education spectrum. Children enrolled in preschool increased 
from 6,000 in 1960 to 266,000 in 2008.19 University degrees, once the 
sole purview of a small elite, were conferred on 19,000 people in 1995. 
By 2008, the number of students receiving university diplomas stood 
at 84,000. For the last two decades, a sizeable majority of degrees have 
been conferred on women. Since 1994, women have received 60 percent 
to 68 percent of the yearly total of degrees.20 While the large increase 
in university enrollment and graduations are a major achievement, the 
labor force remains undereducated in comparison to the more devel-
oped societies of the OECD. This is so for two principal reasons. First, 
older workers have much lower levels of educational attainment com-
pared to workers in these other countries. Using data from 2006 and 
with the exception of Mexico, Portugal ranks lowest or very close to 
the bottom among OECD countries in the percentage of its population 
aged 25  – 64 who have completed upper secondary or tertiary educa-
tion. The same ranking applies for the population aged 25  – 34, indicat-
ing that even in the 1990s virtually all other OECD countries, with the 
exception of Mexico, continued to surpass Portugal. By 2006, however, 
entry rates to and graduation rates from university had climbed. They 
were still below the midpoint of the range, but they were no longer at 
the bottom.21
Second, and of greater concern, is the problem of educational failure, 
or insucesso escolar.22 This takes several forms. One is the large num-
ber of students who not only fail to complete high school on time, as we 
have seen, but who also fail to return to the educational system. One-
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third of young people aged 18 – 24 is not in school and has not completed 
high school.23 This is more than double the rate for the European Union 
as a whole. Another way in which insucesso escolar manifests itself is 
in the poor performance of Portuguese students in international tests. 
In the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) tests, for 
example, Portugal ranked fourth from the bottom, doing better than 
Mexico and only slightly better than Greece and Italy.24 This poor result 
is all the more problematic given that Portugal has the OECD’s highest 
ratio of teachers to students and above-average spending on education 
relative to GDP.
Social and demographic factors are often mentioned as causes of this 
comparatively poor performance. Teachers complain of a lack of student 
engagement. A large cohort of parents with low levels of educational 
attainment is perhaps less able to promote their children’s education 
or perhaps values it less than parents with higher levels of education. 
Because education through high school is free and because the wage 
premium to education is high, expanding access to education and clear 
market signals of the opportunity cost of forgoing education don’t seem 
enough by themselves to solve the problem of low educational attain-
ment.25 Despite very large investments in education and improvements 
in average years of education attained, the results are decidedly mixed. 
High dropout rates and low performance on international tests con-
tinue to plague the Portuguese educational system.
Employment and Labor Market Change
The growth of the education and health sectors brought with it a large 
expansion of public employment. Although the size of the public sector 
is high on the public agenda today, it was long in the making. Local and 
central administration accounted for 196,000 jobs in 1968. This num-
ber had risen to 516,000 by 1983 and to 716,000 by 2001.26 Between 
1980 and 2002 the public employment share rose from 9.7 percent to 17 
percent, the steepest rise in the EU 15.27 In a comparison that includes 
the United States, Japan, Poland, and the Czech Republic as well as 
the EU 15,28 Portugal’s ranking in public employment share increased 
from fourteenth in 1980 to seventh in 2001 and was exceeded only by 
Sweden, Finland, Denmark, France, and the United Kingdom. Looking 
at a more recent period, the OECD estimates government employment 
growth in Portugal between 2000 and 2005 at over 4 percent.29 Until 
the mid-2000s when Portugal’s unemployment rate started to climb, the 
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positive employment performance was in large measure the result of 
major increases in public employment.
Under democracy the state has become a signi`cant source of jobs, 
accounting for about 20 percent of employment. This is particularly the 
case for university graduates, about half of whom `nd employment in 
the public sector.30 The weight of public employment is clearly visible 
in government expenditure data. The government wage bill consumed 
12.9 percent of GDP in 2008, which is substantially higher than the 
Euro Area 12 average of 10.1 percent.31
The state’s role in the labor market has not been restricted to public 
employment, however. Of equal importance are changes in employment 
regulations and labor market policy. Although the upsurge in worker 
movements following the revolution was substantial and at its peak 
included the dramatic takeovers of farms and factories, this was rela-
tively short-lived.32 More long-lasting were actions taken by the state. 
Unions became legal and free. Membership expanded quickly during 
the upsurge of worker movements but — with the exception of the pub-
lic sector and a few areas of the private sector, such as banking — has 
declined since. Outside such areas, unions today are relatively weak. 
Member dues are opaque. Indicators of labor market protest actions 
such as the number of strikes or the number of days of work lost to 
strikes are low.33
However, low rates of unionization outside the public sector have 
been partially compensated by regulations that extend agreement 
between unions and employers to nonunionized workers.34 In addi-
tion, tripartite bargaining between the state, employers’ associations, 
and the union confederations was institutionalized, though the success 
and impact of these economic and social accords has varied over time.35
Employment protection legislation in the early years of the democ-
racy was tightened, giving workers substantial protection from job loss 
but making it hard for employers to `re workers. The OECD ranks 
Portugal as having one of the highest degrees of employment protec-
tion legislation.36 Critics of employment protection legislation argue 
that it stiaes hiring as much as it does `ring. In so doing it reduces 
the ability of the labor market to react to changed circumstances. It 
is a drag on ef`ciency and is thought to increase unemployment.37 
Recommendations that Portugal weaken its employment protection leg-
islation are frequent.38
However, unemployment for most of the democratic period has been 
quite low. The ability of the labor market to absorb the return of the 
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Portuguese settler population from Africa and the demobilization of 
a large part of the military in the mid- to late 1970s, when economic 
conditions were unfavorable, is remarkable and well known.39 This has 
been partly attributed to wage aexibility, in turn facilitated by inaa-
tion and by currency devaluation. Four other factors have also been put 
forward to explain Portugal’s low unemployment rate for most of this 
period. First, although a system for unemployment compensation was 
established early in the democracy, eligibility rules have remained tight 
by European standards. As a result the incentives faced by the unem-
ployed to `nd a job quickly are quite high.
Second, employment protection legislation applies only to a pro-
tected class of employees, those with inde`nite contracts. Finding it ini-
tially dif`cult to weaken the protections head-on, Portugal, like many 
other southern European states, liberalized the use of short-term and 
`xed-term contracts.40 A further change was the substitution of service 
contracts, known informally as recibos verdes, for employment con-
tracts. These new types of contracts bypassed the otherwise rigid `ring 
rules and had the practical effect of reducing employment protection 
legislation.
Third, the state was eventually successful in weakening the employ-
ment protection rules directly. Reducing personnel due to economic or 
technological reasons is permitted, for example, and collective dismissal 
can be used for smaller numbers of workers than was previously the 
case. In comparison to other European countries, Portugal’s employ-
ment regulation ranking remains high but no longer extraordinarily so.
Finally, employment growth in the public sector has masked weak 
employment growth in the private sector. In the absence of govern-
ment employment, unemployment numbers would likely have crept up 
sooner. One irony is that the government itself resorted to `xed-term 
contracts and the use of recibo verde service contracts. In recent years, 
and particularly with the economic crisis, unemployment has grown 
quickly.
The evidence on the effects of employment protection legislation in 
Portugal is mixed. The creation and loss of jobs is relatively high, but 
job-switching is low and a high proportion of the unemployed are long-
term.41 Unemployment remained relatively low for much of the dem-
ocratic period primarily because of the growth of employment in the 
public sector and the use of temporary and atypical contracts.
Although employment protection legislation in Portugal failed to be 
reaected in a high unemployment rate, it was not without negative con-
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sequences. The use of atypical and temporary contracts creates deeply 
inequitable divisions between protected and unprotected workers. 
Protected workers have inde`nite contracts, job stability, and partici-
pate fully in the protections offered by the welfare state. Unprotected 
workers are much more likely to have interrupted work histories and 
greater levels of `nancial volatility and instability, making long-term 
planning dif`cult. In addition, they often fall between the cracks of 
social protection systems. They are at much greater risk of being ineli-
gible for unemployment compensation, have less access to paid vaca-
tions, and their spottier work histories will be reaected in lower retire-
ment bene`ts. Young workers are much more likely to be unprotected, 
which creates a sense of frustration and disillusionment. This said, it is 
important to strike a comparative note. Portugal is not alone in these 
problems and by some indicators has done comparatively well. Many 
European countries have had overall and youth unemployment rates 
well above the Portuguese average for much of the democratic period.
It is also important to note the huge structural changes that have 
taken place in the labor market. Women have entered the labor force 
in very large numbers. Unlike other southern European and most con-
tinental European countries, Portugal’s female employment rate is high. 
By 2007, the Portuguese female employment rate had reached 61.9 per-
cent.42 Employment rates of older workers, both male and female, in 
Portugal are higher than the EU average. Male employment rates used 
to be higher than the EU 15 average but have been declining since 2001, 
and by 2007, at 73.8 percent, had reached the EU 15 midpoint.
In 1974, the primary sector (mostly agriculture but also `shing) 
accounted for 34 percent of employment.43 By 2008, this had declined 
to 11 percent. As A. Barreto notes, this movement out of agriculture 
resulted in internal population shifts toward the coasts and urban cen-
ters.44 In 1974 industry accounted for 33 percent of employment. This 
rose to 37.9 percent in 1991 but by 2008 had fallen to 28.9 percent. The 
service sector grew signi`cantly during this period, from 33 percent of 
employment in 1974 to 61 percent in 2009. Despite the two-thirds drop 
in primary sector employment, Portugal remains the Western European 
country with the highest percentage of employment in agriculture.
The entry of women into the workforce and the rise of the ser-
vice sector were the result of processes of economic development and 
social change, but they were also inauenced by state action, including 
the expansion of the health and education sectors. Labor market reg-
ulations shifted substantially with the turn to democracy even as the 
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commitment to economic openness, started in the dictatorship, deep-
ened, with profound implications for the nature of employment. As seen 
above, the state itself became a major employer, accounting for one in 
`ve jobs. Finally, the rise of social transfers expanded the role of the 
state even further. By 2010, more than one in three Portuguese received 
transfers from the state. The role of the state as a provider of income — 
either through social transfers or directly as an employer — had grown 
to levels that by several measures exceed the European average.
Poverty and Inequality
Despite a signi`cant state effort in income support, high employment 
rates, and, with the exception of recent years, comparatively low unem-
ployment, Portugal continues to have among the highest poverty rates 
in Western Europe and among the highest levels of inequality in the 
European Union.45 In 2007, with an 80/20 income quintile ratio of 6.5 
in Portugal, only Romania and Bulgaria had worse levels of income 
inequality.46 In 2000, 19.1 percent of the Portuguese population lived in 
poverty (de`ned as below 60 percent of median income).47
Several factors explain the apparent paradox of convergence to 
European norms in terms of substantial welfare state effort and a high 
level of direct state employment but continued high poverty rates. The 
`rst set of factors has to do with the labor market and with the problem 
of low wages and high wage inequality. The distribution of income is 
highly unequal and correlates closely with the high inequality in educa-
tional attainment. Income among agricultural workers is also low, con-
tributing to signi`cant regional differences in income and poverty rates. 
This can be seen in the high poverty rates of 50.4 percent for people 
working in agriculture and of 48.3 percent for people with less than a 
primary education.48
There is considerable debate about the degree to which the 
Portuguese tax system and social spending reduce or help replicate 
income inequality. Many analysts argue that evasion, tax shifting, 
deductions, reductions in the number of tax brackets, and the differen-
tial treatment of wage income from capital gains reduce the progressiv-
ity of the Portuguese tax system.49 Writing in 2001, the OECD found 
that Portuguese “income taxation achieves little in the way of income 
redistribution.”50 Two years later, the OECD had become more pessi-
mistic, writing that “the `scal system probably exacerbates the inequal-
ity of income distribution.”51 The Portuguese welfare state, like many 
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of the welfare states in southern Europe, privileges pension spending. 
Although a social pension scheme covers individuals who did not con-
tribute enough during their working lives to qualify for the regular state 
pension system, the bulk of spending occurs in the latter system and this 
system is Bismarckian, replicating differences in earned income.
However, other analysts `nd that state taxes and transfers are indeed 
redistributive and became substantially more so during the 1990s.52 
Improvements in tax collection and the development of substantial 
antipoverty programs such as the Rendimento Minimo Garantido 
(Minimum Guaranteed Income) were effective in compensating for 
widening market inequalities of income. It is this greater redistribu-
tive effort of the state, countervailing ever wider wage inequality, which 
accounts for the relative stability of the Gini index.
Because the Portuguese welfare state is pension-heavy, it underpro-
vides community social services such as day centers and long-term care 
for the elderly, the disabled, or the chronically ill.53 In response, the 
Portuguese state has developed tax incentives for charitable giving to 
social service nonpro`ts and has also contracted out with these groups 
to provide services.54 The relative paucity of services in this area led 
some analysts to argue that Portugal was a welfare society.55 In the 
absence of state provision, society — either through the extended fam-
ily or through the community — met needs. This concept has been chal-
lenged by `ndings that supportive social networks are richer and more 
prevalent at the higher end of the socioeconomic and educational dis-
tribution. As a result, informally provided welfare seems to “reinforce 
existing social inequalities and to offer less support for those who most 
need support.”56
Taxes, Budget Deficits, and Current 
Challenges
The very large increases in public expenditure required large increases in 
taxation, and this Portugal has achieved, although concerns about equity 
and tax evasion persist. A large number of `rms report annual losses, 
many professionals and self-employed fail to accurately report income, 
and tax shifting — in which income is declared as a business expense, for 
example, and taxed at a lower rate — is common. Nonetheless, the tax 
take of the government is substantial and has increased steadily over the 
democratic period. Notable is the convergence toward the average of 
the EU 12, a group of countries that on average are much wealthier than 
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Portugal. In 1995, the total tax burden in Portugal amounted to 31.9 
percent of GDP, still substantially less than the EU 12 average of 40.4 
percent.57 By 2008 the tax gap had narrowed considerably. Portugal’s 
tax burden had grown to 37.5 percent, only 3 points below the EU 12 
average, which had barely increased to 40.5 percent. Relative to its GDP 
per capita, Portugal is a high-tax state. However, the tax take is not by 
itself enough to cover expenditure. Expenditure in 1995 was 43.4 per-
cent and 45.9 percent in 2008 (the latter `gure is just 0.8 percent of 
GDP shy of average expenditure in the EU 12).
In stark contrast to the dictatorship, democratic Portugal has had 
great dif`culty balancing its budget. Because budgetary problems have 
been so persistent, Portugal has engaged multiple times in episodes of 
budgetary consolidation to reduce de`cits. These have frequently relied 
as much on tax increases as they have on expenditure cuts, even when 
done under IMF supervision. Balanced budgets are not, of course, a 
sign of virtue, and budget de`cits and debt play an important role in 
smoothing business cycles, in paying for investment, and in meeting 
social needs. The Maastricht criteria, for example, don’t call for the 
elimination of budget de`cits but rather limit them to no more than 3 
percent of GDP, a limit that nonetheless has been frequently violated 
by many in the euro area. Crucial to an evaluation of debts and de`cits 
and their sustainability are the rate of economic growth, inaation, and 
the interest rate. High growth makes it much easier to manage de`cits.
The principal problem facing Portugal, and a fundamental cause of 
its inability to borrow from the `nancial markets at an affordable cost, 
is its low growth prospects. Unlike Greece, Portugal was accurate in its 
budgetary reporting and did not engage in fraud. Unlike Ireland and 
Spain, Portugal did not experience the collapse of a massive housing 
boom. But since 2000, growth in Portugal has been anemic, averaging 
just 0.7 percent per year.58 Convergence in GDP per capita toward the 
richer countries in Europe reversed. Triggered by the global recession 
and the Greek crisis, the lack of con`dence among buyers of Portuguese 
debt came quickly. High interest rates are unsustainable for long, and 
Portugal was forced to seek a bailout, the third since the transition to 
democracy, but this time with no recourse to a competitive devaluation. 
What happened to growth in the democratic period? How did Portugal 
reduce its budget de`cits in the past? And what does this mean for the 
future of the Portuguese welfare state?
Unlike the postwar period of the dictatorship, when productiv-
ity (measured as GDP per hour worked) grew faster than in the most-
Welfare State Growth in the Second Portuguese Republic   |  167
advanced countries, in democratic Portugal productivity has mainly 
grown at only the same rate as in the most-developed countries.59 
Portugal has been unable to close the gap, which since 1980 has ranged 
from 50 percent to 55 percent of the average productivity of these coun-
tries. Economic growth above productivity and the ability of the gov-
ernment to paper over budget de`cits are explained by a number of fac-
tors, but these have either run their course or are otherwise no longer 
available. One is the growth of the labor force, principally fueled by the 
entry of women into the labor market. Given high current participation 
rates of women, this engine of growth has run its course. Fertility rates 
below replacement level suggest that the labor force will start to shrink, 
unless there is a compensating increase in immigration. As a result of 
these demographic shifts, high school enrollments have already peaked.
Declines in interest rates, partly stemming from anticipation of entry 
into the Euro and then as result of the common currency, provided the 
government with breathing room to consolidate debt as well as to run 
an expansionary policy. Declines in interest rates freed up several points 
of GDP from debt service to other uses. In 1995, for example, public 
expenditure on interest consumed 5.8 percent of GDP. As late as 2008, 
as a result of extraordinarily low rates set by the European Central 
Bank and after a series of budgetary consolidations earlier in the decade, 
interest consumed only 3 percent of GDP.60 Even if a return to low pre-
crisis rates were possible, it will be a long time before interest payments 
again consume such a small percentage of GDP.
Another consequence of adopting the Euro was of course the elimi-
nation of exchange rate policy as an economic tool. Currency devalua-
tions such as the crawling peg system that Portugal adopted to ensure 
economic competitiveness were no longer available. The calculation 
was that the elimination of exchange rate risk, the `rmer anchoring 
of inaation in a Bundesbank-inspired European Central Bank, and the 
elimination of transaction fees would elicit both higher cross-border 
investment as well as trade, leading to deeper economic integration. 
American economists in particular voiced concerns about asymmetric 
shocks and warned that Europe did not meet the criteria of an optimal 
currency area. Despite these debates, adopting the Euro was a political 
project as much as an economic one and was successfully introduced. 
Nonetheless, the lack of an exchange rate policy constrains the actions 
of the Portuguese state. It is unable to restore competitiveness and pro-
mote exports through devaluation, one way in which Portugal’s clas-
sic wage aexibility used to be achieved (inaation was the other means). 
168  |  The Republic and Its Citizens
Nominal cuts in wages are much harder to make, and especially so if the 
context is one of deaation.
Transfers from Brussels in the form of cohesion or structural funds 
were another way in which budget de`cits could be closed and eco-
nomic growth stimulated, but this route too is largely over. Portugal 
is wealthier, so some regions that had previously quali`ed for funds 
no longer do. New accession members have asked for funds, and the 
growth of both government expenditure as well as the economy imply 
that even had the funds remained at their original levels, they would 
represent a smaller percentage of GDP.
Finally, for a number of years privatization was an important way 
in which governments could close budget gaps. Because so many `rms 
have already been sold, fully or in part, this strategy is also starting to 
run up against limits. The measures to deal with the current crisis do 
involve privatization of a number of remaining state-owned enterprises, 
but the list is a dwindling one.
The result is to some extent paradoxical. A larger state, with greater 
responsibilities for social well-being, has lost an important set of tools 
that allowed it to manage the economy as well as to paper over chronic 
budget de`cits. These tools help explain how Portugal could run an 
expansionary budgetary policy so frequently and how budgetary con-
solidation, even if temporary, could be achieved without drastic cuts in 
expenditure.
Now, however, the options are stark. Tax increases and cuts in spend-
ing while the economy is so weak are not only painful but also will 
throw the economy deeper into recession. In the absence of credible pros-
pects for higher growth, debt rollovers will require unsustainably high 
interest payments. Deaation and continued high unemployment look 
likely. Exiting from the Euro, which would be very hard to manage and 
was until recently unthinkable, is now advocated as potentially the best 
option among unpalatable choices61 though it is strenuously ruled out by 
government. And the considerably less draconian possibility of a hair-
cut on the debt, increasingly seen as both likely and necessary by many 
independent analysts, is also continually disavowed by the government.
The Current Crisis: From Stimulus to Austerity 
to Structural Reforms
The `nancial and economic crisis that started in 2007 led to rapid 
increases in both budget de`cits and government debt. Up to and includ-
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ing 2007, Portugal had made steady progress in correcting a high bud-
get de`cit of 5.9 percent of GDP in 2005. The de`cit had been reduced 
to 4.1 percent in 2006 and to 3.1 percent in 2007, but it soared to 10.1 
percent in 2009. This was the result of not only an 11 percent drop in 
tax receipts and increased spending as a result of the welfare state’s auto-
matic stabilizers, but also of stimulus actions undertaken by the govern-
ment, which included easing the rules on unemployment bene`ts. Efforts 
to shore up the labor market introduced in 2007  – 2008 included targeted 
reductions in nonwage costs and expansions in job-search and short-
time working opportunities, as well as training and income support for 
the unemployed.62 By 2009–2010, the Socialist government of Prime 
Minister Socrates decided to reverse course. Most of the labor market 
support measures introduced a year or two earlier were withdrawn as 
budgetary containment became the order of the day. The austerity mea-
sures implemented up to June 2011, when the new PSD-led government 
of Prime Minister Coelho took of`ce, included a mix of increases in 
taxes, cuts in public sector pay, and reductions or freezing of social ben-
e`ts. Listed in a research note,63 the mix of austerity measures tracked to 
investigate changes in household income included the following:
Increases in Direct Taxes
? Tax rates were increased by 1 and 1.5 percentage points depending 
on income level.
? A new bracket for incomes above €153,300 was introduced, raising 
the highest tax rate from 42 percent to 46.5 percent.
Increases in Indirect Taxes
? In January 2011, the standard VAT rate was increased from 20 
percent to 23 percent.
? At the same time the reduced VAT rate was increased from 12 
percent to 13 percent and the base rate from 5 percent to 6 percent.
Reductions in Tax Credits and Tax Allowances
? The reference indicator for tax credits was reduced by replacing the 
2011 minimum wage of €485 with the 2010 minimum wage of €475 
or the 2011 social bene`t index of €419.22.
? The pension tax allowance was reduced.
Reductions in Social Bene`ts
? The nominal value of the social bene`t index used for most social 
bene`ts was frozen at the 2009 level.
? The nominal value of bene`ts not linked the social bene`t index 
(such as pensions) was frozen from 2010 to 2011.
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? The social assistance bene`t was frozen from 2010 to 2011.
? Family bene`t was frozen and eligibility conditions were tightened.
Public Sector Pay
? Public sector pay was cut by 10 percent.
When compared to Spain, Greece, Estonia, the United Kingdom, and 
Ireland, simulations of the effects of Portugal’s austerity measures led 
to the second-highest increase in the risk of poverty, de`ned as house-
hold income below 60 percent of the precrisis median. Ireland had the 
highest increase in the risk of poverty among the countries studied but 
the size of its austerity cuts (8.1 percent of total household dispos-
able income) was more than 2.5 times the size of the austerity cuts in 
Portugal (3 percent of total household disposable income). As a point of 
comparison, Spain and Greece’s austerity measures during this period 
amounted to 2.7 percent and 2.2 percent, respectively, of total house-
hold disposable income. If the poverty threshold is changed to 60 per-
cent of the median of the new postausterity distribution of income, the 
risk of poverty increased the most in Portugal.64
The study also simulated the distributional effects of the austerity 
measures on household incomes and found that Portugal was the only 
one of the countries studied where the distribution was clearly regres-
sive. About this information a number of caveats need to be kept in 
mind. First, as mentioned by the authors of this study, the analysis 
focuses solely on the distributional effects of the austerity measures 
listed above. It excludes the very large distributional effects of the 
crisis itself (through increases in unemployment, for example, which 
were signi`cantly larger in Spain and Greece than in Portugal). It also 
excludes cuts to public services that are not easily tracked in terms of 
the distribution of household income but which might have signi`cant 
effects. Finally, the study looks only at what might be called the `rst 
wave of austerity measures implemented by June 2011. Nonetheless, 
the study raises important questions about not only the different sizes 
but also different designs — and impacts — of austerity measures across 
countries.
The shift from initial stimulus to austerity, as well as the shifting 
European economic outlook, led to signi`cant variation in Portuguese 
GDP growth rates during the crisis. Growth of 2.7 percent in 2007 on 
the eve of the crisis shifted to contractions of 0.35 percent in 2008 and 
2.1 percent in 2009. GDP grew by 0.91 percent in 2010 but contracted 
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by 1.6 percent in 2011 and is expected to contract by 3.2 percent in 
2012. Dif`culties in many of Portugal’s most important European 
export markets, most notably Spain, the deleveraging of debt at home, 
dif`culty accessing credit, increasing unemployment, and the effects of 
new austerity measures agreed with the troika all play signi`cant roles 
in explaining the contraction.
In May 2011, the Socialist caretaker government agreed to the 
terms of a €78 billion bailout package with the troika of the European 
Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International 
Monetary Fund. The package required Portugal not only to implement 
additional austerity measures but also to engage in structural reforms. 
These included privatization of state-owned enterprises as well as 
reform of its labor market and justice system. The PSD government of 
Prime Minister Coelho that took of`ce in June 2011 has vowed to fully 
implement the troika’s prescriptions and, indeed, to make even faster 
progress in reducing the budget de`cits than is envisioned in the plan. 
In contrast to Greece, where both political will and the track record of 
implementation have been questioned, Portugal has been cast as the 
“good student” of Europe, embracing and implementing the policy pre-
scriptions it is being asked to carry out. Nonetheless, it is increasingly 
doubtful that austerity and structural reform will by themselves place 
Portugal back on a track of sustainable debt, economic growth, and 
international competitiveness. Many think not only that a return to the 
`nancial markets by 2013 or 2014 is unlikely but that a haircut on the 
debt will also be needed. The debt – to-GDP ratio was 107 percent at the 
time of the May 2011 bailout but is likely to reach 113 percent over 
the next two years due to the shrinking economy as well as the poorly 
controlled debts of regional governments and a number of some state-
owned enterprises.65
In order to reduce Portugal’s budget de`cit from 5.9 percent in 2011 
to 4.5 percent of GDP in 2012 and to comply with the troika’s terms, 
the new PSD government implemented its `rst set of austerity measures 
in November 2011. These include both cuts in pension spending and 
reductions in welfare spending and the health budget. Further cuts to 
public sector pay have also been implemented. Proposals have included 
a reduction in the number of holidays and the elimination of holiday 
pay (an extra two months’ pay, called the “thirteenth and fourteenth 
months’ pay,” traditionally paid in August and December) for the next 
two years. Combined with earlier public sector wage cuts and increases 
in income tax, the take-home pay of many public sector workers is 
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declining by over 22 percent. And by reducing lunch to half an hour, the 
government has proposed increasing working hours in the public sector.
In the wake of the 2007 onset of the crisis, a number of structural 
reforms were implemented by the Socialist government. More are envis-
aged under the troika agreement and planned or carried out by the cur-
rent government. These include privatization of state-owned enterprises, 
reductions in the public administration workforce through adoption of 
a rule specifying a 2:1 ratio of job leavers to job hires, reduced admin-
istrative burdens on business, including the lifting of licensing for some 
services, and the liberalization of regulated professions.66 Actions have 
also been taken to simplify the tax system and to broaden the tax base 
in consumption and income taxes while reducing tax expenditures.
Labor market reform is one of the troika’s priority areas for structural 
reform, and a number of steps have already been taken. With respect to 
regular contracts, notice periods for individual dismissals were short-
ened and administrative procedures were streamlined in 2009. The 
year 2011 saw the introduction of lower severance payments for new 
hires; 2012 is likely to see the de`nition of “fair dismissal” expanded. 
Unemployment bene`ts will become less generous but eligibility will 
be extended. Both the OECD and the troika recommend that Portugal 
reduce labor market dualism by better covering the young while eas-
ing job protection in regular contracts and reducing the duration and 
replacement rates of unemployment bene`ts for older workers.67 These 
reforms are being undertaken during particularly dif`cult labor mar-
ket conditions. Overall unemployment stood at 14 percent in 2011 and 
continues to grow. Youth unemployment, as in so many European soci-
eties, is much higher, and young university graduates are not immune — 
close to 10 percent of them are currently unemployed.68
Other priority areas include developing a more ef`cient court system, 
long one of the most de`cient areas of governance; liberalizing the hous-
ing rental market; and promoting competition and reducing rents in the 
energy and telecoms markets.69
If budget cuts, liberalization, and a turn to the market have charac-
terized most measures of the government, education has stood out as 
distinct. Special attention has been paid to addressing chronic prob-
lems of students repeating years in secondary school, increasing oppor-
tunities for vocational education and training, and implementing a con-
tested national evaluation system for teacher performance.70
In marked contrast to Greece, protests in Portugal against austerity 
have been few and never violent. Although the CGTP (Confederação 
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Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses) union has protested the cuts, the 
UGT (União Geral dos Trabalhadores) union has conceded that cuts are 
necessary and inevitable. Mirroring the division in the labor movement, 
a February 2012 poll revealed that although 48.4 percent of the pop-
ulation thinks austerity is the wrong solution for the crisis, a sizeable 
minority of 40.3 percent believes austerity is needed. A sizeable increase 
in emigration, to 120,000 in 2011, principally to the fast-growing econ-
omies of Brazil and Angola, shows that many people have found and 
are exercising an exit option, reducing pressure on the government. The 
government, a stable PSD coalition with the People’s Party, controls a 
safe 132 seats in the 230-member parliament, and the principal opposi-
tion party, the Socialists, control only 74 seats, their weakest number in 
more than two decades. Portugal enjoys considerable international sup-
port from the troika.71 Nonetheless, many of the newest austerity cuts 
have yet to bite, and 2012 will be a year of deep recession: social indi-
cators will worsen further.
Conclusion
To what extent then do the combination of spending cuts and tax 
increases that make up the austerity packages and the structural 
reforms — rolled out both by the Socialist government (in the last two 
years of its term) and by the new PSD-led government under supervi-
sion of the troika — amount to a rescaling and reorganization of the 
Portuguese welfare state? To what extent will this recalibration of social 
policy and social protection alter the distribution of income or the dis-
tribution of opportunity in Portuguese society?
It is too early to answer these questions de`nitively, but some points 
are already clear. Older ad-hoc solutions to long-standing problems are 
no longer tenable. Employment growth in Portugal was disproportion-
ately concentrated in the public sector and masked anemic employ-
ment growth in the private sector. This route of state-supported income 
is now largely closed off. Inequalities in employment protection and 
access to unemployment compensation stemming from the dualism of 
the labor market are being reduced. While there are grounds to sup-
port this from the perspective of equity, in the absence of robust job 
creation this creates a serious danger of increasing precariousness and 
risk. Although rigid labor laws have prevented hiring of young people 
on regular contracts, those same rigid labor laws have often ensured job 
stability and access to generous unemployment bene`ts for at least one 
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parent in the household. Removing such protections during a recession 
with no end in sight is likely to increase the number of zero-employ-
ment households at a time when social bene`ts are being cut or frozen. 
Studies that suggest that Portugal’s austerity packages are distinctively 
regressive are worrying though in many ways are sadly not surprising — 
income inequality has long been high in Portugal, despite and some-
times because of its welfare state. Household and private sector dele-
veraging of debt will take time, particularly in a context of low growth.
These ominous developments notwithstanding, there are some rea-
sons for hope. Continued investments in education, a well-functioning 
and well-regarded health system, wage aexibility, and structural reforms 
may provide the basis for productivity increases and resumed growth, 
when and if Europe — and Spain, Portugal’s main trading partner — 
emerge from recession, particularly if support from the troika or a man-
aged restructuring reduces the burden of public debt.
However the debt crisis may end, in the medium to long-term, popu-
lation aging will place increasing pressure on health care and the pen-
sion system, making the resumption of growth, through increases in 
productivity, all the more important.
Higher educational attainment should help in this regard, particu-
larly if the tradeable sector can attract a larger percentage of univer-
sity graduates. Despite continuing high rates of poverty, inequality, and 
challenges in educational performance detailed above, it is important 
to remember how far Portugal has come in the past thirty-eight years 
of democracy. High-quality healthcare; protection against the risks of 
old age, disability, sickness, and unemployment; and access to educa-
tion have been made broadly and in many cases universally available. 
Citizens have come to expect more from their state; the degree to which 
they will be able to continue to do so in the future is now an open 
question.
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In the beginning of the twentieth century a feminist and republican 
movement made history in Portugal. In a country where there was no 
tradition of feminine participation in public life, an elite of highly cul-
tured, courageous, and strong-minded women came suddenly “out of 
the shadows,” with the support of republican leaders, in defense of dem-
ocratic ideals and righteous causes, like education for all, equal civil 
laws, and universal suffrage.
That universal suffrage was a promise never ful`lled was the cause 
of immediate dissent among the heads of the feminist movement — some 
more feminists than republicans, and others de`nitely more republicans 
than suffragists, even if they all remained faithful to the new regime. Did 
their natural moderation and their innate republican complicity with 
their male partners — husbands, family, and friends — play against them? 
In the end, they won their main battle through the efforts of future gen-
erations of women and they are alive in the memory of the Republic, 
today and forever.
1
Feminist movements were in rapid development in Europe from the 
mid-nineteenth century on, with their main focus on women’s suffrage. 
Portugal was no exception. However, the `rst initiatives that started by 
the end the nineteenth century were restricted to a limited circle of believ-
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ers in sexual equality. And the circle did not expand much until 1907 – 8, 
on the verge of the change of regime, and, when it did, it was by direct 
interference by prominent republican leaders — all men, of course. This 
particularity would, in my opinion, give historical feminism in Portugal 
its unique features and destiny, because it was supposed to become an 
asset to the republican cause, as well as to the cause of the emancipation 
of women. It was for this reason that the accomplishments of feminism 
in Portugal would stand apart. As in other southern European societies 
there was no tradition of women playing a role in public life. We know 
that throughout the centuries our historians portrayed a few outstand-
ing women, monarchs, heads of state or acting as such, very inauential 
and powerful queens of Portugal, ruling side by side with their husbands 
or offspring, unexpected ` ghters in heroic battles in faraway lands of the 
empire — in the Portuguese half of the world as divided by a pope — and a 
few remarkable writers, poets, artists, and even leaders or participants in 
mass uprisings, the last one alive in the memory of the people being the 
legendary Maria da Fonte, who inspired one the hymns of the Republic, 
still sung in of`cial ceremonies. They were accepted and admired by 
their contemporaries as exceptions — our own “iron ladies.”
However, European ideas, tendencies, and social movements, sooner 
or later, had their effects among us, and, later than sooner, “feminism” 
would also. By 1902, a leading intellectual and feminist, Carolina 
Michaelis de Vasconcelos — German born, Portuguese by marriage, and 
the `rst woman to belong to the Academy of Sciences and to become 
professor of the University of Coimbra — wrote that there was no wom-
en’s organization at all in the country and that from her point of view, 
that of someone born and brought up abroad, women’s political par-
ticipation was unthinkable, seen as unnatural by Portuguese standards.1 
At the time, French and British feminists were already promoting huge 
protest marches against discrimination through the avenues of Paris 
and London. In 1903, Mrs. Pankhurst was engaged in setting up the 
Women’s Social and Political Union. In 1910, the so-called suffragettes, 
her potent and radical movement, organized a march that extended for 
several miles along the streets of London on the way to the Parliament 
on the very day a proposal on feminine suffrage was defeated. Over two 
hundred MPs had supported it — many, but not enough. In similar cir-
cumstances, every time an electoral law denied them the right to vote, 
the Portuguese put all their indignation in a carefully and beautifully 
written paper or asked for an audience to express their disillusion to a 
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sympathetic but ineffective high dignitary — the president of the Republic 
himself, or the prime minister, or the president of the Assembly.2
In this domain, accomplishments or lack thereof have more to do 
with a “north-south” cultural gap than with the nature of the regime. 
Stable Nordic monarchies like Denmark, Norway, and Sweden did not 
need to envisage a change of system in order to improve women’s status, 
and they set an example of good laws and good practices much earlier 
than the two revolutionary Republics — France and Portugal — and many 
other countries in the world.3 In Denmark women were on the way to 
the right to vote at the local level by1908, even if they had to wait until 
1915 for an unrestricted vote in all elections and until 1921 for access 
to all careers, the army excepted. In Norway, Camilla Collet had been 
a pioneer activist since 1884, followed in the beginning of the new cen-
tury by Gina Krog, a founder of the Norwegian Association for Women. 
Norwegian women advanced step by step, ` rst as full members of school 
councils (1889), social security councils (1890), and municipal councils 
(1901). In 1907 they were recognized as citizens with the right to vote at 
both the local and national levels. In 1911 the `rst Norwegian woman 
was elected to parliament. By 1912 most of the careers in the public sec-
tor were open to women. In Sweden clever support of the “cause” in the 
literary domain and religious ideals of fraternity seem to have played 
a more important role in gaining these rights than legal arguments or 
the involvement of political personalities, mainly through the writings 
and action of Fredrika Bremer, contemporary of feminist writers like 
Henrik Ibsen or Ellen Key and herself an acknowledged writer and liter-
ary critic and a great speaker and campaigner as well. Sweden was the 
last northern country to approve legislation on women’s vote and eligi-
bility for the parliament in 1919, three years later than Iceland did the 
same. Finland had been the earliest adopter, where in 1906 a women’s 
suffrage law was passed and in 1907 the `rst female parliamentarian 
was elected. Southern Europe pursued the trend much later. In fact, in 
that geographical and cultural area only Spain was ahead of Portugal.4
In view of the dominant mentality about women’s participation in pol-
itics, the Portuguese feminist movement never got much visibility and 
wide-ranging recognition. Even historians nowadays tend to under-
evalue the inauence it had in the birth of the new era. The history of 
Portuguese women is still in waiting, unwritten to the full extent of its 
worth, as Elina Guimarães, the last survivor of that dazzling generation, 
184  |  The Republic and Women
appropriately asserted.5 But facts are available for research. Women 
were there as the living proof that the feminine half of the Republic 
was capable of living up to the social and cultural revolutionary ideals 
of gender equality, along with the principles of a new order in state and 
society. In fact, Portuguese feminism was never a vast mass movement, 
and although it grew gradually with a signi`cant number of strong-
willed, well-learned women, it was not to be as successful as it should 
have been, for several reasons. None had to do with their own capac-
ity to have made things work out better, in another time, another place. 
When you observe their culture or political savoir faire as expressed in 
so many speeches and writings, you `nd no “gap” at all compared with 
feminist leaders all over Europe. Among them, before and after the rev-
olution, there are illustrious medical doctors, like Adelaide Cabete or 
Carolina Ângelo; writers like Ana de Castro Osório, Sara Beirão, or 
Maria Lamas; teachers like Maria Veleda, Clara Correia Alves, or Alice 
Pestana; journalists like Albertina Paraíso or Virgínia Quaresma; and 
lawyers like Regina Quintanilha or Elina Guimarães (then a young law 
graduate). A distinguished elite, in the company of a minority of a few 
thousands of female citizens, unfortunately more and more divided, like 
republican politicians themselves, yet not for the same reasons, rather 
because some of the feminists, as the revolution went on and left them 
behind, took it better than others. Regrettably, they had a late appear-
ance in the campaign for women’s rights. They occupied their political 
and civic space for more or less twenty years, and then their lessons or 
patterns of civic intervention were practically forgotten after the col-
lapse of the Republic and the advent of a long and misogynous dicta-
torship. Portugal has not yet regained the same human dimension and 
radiance.
We will brieay look into these two decades from 1906 to 1926. 
Initiatives undertaken in the end of the nineteenth century, interesting 
as they were — such as the `rst Feminist Congress in 1892, or the `rst 
feminist newspaper (La Fronde) in 1897  — had such limited impact that 
Carolina Michaelis in her essays on feminine enterprises does not take 
them into due consideration. In 1904, a few brave women did partici-
pate in the `rst Freethought Congress, names that would be part of 
the history of the Republic, like Adelaide Cabete and Maria Veleda, 
among others. Congresses, huge political meetings, as well as daily 
activities in republican centers played an important role in mobilizing 
public support that made the impossible revolution possible. Women 
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suddenly became partners accepted and welcomed, sharing the intense 
and clever effort of republican propaganda. Many of them got drawn 
into the daily life of Mason organizations, in journalism, in associations 
providing all kinds of social help to children and needy girls or women, 
including educational and vocational training. By the turn of the cen-
tury, republican centers and clubs were being set up all over the coun-
try — promoting social and cultural activities, publishing papers and 
leaaets — in an attempt to spread the Republican party line, the prom-
ises of an era of freedom, prosperity, democracy, and equal participa-
tion for all. Women gained access to such clubs, mainly in Lisbon and 
minor cosmopolitan urban areas. It was the proper way to prepare them 
for future leadership and political commitment, even if, as we cannot 
ignore, they were given the opportunity to work for the victory of the 
republican cause rather than for the advance of their suffragist agenda, 
as they would soon `nd out. In 1908, inauential personalities, like 
Ana de Castro Osório and Adelaide Cabete, were invited by António 
José de Almeida and other leading members of the party to join the 
Portuguese Republican Party (PRP) in an organization of their own, the 
Republican League of Portuguese Women. In 1909, the League became 
a formal structure of the party. In 1911, the denial of women’s suffrage 
in the legislation approved in March and April produced discontent 
that would lead to the coming apart of the League. Mrs. Osório and 
Dr. Carolina Ângelo set up the Association on Feminine Propaganda 
(Associação de Propaganda Feminista) that became a member of the 
International Woman Suffrage Alliance. In 1913, a new electoral law 
unequivocally excluded female citizens. In 1914, another founder of the 
League, Dr. Cabete, formed the National Council of Portuguese Women 
(Conselho National das Mulheres Portuguesas), which was admitted to 
the International Council of Women, another international suffragist 
organization.6
In 1918 the electoral law-decree of March 30 did not open suffrage 
to women; the same happened in the 1919 decrees of March 1 and April 
11. By then, no major founder remained in the League. They went their 
separate ways, divided by their different sets of priorities. From 1914 to 
1918, they were once again reunited in defense of Portugal participating 
in the World War. The Committee “Pro Pátria” was founded in 1914 and 
the Portuguese Women’s Crusade (Cruzada das Mulheres Portuguesas) 
in 1916, headed by Ana de Castro Osório. The latter was Osório’s last 
civic crusade, a last display of great dynamism and courage, not only 
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in the diffusion of opinions but also in the direct help of wounded sol-
diers through “committees” of nurses regulated and supported by the 
government.7 In 1924, the First Congress on Feminism and Education (I 
Congresso Feminista e da Educação) was held. President Teixeira Lopes 
and future President Bernardino Machado were both there. In 1928, 
already under dictatorship, without any kind of of`cial support, a sec-
ond and last congress took place. Women’s suffrage came three years 
later, ironically by the hand of Salazar, the quintessence of antifemi-
nism — a restricted vote proposed and defeated many a time during the 
sixteen agitated years of the First Republic.8
2
Portuguese feminists gained very important battles, like education for 
women, coeducation, more or less egalitarian civil laws, such as fam-
ily laws and divorce, and more opportunity for professional work and 
involvement in politics, in journalism, in sciences and arts. They got the 
moral certainty of their remarkable contribution to the change of cus-
toms, mentalities, and laws on the line of democracy. However, they 
were never full citizens in the new Republic, as they never acquired the 
right to vote. None of them would ever have the option of running for 
parliament, as Emmeline Pankhurst had, or of being elected as a mem-
ber of Parliament, as Lady Astor was, soon after the end of the `rst war, 
both in England. But on March 8, 1988, more than eight decades after 
the commencement of their long struggle for emancipation and of the 
setting up of the Group of Women’s Studies (joining Cabete, Osório, 
and followers) a tribute was paid to them in the Assembly.9 Some of 
these early feminist activists were, at last, “given the aoor” through the 
voices of women of our generation. The proposal had been made by 
poet Natália Correia, then a member of the Assembly, a `gure to be 
compared to the best of the 1910 generation.10
Let me repeat some of the citations of the early Portuguese feminists 
chosen for that memorable occasion, as the words sound surprisingly 
meaningful, signi`cant, and up-to-date, even if something gets lost in 
my translation. They spoke then as we would today, and their state-
ments identify many challenges still to be met in our own time.
Angelina Vidal: “For us the emancipation of women is the founding 
stone of public morality. We recognize many dif`culties to reach such a 
fair scope, but we cannot forget that all the great ideals of what is fair 
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or beautiful or lawful, worked out through sacri`ces and merit of suc-
cessive generations, were formerly considered as utopias.” And in two 
other very interesting remarks she concluded: “We cannot separate our 
emancipation from men’s emancipation.” “Freedom does not tolerate 
any kind of slavery, only freed women may bring into being free, strong, 
moral and healthy societies.”11
Emmeline Pankhurst — who once said, “if civilization is to advance at 
all, it must be through the help of women, freed of their political shack-
les, women with full power to work their will in society” — would agree.
Maria Veleda: “We want a new world, without discrimination based 
on race, caste, without discouraging laws, without slavery of any kind, 
without mistrust between sexes . . . men and women united to reach the 
same goal, to share the same possessions, rights and ideals . . . women 
have to walk side by side with men, calm, spirited and self-possessed.” 
She defends education and the need of professional training for women 
and equal participation — topics still in our agenda. And she calls atten-
tion to the fact that lack of direct participation may induce evil forms of 
compensation: “If a woman can’t elect she may conspire, she has done 
so in different ages, or fought with arms in her hands like those sturdy 
peasants who followed Maria da Fonte.”12
Alice Pestana: Pestana (her pseudonym “Caiel”) is considered more a 
paci`st than a conventional feminist, but in fact I think she was both. 
(She was president of the Portuguese League for Peace after 1889.) A 
synthesis of her beliefs was presented in the parliamentarian session 
referred to earlier:
“The Portuguese Nation must give women modern learning, mobi-
lize them to get an interest in social reality they now think about much 
more with their heart than with adequate comprehension, instruction 
and intellectual capacity.” She is above all a “peace `ghter” engaged in 
a “war against war”: “We ask for the creation of committees for the 
cause of peace in each country, so that in the twentieth century we may 
live in harmony, meaning peace, freedom, and justice.” Nonetheless, she 
makes an exception, not seen as a contradiction, for what she designates 
the battle for a noble cause, stating that women “have been on the side 
of justice, democracy and peace throughout the ages, even when writ-
ten history does not mention it. In classical armies she usually `nds no 
place, but in guerilla resistance or liberation armies, in mass movements 
she is present.” Pestana speci`cally refers to mass movements as those 
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contributing to the independence and the foundation of national iden-
tity in Portugal.13
Ana de Castro Osório: Mrs. Osório was the most famous of the 
feminists of her time. She also seems to have been the `rst to fear the 
incapacity of the Republic to carry out the promise of feminine suf-
frage, as she said: “If a Republic does exclude us from its civic laws, 
we cannot consider ours the country where we have no rights, where 
we do not have a voice to protest.” Suffrage is her priority, a target 
always pursued and never attained, yet she does not minimize progress 
where it really happened, as in social and cultural spheres — education, 
more family rights, opportunities for revealing unexpected competence 
in social and civic activities or in professional work. She stresses that 
events were already moving fast: “One who would defend the idea of 
feminine subjection or inferiority in a public statement would be com-
pared to those who would have the perverse courage of being in favor 
of slavery.”
She also said, “To be feminist does not scare anyone today, because 
the advancements brought by feminism are so many and so revealing of 
the high principles that guide intelligent women, that opponents do not 
dare speak against it — even if they wanted to — because their opinion 
would be considered as outrageous.” Many times she addresses “true 
feminism” in precisely that logic: “to be feminist is a duty of all par-
ents.” It has to do with “the aim of educating women in a practical and 
useful way,” to turn them into “sensible and able human beings free 
from dependence, that denies human dignity.” According to her, true 
feminism is to be shared by men and women. It is not to be seen simply 
as part of the social problems of class struggle or poverty. The rights of 
poor or wealthy women, commoners or aristocrats are to be granted 
the same level of importance. On the other side, states Mrs. Osório, true 
feminism is not “a defense of the egotism of one sex against the other.” It 
is about altruism and women’s will to take their share in collective life, 
to improve the situation for all, for a better society. And as a true demo-
crat as well, she adds: “Good and practical ideas as they come from pri-
vate initiative should be supported and followed by governments that 
respect public opinion.”14
Carolina Beatriz Ângelo: Last in the short list of the Assembly mem-
bers in that historic 1988 session, Dr. Ângelo was especially remem-
bered for her celebrated solitary act of voting, as a woman citizen, in 
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the earliest election after the proclamation of the Republic — on May 
28, 1911. She became the `rst southern European woman to exercise 
the right to vote. It was news all over Europe! In fact, she skillfully took 
advantage of the text of the electoral law that admitted to suffrage all 
citizens who were over twenty-one, “heads of a family,” and literate. 
As a thirty-three-year-old widow, the mother of a child, and a doctor 
by profession, she formally satis`ed all the conditions required to vote. 
Nevertheless, as she was a woman, her registration was denied by the 
authorities, because no electoral laws in the country had ever mentioned 
sex, to be either included or excluded, but women had always being 
implicitly barred. She went to court and won her case against the au-
thorities. The judge — who, by the way, was a liberal republican and the 
father of Ana de Castro Osório (a true “feminist,” by his own daughter’s 
de`nition) — decided in her favor. If the legislature intended to leave out 
the feminine sex, it should say so, unambiguously, ruled the judge. In 
1913 that is exactly what the lawmakers did say. Women had to wait 
for another twenty years to be integrated in a limited circle of of`cially 
registered participants in elections.15
I cited above the favorable press Dr. Ângelo’s vote immediately 
obtained at national and international levels. I must also mention the 
enthusiastic standing ovation she got from all men who had the priv-
ilege of witnessing the historical moment of her ballot vote. In the 
Portuguese parliament in 1988 her daring act was once again given a 
round of applause.
Not only these few women cited here but others who were at their side a 
hundred years ago appear like our contemporaries, as if they could be our 
sisters rather than our grandmothers. I think the main explanation for 
this kind of “anachronism” is the fact that their feminism was more “fem-
inine” by contrast with other concepts of their epoch than of our own, at 
least in Portugal. A feminism inspired by the concept of gender equilib-
rium and cooperation, of “gender parity,” as we call it nowadays, rather 
than that of “gender war,” refusing rage or hatred between sexes and 
preaching acceptance and tolerance between them. The opinion uttered 
of Ana de Castro Osório : “We never witnessed violent ` ghts as in foreign 
countries where the feminist question turned out to be a true sex war.”
Gender parity is still what Portuguese legislators are seeking today, 
in our constitution and in our laws, along with the majority of women 
and men engaged in the `ght for equality, even if some of them may 
disagree with the existing regulation imposing the “quota system.” The 
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reasons why the early feminists seem ahead of their times are certainly 
due to their own merit, to their own awareness of the social problems 
involved and the best possible solutions, but it is also partly explained 
by their position in family and society. They were a select few educated 
women linked by ideological as well as family ties with their republi-
can counterparts. They came suddenly “out of the shadows” by their 
own free will, but with the help and complicity of men with whom they 
shared beliefs and aims, destiny, and global political projects for a future 
in which they had a role to play. They were ready to engage in the same 
revolution, to accept the same duties, to undergo the same risks as their 
fellow men. They believed that a Republic would mean general prog-
ress and would treat them as equal citizens with full civil, family, and 
political rights. They were part of the cosmopolitan assertive leadership 
emerging in the Republican Party, conspiring side by side with parents, 
husbands, brothers, and friends. In 1910 no Portuguese feminist could 
foresee that the laws on suffrage would remain unchanged. Their long 
`ght had started in full hope and amiable complicity with men, who 
were seen as allies, not foes. For them laws concerning women’s rights 
were far behind social practices, because at least in their own upper 
class of cultured people they were treated as equals. The Republic, they 
felt sure, would instantly `ll the space between law and life. We know 
how wrong they were.
3
A feminist and republican movement — as it was “two in one” in 1910. It 
makes a difference when you distinguish the Portuguese example from 
others, even if links of feminists groups with political parties existed 
elsewhere. In Portugal the advent of the Republic was truly seen by 
the suffragists as a “prerequisite” for the achievement of their goal. On 
behalf of the Republic many of them would, in fact, in later years con-
`rm a no-nonsense approach to politics, including the sacri`ce of the 
vital issue of women’s right to vote. They gave up equal suffrage, lim-
iting their claim to a small circle of highly educated ladies. The “lady-
like way of behaving” inside the political world of these exceptional 
women — carefully staying away from foreign examples of extremism in 
their individual outward appearance in public life, and sometimes even 
in their manner of demanding equality and justice — did probably work 
against them.16 Very often it does not pay off to be too much ahead of 
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one’s time! Theirs was or is, as I see it, the right attitude for us in the 
new century, but then and there it was premature. Now we can afford 
reconciliation and harmony, or “synthesis.” A century ago was a time 
for “antithesis,” for unbending and hard opposition.
Lack of harshness was, in my opinion, only one the main reasons 
for (partial) failure: a kind of contradiction between their consis-
tent and often brilliant writing or speeches, even if they were more 
or less temperate, and their way of political intervention, much too 
“soft” to have the necessary impact. Another cause was dissent among 
them: dispute on priorities, the priority of many of them being edu-
cation, employment, and massive civic intervention initially, and suf-
frage only later — obviously, a very convenient order of precedence for 
the republican leaders. The movement did split into several smaller 
circles because some of them were republicans above all — like Maria 
Veleda, the unconditional supporter of Afonso Costa and his radical 
Democratic Party — and others were more feminists than republicans — 
like Cabete and Osório, who never gave up the fundamental battle 
for suffrage, along with other more consensual issues, like education. 
Education was, as they all agreed, an indispensable basis of the eman-
cipation of the feminine sex. Radical, revolutionary, and law-abiding 
feminists, and even a more conservative nonfeminist wing, shared that 
conviction.17 Education for women, a very limited number, of course, 
was already under way before the Republic was established, but from 
then on the focus was on equal public instruction for both sexes, from 
primary to high school and to university, and it became an irrevers-
ible process that lasted during the Estado Novo.18 The expansion that 
started in 1910 with the help of the feminist movements may be con-
sidered the most important contribution of the Republic to the eman-
cipation of women.
The refusal of universal suffrage was a major disillusion for the femi-
nists. In a way, their suffragist campaign started hand in hand with their 
male associates, and they gave up the aim of immediate and full equality 
to help strengthen the new regime until it could be self-con`dent enough 
to be able to satisfy their demands. Unlike suffragists in England and 
almost everywhere else, Portuguese feminists seemed as afraid as men 
proved to be of the consequences of universal suffrage. It is well-known 
that “leftist” parties feared the “conservative” vote of women, and the 
conservative parties, sure to gain by their voting, were simply against 
it. In Portugal, ruling republicans also feared a conservative male vote, 
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and arti`cially reduced the electoral universe to a very small percentage 
of the adult population. The hostile rural Catholic and monarchist vote 
was largely reduced by the prerequisites of literacy and tax-paying.19 
Electoral laws introduced a few changes but never eliminated these two 
very useful discriminations. Republican women were themselves aware 
of the risk of endangering the future of the regime by adopting a system 
of liberal and open voting. This explains their approval of the manipula-
tion and cutback of the electoral universe. They never asked for the bal-
lot for all women, just for the much-reduced number of those who were 
educated and considered more republican than the others. That is why 
they went as far as accepting an unequal suffrage for women. Looking 
back, we must conclude that republics like France and Portugal delayed 
fair treatment of female citizens for as long as they could, and as a result 
many of the countries where women `rst got equal civil and politi-
cal rights were — and remained until now! — constitutional democratic 
monarchies. In Portugal, really, feminists had no alternative but to trust 
republicans, because there was no place for them in any of the monar-
chist parties, as the very few monarchists who were in favor of women’s 
emancipation acknowledged.20 The truth is, there was no proper place 
for them in the Republican public institutions either. They worked hard 
for the revolution, they remained faithful to the republican principles, 
and I believe their participation inside public institutions could have 
made a difference.
The incapacity of the republican politicians and parties to play fair 
with these feminist advocates was a sign of the inevitable decline of 
the regime, harmed by dissension and instability, centralist and authori-
tarian urges, and growing lack of public support. This is past history. 
Feminist thoughts and ideals, as the parliamentarians of 1988 wanted 
to stress, are very much alive. The feminists of the First Republic, their 
hopes and dreams, did have more future than present — which was the 
opposite for the regime. Many Portuguese of my generation still look 
at them as inspiring and amazing `ghters, so gentle and strong, setting 
good examples and making us think that in 1910 we, too, would have 
been republicans and feminists. In 2010, we are simply democrats, and 
feminists — “true feminists,” according to Osório’s de`nition.
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is not what it’s supposed to be by so many people — women eager to mimic men 
by smoking, by using white collars and ties and other ridiculous imitations.” 
17. Among the antifeminists, Maria Amália Vaz de Carvalho was one of the 
voices supporting education for girls; a Lisbon high school is named after her.
18. It enables Portugal to be, right now, at the top of the ranking worldwide 
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in the percentage of women graduates in almost any area, from law to medical 
studies, where women are well over 60 percent.
19. The program of the Republican Party by the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury was de`nitely in favor of universal suffrage as well as a single constituency 
system throughout the country in the name of real decentralization of power. 
Nothing was to be achieved. Portugal had at the time a population of `ve mil-
lion people and only one million could read and write, among them not much 
more than 300,000 women. According to successive laws only about 700,000 
in the total population could register to vote.
20. Dom Antonio da Costa, one of the few monarchists to support the rights 
of women, praised the program of the Republican Party for the defense of 
equality of gender in a famous book published in 1892, A Mulher em Portugal.
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The main aim of this paper is to establish a possible link between artistic 
production and socially accepted aesthetics, and particularly the gender-
ing of both. To this end, one must start by questioning the parameters 
that guide both the construction of socially and culturally accepted aes-
thetics and the artistic production that either adopts or rejects those aes-
thetics. Without entering into the discussion of aesthetics that has kept 
philosophers fully engaged since Socrates, there are a few notions that 
I intend to address in this paper. One is the notion introduced by Plato 
that the production of art is threatening to society — so much so that he 
would have preferred not to allow poets and playwrights in his Republic. 
Since banning them would be impossible, he advocated heavy censor-
ing of the artistic production, not only of poets and playwrights but also 
of musicians and painters. In sum, according to Plato the arts have the 
power to inauence humans and mold character; as such, art producers 
must be strictly controlled. This concept, which seems to provide justi-
`cation for censorship as a whole and in any form, can also be viewed 
as a considerable driving force in canon construction. The intrinsic con-
nection developed by the founders of Western thought linking beauty 
and goodness and, in opposition, ugliness and evil has been fundamen-
tal to the construction of Western aesthetics and hence art production. 
Since, as Socrates defended,1 beauty is relative, we must logically infer 
that, as such, each society is able to construct its own notion of goodness 
through the construction of a socially endorsed notion of beauty.
chapter 12
Portuguese Women Writers: 
Controlled, Silenced, or 
Otherwise Ignored Voices
Deolinda M. Adão
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This process is amply found throughout the history of the Western 
world and goes well beyond the realm of art production. In any event, 
for my purposes I will only concern myself with literary production and, 
more speci`cally, how these arbitrarily constructed aesthetic parame-
ters impact feminine literary production, particularly that of Portuguese 
women writers in the last one hundred years. Of the hundreds of women 
who have written and published in Portugal since 1910, many of whom 
remain unknown to this day, I will focus only on Ana de Castro Osório, 
Florbela Espanca, Maria Lamas, Judith Teixeira, and Natália Correia. 
The work of these `ve women, published both during their respective 
lives and posthumously, is known to varying degrees in Portuguese aca-
demic and literary circles. However, several questions remain: Are any 
of these women considered canonical Portuguese writers? Does their 
writing correspond to the accepted aesthetic parameters of their time? 
How are they represented, or are they even included, in histories of 
Portuguese literature? How is present-day academia reading these 
authors and their texts? This paper aims to address some of these ques-
tions and to attempt to include the writing of Portuguese female authors 
in the wider discussion of aesthetic values and canon construction in all 
areas of art. To some extent I will also address that which is perhaps 
the most signi`cant question when discussing the artistic production 
of women: Were these simply writers who happened to be women, or 
is there something that sets these writers apart in such a way that they 
should be grouped in a subdivision of literary producers identi`ed as 
“women writers”?
Ana de Castro Osório, born in 1882, was one of the most prominent 
women in the Portuguese Republican movement, an activist and avid 
defender of women’s rights in Portugal. In 1909 she was one of the 
founders of the Liga Republicana de Mulheres Portuguesas (Republican 
League of Portuguese Women) which provided a venue for open dis-
cussion of important social issues such as divorce and women raising 
children alone. Between 1898 and 1931 she published at least twenty-
four books, several on the subject of motherhood: A Boa Mãe (1908), 
A Verdadeira Mãe (1925), and O Direito da Mãe (1930). She is also 
considered to be the `rst Portuguese writer of literature for children. 
Although she was a proli`c writer, she is better known for her pro-
republican and pro – women’s rights activism than for her literary accom-
plishments. In the History of Portuguese Literature of A. J. Saraiva and 
Óscar Lopes she is only brieay mentioned: “First writer of children’s lit-
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erature, writer of `ction and drama actively connected with the strug-
gle for feminine emancipation.”2 Likewise, the History of Portuguese 
Literature published by Alfa Editors mentions Ana de Castro Osório 
three times in connection to her friendship with Camilo Pessanha and 
once in reference to the neo-romantic reconstruction of realism and nat-
uralism in her novels Ambições (1903) and Quatro Novelas (1908).3 
Other than that, references to her work are limited to texts such as the 
Dictionary of Portuguese Women Writers,4 where the title and date of 
publication of each of her texts is listed, but no further reference or 
additional information is given in regard to any of those texts. From 
her social and political activity we can gather that most likely her texts 
did not in any way conform to the aesthetic values of that time, at least 
in theme if not in form. The latter seems to be substantiated by the 
above-mentioned source where she is identi`ed as a neoromantic while 
many of her male contemporaries were singing the praises of realism 
and naturalism.5 In 1997, in celebration of the 125th anniversary of 
Osório’s birth, the book A Grande Aliança, which gathers the speeches 
made during her visit to Brazil, was reprinted under the organization 
and foreword of Fernando Vale.
Florbela Espanca, born in Vila Viçosa in 1894, is widely known. Her 
Sonetos have had innumerable editions, and she is regularly included 
in anthologies of Portuguese poetry. She is also well-known outside of 
literary circles, and several of her sonnets have been set to music and 
are included in the repertoire of many well-known Portuguese singers, 
particularly fado singers. Nonetheless, she remains a controversial `g-
ure in Portuguese academia, which consistently labels her as a lesser 
poet and mostly ignores her prose. Usually the argument presented is 
that her poetry should be included in the Parnassian movement, albeit 
she is writing during the period of Portuguese Modernism. If we were 
to agree with this argument, then we must note that she, as had been 
the case with Osório, is writing outside the accepted aesthetic norms. 
However, her illegitimacy goes well beyond the aesthetic nonconformity. 
Actually her entire life is nothing but a long list of illegitimacies. Her 
birth certi`cate states she is the child of an “unknown father.” However, 
she was raised by her father and his second wife (who was also her 
godmother). Nonetheless, he never recognized his paternity until 1949, 
nineteen years after Espanca’s death. She married three times (1913, 
1922, and 1925) and divorced twice (1921 and 1922). In 1930, on her 
thirty-sixth birthday, she died of an overdose of barbiturates, although 
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her death certi`cate lists the cause as a pulmonary edema. Thus, accord-
ing to the norms of Portuguese society, Florbela Espanca leaves life as 
illegitimately as she had entered it.
The fundamental themes of Espanca’s writing — death, love, and 
the multiplicity of the self — can be somewhat responsible for the lit-
erary critics’ distaste for her work. As such, the quali`cation of her as 
a Parnassian is justi`ed by the constant presence of death and love in 
her poetry and prose. On the other hand, the notion of multiplicity 
of self developed in her work, which would put her in dialogue with 
her contemporaries, the Portuguese Modernists, is either ignored or dis-
missed as a symptom of her neurosis. Nonetheless, the argument can 
and has been made that in Florbela Espanca these three themes are 
intrinsically connected and addressed in a form that distances her from 
the Parnassians, although she shares their taste for the sonnet. As stated 
by Maria Lúcia Dal Farra in her text A+nado Desconcerto, for Espanca 
both death and absolute love are the sublime, that which links the poet 
to the divine. Furthermore, Dal Farra states that for Espanca, life is but 
an interlude between two spaces of transcendence — that which precedes 
birth and follows death.6 As such, as is clearly evidenced in the poem 
“Loucura,” the multiplicity of self, or lack of self-recognition, is but 
one of the torments endured by the poet during her captivity within the 
realm of the living:
Ó pavoroso mal de ser sozinha Oh fearful ill of being alone
Ó pavoroso e atroz mal de trazer Oh fearful and cruel ill of having
Tantas almas a rir dentro da minha7 so many souls laughing within my 
own8
Thus, to say that Florbela Espanca diverged from the aesthetic 
norms of her time would be somewhat of an understatement, and per-
haps much of the discomfort still evidenced by Portuguese academics in 
regard to her and her work lies precisely in that nonconformity. Neither 
she nor her poetry is simple and clear, for both are at once traditional 
and radical, submissive and uncontrollable, untamable and blasphe-
mous. For Espanca is not the priestess of love; she is, as woman, the 
representation of the divine, the embodiment of love itself that becomes 
consecrated through death. It is through death that the rite of passage 
from the human into the divine is completed and all the souls trapped 
within the poet’s own are `nally freed. Espanca’s exuberant and pain-
fully bewitching poetry established the link between the female body 
and the divine, and this process increasingly strayed from the socially 
Portuguese Women Writers  |  199
and politically constructed notions of femininity. This shift is most likely 
the main cause for the marginalization of her texts by the literary circles 
of her time, and I would argue is still the basis for the Portuguese aca-
demics’ systematic dismissal of her work.
Judith Teixeira was one of the most controversial Portuguese women 
writers of the twentieth century. She was born in 1880 and is considered 
to have been one of the few women, if not the only woman, who par-
ticipated in the Portuguese Modernism movement. She married and was 
divorced under the accusation of adultery and home abandonment. She 
later remarried, and little more is known about her private life. She pub-
lished in several literary magazines, including the Contemporânea, and 
published `ve books: Decadência, De Mim, Nua, Satânia, and Poemas, 
which, by the way, is four more than the emblematic Fernando Pessoa 
ever published in life. However, both she and her poetry were scandal-
ous, mostly due to the openly homoerotic nature of many of her poems, 
such as the poem “Statue”:
Ó Vénus sensual! O sensual Venus
Pecado mortal Mortal sin
Dos meus pensamentos! of my thoughts!
Tens nos seios de bicos acerados At the pointed tips of your breasts
Num tormento, in a torment,
a singular razão dos meus 
cuidados!9
lies the singular reason of my 
sorrows!10
Another controversial aspect of her poetry is the frequent reference 
to drug use, namely morphine-induced orgies. Indeed, she was one of 
the few poets (the only female) to openly admit to drug use. In Teixeira, 
morphine provided much more than poetic inspiration; it was indeed 
her muse, as is well exempli`ed in the poem “A Minha Amante” (“My 
Lover”):
Dizem que eu tenho amores contigo! People say you are my lover!
Deixa-os dizer! . . . Let them . . . 
Eles sabem lá o que há de sublime How could they know how sublime
Nos meus sonhos de prazer . . . 11 Are my dreams of pleasure . . . 12
Most likely even now her poetry would continue to cause some dis-
comfort, and it is most de`nitely not within the aesthetic norms of her 
time. Perhaps consequently, she continues to be consistently ignored, 
hardly ever being represented in anthologies of Portuguese poetry. This 
even includes the Anthology of Erotic Portuguese Poetry13 compiled by 
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Natália Correia, which has no mention of her. Likewise she is barely 
mentioned in the Dictionary of Portuguese Literature organized by 
Álvaro Manuel Machado,14 and not at all in the History of Portuguese 
Literature authored by António José Saraiva and Óscar Lopes.15 She 
is mentioned in the Diccionário de Escritoras Portuguesas,16 accord-
ing to which she is also included in the Diccionário Cronológico de 
Autores Portugueses17 edited by Eugénio Lisboa and in the Dicionário 
de Literatura18 by Jacinto do Prado Coelho. The above-mentioned 
Diccionário de Escritoras Portuguesas further states that Teixeira’s 
book Decadência is also mentioned in Cecília Barreira’s book História 
das Nossas Avós: Retratos da Burguesa em Lisboa 1890  – 1930.19 
Nonetheless, the authors of the Diccionário de Escritoras Portuguesas 
con`rm the marginalization of her work in the less than two-thirds of 
a page dedicated to Judith Teixeira: “Even now her poems cannot be 
found in most anthologies.”20
The argument can be made that Judith was not the best poet of her 
time. However, that argument is weakened by the observation that her 
poetry was at least on a par with that of several of her male counter-
parts who are widely known and consistently included in literary dic-
tionaries as well as most anthologies. Likewise, she was not the only 
poet who exposed drug dependence in their poems — Camilo Pessanha 
is another. However, she was the `rst Portuguese woman to write les-
bian homoerotic poetry. And it seems it was precisely that particularity 
that caused her book Decadência to be con`scated in 1923 by order of 
the governor of Lisbon, who further ordered that all copies be burned 
in the public square and prohibited its republication. In that same year 
Judith Teixeira published a lecture with the title De Mim in which she 
defends her poetry and lays out her position regarding life as a whole, 
as well as regarding aesthetics and morality. It seems unquestionable 
that Judith Teixeira was writing well outside the aesthetic parameters 
of her time, and perhaps even of our time. The price she paid was ostra-
cism, and the handful of literature students and scholars who study her 
poetry are mostly those focusing on either gender studies or noncanoni-
cal twentieth-century literature.
Born in 1893, Maria Lamas has the particularity of having lived in all 
three moments of the Portuguese republic. She was born under monar-
chic rule, and died in 1983 almost a decade after the 1974 revolution 
that put an end to state-run censorship. Besides writing novels and 
essays, she also worked as a translator and as a journalist. For twenty 
Portuguese Women Writers  |  201
years she was the chief editor of the popular women’s magazine Modas 
e Bordados (Fashion and Embroidery); she was also the Portuguese ver-
sion of Dear Abby, publishing an advice column under the pseudonym 
of Tia Filomena (Aunt Filomena). She was also politically engaged and 
an activist for women’s rights. In 1945 she was elected president of 
the National Council of Portuguese Women, an association founded 
during the First Republic but that would be outlawed by the Estado 
Novo in 1947. The closing down of the National Council of Portuguese 
Women is directly linked to an exhibit organized by Maria Lamas in the 
Sociedade Nacional de Belas Artes in Lisbon. This exhibit, Exposição 
de Livros Escritos por Mulheres, was held from January 4 – 12, 1947, 
and gathered close to three thousand books written by `fteen hundred 
authors from twenty-eight countries. Besides being a great success in 
establishing a worldwide dialogue among women writers, the exhib-
it’s catalogue provides precious information regarding the number of 
women writing and publishing in so many different countries. Lamas’s 
speech closed the exhibit. It is believed that the content of her speech 
was unacceptable to the Estado Novo and caused the full force of the 
PIDE21 to be unleashed on the Council of Portuguese Women.
On June 4 of that same year, less than six months after the exhibit, 
the women’s council was closed and, a few weeks after that, on June 25, 
Lamas was `red from Modas e Bordados, never again to `nd steady 
work in Portugal. After surviving on several temporary and odd jobs, 
and being arrested several times, in 1961 she sought exile in Paris where 
she remained until 1970.
In the preface of the 2002 publication of Lamas’s novel Para além do 
Amor, Eugenia Vasques states: “The case of Maria Lamas as a novelist 
is an example of the type of cultural crime perpetrated by dictatorships 
that is not talked about, because it goes unseen, but that is as lethal and 
devastating as the cold walls of solitary con`nement. I refer to the crime 
of asphyxiation and gagging of the artist. And in this particular case of 
the total annihilation of the budding novelist.”22
Thus, in the case of Maria Lamas it is clear that as long as she restricted 
her activities to the socially and politically accepted limits, as in the case 
of the women’s magazine she directed, state control was limited to the 
common levels of state-run censorship. However, when the writer began 
to expand her area of intervention and took a position regarding any 
social or political issues she was immediately constrained and punished. 
In the case of Maria Lamas, as for all the writers considered up to this 
point, that punishment was the removal of any type of interlocutor with 
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whom these women could be dialoguing, or in other words the erasure 
or silencing of their voices that for all intents and purposes eliminated the 
ability of women to attain agency over their lives and bodies.
The last writer I would like to address is Natália Correia, who was 
born in 1923 in Fajã de Baixo, near the city of Ponta Delgada, Island 
of São Miguel, Azores. Correia was a very proli`c writer who between 
1946 and 1993 published poetry, novels, essays, drama, and even a can-
tata. She was also politically engaged. In 1944 she participated in the 
Democratic Unity movement, in 1958 she supported the candidacy of 
Humberto Delgado, in 1969 she enlisted in the electoral committee of 
Democratic Unity, and in 1979 and 1987 she was elected as a mem-
ber of the Assembly. In both her literary and her political life, Natália 
directly addresses the construction and de`nition of the feminine in par-
allel to that of the masculine, rather than in contrast or opposition, thus 
bypassing the then in-vogue male-female binary. In Natália the con-
struction of the feminine is based on the female body and female sexu-
ality. Writing from within a sexist and moralist society that legislated 
and controlled the female body, and under the scrutiny of the Estado 
Novo’s censorship that oversaw all artistic production, Natália dared 
to construct a mythology of the feminine that rejects previously estab-
lished markers of feminine identity. In other words the woman aris-
ing from Natália’s work is neither the virgin nor the sinner; she is the 
merger of the two, a woman of aesh and blood who de`nes herself by 
taking ownership of her own body and of her sexuality, as is evidenced 
in the following poem:
Há Dias e Dias . . . There are Days and Days . . . 
Há dias em que sou monja There are days when I am a nun
Há outros em que sou fêmea Others when I am a female
E, embruxada, na fogueira And, bewitched, in the bon`re
Do amor ponho mais lenha. Of love I fuel the aames.
Nos dias em que sou monja On the days that I am a nun
Ardo nos claustros da lua. I burn in the moon’s cloisters
Nos dias em que sou fêmea On the days that I am female
No sol arrefeço, pudica.23 Pudic, I shiver in the blazing sun.24
As it was to be expected, several of Natália’s texts, such as O 
Encoberto, were seized by the censorship, and in 1970 she was tried for 
the publication of the Antologia de Poesia Portuguesa Erótica e Satírica, 
receiving a sentence of three years in jail, although her sentence was 
later suspended.
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As had been the case in all the writers I mention, although Correia is 
by far the best known and is widely read, at least until April 25, 1974, 
both Natália herself and her work were clearly controlled and silenced 
by the governmental25 and social power structures of the Portuguese 
society of her time. It also seems rather clear that all of these women 
were writing outside of the socially accepted aesthetic norms of their 
time, and that fact to some extent contributed to the poor acceptance 
of their work at the time of publication, as well as to the overall lack 
of canonic recognition of their work. In fact, several studies regarding 
feminine literary production in Portugal suggest that until the end of 
the Estado Novo, female authorship was rather limited, or at least not 
encouraged by the conservative structure of the regime.
This is not to say that Portuguese women were not actively engaged 
in art production, particularly as it pertains to literary production. In 
the anthology A Urgência de Contar: Contos de Mulheres dos Anos 40, 
Ana Paula Ferreira looks at the literary production of Portuguese female 
writers during the 1940s. In the preface entitled “A ‘literature feminine’ 
nos anos quarenta: uma história de exclusão” (“Feminine Literature” 
in the Forties: A History of Exclusion), Ferreira states: “Taking into 
account that perspectives centered on women writers or gender related 
politics have been practically ignored by Portuguese literature studies, 
it should not be surprising that the literary production of women not 
identi`ed with the hegemony of some ‘ism’ has been ignored.”26 I would 
argue that this phenomenon is not exclusive to the literary production 
of Portuguese women of the forties, but of the greater part of the twen-
tieth century, if not of the entire history of Portuguese literary produc-
tion. In the post-1974 Portugal many things have changed, and some 
would argue that women were the great victors of the April twenty-`fth 
revolution. Today there is an abundance of women writers in Portugal, 
several of whom enjoy both favorable critical appraisal and `nancial 
success. However, as we enter the second decade of the twenty-`rst cen-
tury, in one of the exhibit rooms of the Cadeia da Relação in the city of 
Porto, visitors can `nd a plaque that lists several famous or infamous 
individuals who at one time or another were incarcerated in that insti-
tution. This informative plaque includes the Portuguese writer Camilo 
Castelo Branco and his lover and subsequent wife, Ana Plácido,27 who is 
simply described as: “escritora sem talento” (writer without talent). This 
particular entry leads me to conclude that the dismissal and erasure of 
Portuguese feminine voices in print is still alive and well in today’s fully 
democratic Portugal.
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Introduction
Tourists and residents alike aock to the restored waterfront at the 1998 
Expo site in Lisbon. They walk along the corniche, dine in restaurants, 
attend concerts; a few live in the new condominiums that rank among 
the most expensive properties in the city. What in the 1980s was a con-
taminated industrial site astride the foul Trancão River as it discharged 
its load of contaminants into the Tejo Estuary, the Expo site was utterly 
transformed — a remarkably successful example of urban renewal. It is 
probably no accident that it was located along the estuary (“river”) 
banks, with open views across the water and within sight of the grace-
ful Vasco da Gama Bridge, also completed in 1998. The Expo project 
transformed a derelict urban area into an appealing leisure, cultural, 
and residential location by reestablishing the city’s relationship with 
the river.1 The Expo site spans a 5,000-meter-long and 800-meter-wide 
strip along the Tejo, with features including a new metro station, a 140-
meter tower, bars, restaurants, shopping, an aquarium, and apartment 
and of`ce buildings — all oriented toward the riverfront. A riverside 
promenade follows the river, and further inland the “Water Way” path 
parallels the promenade (see `gure 13.1); canals and fountains were 
constructed along the Water Way. Following the Expo the new urban 
district became the Parque das Nações (Park of Nations) and is one of 
the largest urban redevelopment projects in Europe.
Chapter 13
Water and Environment in Portugal: 
The Dammed and the Reborn
Pedro Pinto, Kristen Podolak, and Mathias Kondolf
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The Lisbon Expo site is only one manifestation of a growing phe-
nomenon: urban waterways as designed landscapes of leisure and con-
sumption in developed countries, reaecting a transition from utilitarian 
to recreational, from spaces of industry to spaces of leisure and enter-
tainment. In Europe and North America, formerly important indus-
trial city centers have been widely redeveloped as tourist districts, often 
including riverside trails to link city centers with other neighborhoods.2 
Whereas the urban riverbank was formerly seen from the practical con-
sideration of how deep draft of ship can moor along a dock, whether 
the aow and drop of the river suf`ce to drive a water mill, or whether 
the river’s aow is enough to absorb a given quantity of efauent, new 
criteria (largely aesthetic) emerge for the river’s transformed but still-
central role.
The evolution of urban rivers can be seen to illustrate the progres-
sion from industrial (the ` rst circuit of capital, identi`ed by Karl Marx), 
through real estate (the second circuit of capital, identi`ed by Henri 
Lefebvre), the third circuit (investment in new areas of scienti`c and 
professional reproduction of work force, identi`ed by David Harvey), 
and ultimately to the fourth circuit of capital, that of consumption.3 
These changes are especially well expressed along waterfronts, the “con-
Figure 13.1. The Lisbon Expo along the Tejo River at night (photo by Kristen 
Podolak).
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tact zones” of M. L. Pratt,4 boundaries where cultures meet and across 
which multiple transactions occur.
Lisbon occupies the banks of the Tejo River estuary much as San 
Francisco occupies hills along the margins of San Francisco Bay (the 
estuary of the Sacramento River). While “The River” (the estuary) `g-
ures importantly in local sense of place, smaller drainages that aow into 
the estuary have been largely forgotten: they were put into underground 
pipes or con`ned to narrow channels in areas with dense population or 
infrastructure, fenced off from human contact, and face the backs of 
buildings. Even sizable streams such as the Ribeira de Alcântara, which 
aowed underneath the famous aqueduct along the valley bottom, were 
relegated to underground culverts early on in the city’s development. 
Poor water quality has historically been a motivation for such treat-
ment, but with improvements in both wastewater treatment and water 
quality, we observe an explosion of river and stream restoration efforts, 
including revitalization of urban waterfronts. Even smaller urban rivers 
and streams increasingly bene`t from restoration projects motivated by 
social goals and supported by the Water Framework Directive (WFD) 
requirements of good ecological conditions.5
Brief History of Water Management 
in Portugal
Water management and human development went hand in hand 
throughout the history of Portugal. Even before it became a country, 
this territory was settled by Mediterranean civilizations that attributed 
a primordial importance to the control of water and waterways, for 
agricultural and human consumption as well as for transport routes. In 
fact, except for a few military strongholds set on remote hilltops, most 
of today’s Portuguese cities are located on, or near, rivers and streams.
The Romans created an urban system that relied as much on the 
well-known road network as on the several river routes connecting 
the hinterland to the major urban centers, and these cities to the larger 
empire, through major navigation routes. In the Mediterranean climate 
the protection of water and its management throughout the year led 
to the construction of aqueducts and dams (the ruins of a Roman dam 
are still visible near Lisbon, in Belas). Urban centers traditionally could 
grow only as much as their water supply would allow, and these water-
works permitted an unprecedented growth of urban centers.
After the fall of the highly developed Roman Empire, a collapse of 
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the urban network and water management infrastructure ensued. In the 
south of the country, however, the Moorish domination of the territory 
(eighth to twelfth centuries) quickly recovered — and deepened this con-
nection to water and revitalized the urban system. The urban network 
of each region consisted of a hierarchy of smaller villages, located along 
the tributaries of major rivers and connected to the major city through 
these waterways (see `gure 13.2). The hinterland of each city provided 
for agricultural products and minerals, while the city transformed these 
raw materials into exportable goods and traded them with the other 
major urban centers.7 This was an early example of the process of urban 
revival that would only fully blossom in Central Europe from the elev-
enth century onward.8
The Kingdom of Portugal was created in 1143; for the `rst few cen-
turies, the territory was settled and developed in strict connection to 
the river system. During this period, trade relied almost exclusively on 
waterways, and the hierarchy of the urban system closely mimicked that 
of both the rivers and their tributaries.9 Major urban centers were set 
on the intersections of roads (mainly used for short-distance connection 
between neighboring watersheds) and rivers. Long distance trade was 
carried via near-shore sea navigation.
Figure 13.2. The Toledo region during Islamic domination, with the urban and eco-
nomic systems anchored on the Tejo and its tributaries.6
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As a result, most of Portugal’s present urban system is the direct 
result of a succession of settlement waves deeply connected to the river 
system. Although the ascension and decadence of several of the coun-
try’s urban centers depends on several other factors, the basic urban 
structure of present-day Portugal has remained surprisingly stable since 
the late Middle Ages.
Transformation of Land and Water
Although historical information on the condition of rivers in Portugal 
is scarce, there are indications that the countryside and its ecology had 
been heavily modi`ed by the Middle Ages. For example, the brown bear 
(Ursus arctos) is considered to have been extinct from most of the ter-
ritory since the seventeenth century, probably due to a combination of 
direct hunting and the transformation of natural forests into agricul-
tural land and pastures.10 These changes in the land cover of river basins 
likely contribute to severe aooding problems downstream. For instance, 
the Mondego River is known to have aooded the lower areas of the 
city of Coimbra with increasing intensity, due to both heavy siltation in 
this lower stretch of the river and, most likely, increased peak aows. In 
one of the country’s `rst recorded projects of river management (1791), 
Coimbra implemented a two-kilometer bank reforestation project that 
effectively created an arti`cial aoodplain.11 Whenever the river aooded, 
it would spill over to a poplar-dominated terrace that included several 
temporary side channels, trapping sediment and reducing peak aow 
immediately downstream. The impacts of inundation in the city’s center 
were thus reduced.
The city of Porto kept the riverside section of its medieval city walls 
in place until 1821, long after they had become obsolete as medieval 
defenses. This was likely because they still played an important role in 
protecting the Ribeira quarter from the Douro River’s aoods.
The capital city of Lisbon, due in part to its excellent natural har-
bor on the Tejo Estuary, experienced explosive growth during the Age 
of Discovery (1415 – 1542). As the city grew to a population of close 
to 200,000 inhabitants in the seventeenth century,12 the provision of 
drinking water became a serious challenge and a limitation to Lisbon’s 
growth. This was solved through the building of a monumental aque-
duct, opened in 1747, that brought water from the same sources at Belas 
the Romans had dammed a millennium and a half before. Supported 
by sixty-`ve-meter-high stone arches, the aqueduct’s span over the 
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Alcântara Valley remains one of the most iconic feats of European engi-
neering of the time.
The country’s fortunes would wane in the following century and, 
as England and Germany were ushering in the industrial era, Portugal 
was still a mostly agrarian society.13 Although economically this would 
prove to be disastrous for the country, it also meant that most of the 
widespread annihilation of river systems that characterized industrial-
ization was averted. Some attempts to develop a more productive agro-
industrial sector led to the modi`cation of entire landscapes (the Douro 
Valley), but these practices appear to be the epitome of sustainability 
when compared to the heavy, coal-driven industries dominating central 
England or Germany’s Ruhr region.14
There were a few instances where the combination of a productive 
agro-industrial activity was implemented without complete disruption 
of the natural systems. In the Tejo Estuary, a company was created in 
1836 to manage the vast expanses of Lezíria, a type of man-made low-
lying agricultural land regulated through a system of canals and low 
sustaining walls. Although sustainability was probably not a major con-
cern initially, the management has proven to achieve a sustainable agri-
cultural practice ever since. The river is allowed to aood the land during 
the occasional aoods, and signi`cant areas of salt marshes and mudaats 
are preserved. The Regional Plan of 1964 excluded most of the best 
habitat from areas of potential urban development and, although this 
may not have been an express objective of that plan, the result is that 
the northeastern part of the estuary was kept in a very good condition 
until the `rst natural parks were created, after the revolution of 1974, 
and the Tejo Estuary was included in the `rst group of natural reserves 
created in 1976.15
The Corrections
The two major threats to river ecology were, in the case of Portugal, 
recti`cation (“correction”) and damming. Both practices had the dou-
ble intent of promoting irrigation and managing aows to reduce aoods. 
River correction was mostly related to the attempt to enhance agri-
cultural productivity along the fertile aoodplains; the need for protec-
tion derived from the slow but steady growth of the urban centers. The 
urban population increased fourfold between 1864 and 1991, leading 
to widespread encroachment of urban development onto aoodplains, 
riverbanks, and, in some extreme situations, even over river channels 
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themselves, as these were interred below ground. In urbanized areas, the 
paving of upland catchments resulted in less in`ltration of rain, more 
runoff, and intensi`ed aoods, increasing demand for hard aood protec-
tion infrastructure and producing a greater inaux of pollutants from 
urban wastewater. From the initial protection provided by armored 
banks and riverside walls, a few cities went on to “correct” rivers by 
straightening and deepening channels and armoring banks, as is visible 
immediately upstream and downstream of most cities.
Of the 130 cities in continental Portugal, 75 (58 percent) are located 
on rivers.16 In total, forty-seven rivers cross one or more cities, and 
most of them have experienced heavy modi`cation in these urban sec-
tions. The biggest challenges to the river’s ecosystem were the occasional 
break in longitudinal connectivity and, more dramatically, the afore-
mentioned spilling of raw sewage that persisted until recently. While 
highly visible, the engineering of river channels in densely urbanized 
regions affected less overall river length than did recti`cation of chan-
nels in agricultural areas. As cultivation expanded across aoodplains to 
the riverbank, wetland habitats were lost, and widespread construction 
of aood dykes eliminated lateral connectivity between the channel and 
aoodplain. Along many rivers, the riparian corridor, if there was one, 
was reduced to a narrow strip of vegetation along a steep bank.
The Dammed
The construction of large dams was initiated in the 1940s with a national 
program centered on power generation,17 but the scope of the program 
quickly expanded in de`ning dams also as mainstays of aood control, 
especially in the north, as well as water storage for human consumption 
and agriculture, which is very relevant in the Mediterranean climate 
of the south. The Mondego River, for instance, is dammed by hydro-
power dams (such as Aguieira, 1981), urban aood management weirs 
and dams (Coimbra’s Açude-Ponte, also from 1981), as well as several 
smaller weirs, diverters, and canals that feed the Lower Mondego irri-
gation project (a relatively recent irrigation scheme, started in 1979). 
The Cávado, another heavily modi`ed river, is blocked at eight large 
dams, built between 1951 and 1972. The Douro River and its tributar-
ies contain close to `fty dams and weirs, installed between 1965 and 
2005, with a strong emphasis on electrical generation and aood control 
in the basin.
Today, there are more than 230 large dams (reservoirs >1 hm3) in 
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Portugal.18 These dams are likely to produce the most dramatic and irre-
versible impacts on the auvial ecosystems. Most of these large dams do 
not include `sh passages and have severely disrupted longitudinal con-
nectivity of the river corridors (see ` gure 13.3). Virtually all anadromous 
`sh species have either gone extinct (the sturgeon, Acipenser sturio) or 
face extinction (anadromous brown trout, Salmo trutta morpha trutta; 
Atlantic salmon, Salmo salar; allis shad, Alosa alosa; European eel, 
Anguilla anguilla; and European river lamprey, Lampretta -uviatilis).19 
The extent of these dams’ impacts over the environment is yet to be fully 
acknowledged or valued, as the government only recently announced 
the construction of an additional ten large dams,20 some affecting vir-
tually pristine river valleys (Tua and Sabor). Fortunately, recent decades 
have been equally characterized by a growing environmental conscious-
ness; quite a few of these more recent dams have been `ercely contested 
by environmental organizations (Alqueva, which created the largest res-
ervoir in Western Europe, Baixo Sabor, Foz do Tua), and some projects 
have even been abandoned or halted (Padroselos, which would threaten 
one of the last populations of the protected fresh water pearl mussel, and 
the Foz Côa dam, stopped to prevent loss of Paleolithic rock engravings, 
is now designated as a UNESCO World Heritage site).
Figure 13.3. Penha Garcia Dam, concluded in 1979, on a gorge of the Pônsul River 
(photo by Pedro Pinto).
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The Reborn 
More important, though, there is now a widespread awareness of past 
damage done to river systems, and the idea that bodies of water need 
to be protected from the direct and indirect impacts of human activ-
ity is now commonly accepted. Starting with a degraded river system, 
especially in the more urbanized coastal plains, multiple actions have 
been taken to try and reverse past damage. From the utilitarian perspec-
tive of rivers and riverfronts being viewed as mere economic resources 
to be explored, the rivers are now increasingly looked upon as essen-
tial elements in the structuring of the country’s cultural and environ-
mental values. Especially since the country’s admission to the European 
Union (EU) in 1985, Portugal has made a strong and sustained effort to 
improve water quality and, more recently, also to increase the ecological 
condition of the river corridor.
This is visible especially in the enforcement of new laws and regula-
tions concerning water quality and the treatment of sewage. Since the 
original Environmental Law (Lei de Bases do Ambiente, 11/1987), the 
country has produced a set of subsidiary legislation regulating the protec-
tion of the river corridor and aoodplains under the National Ecological 
Network (REN), and transposing the several directives produced by 
the EU. These European-wide directives required all the national gov-
ernments to adopt speci`c legislation and policies to address a set of 
environmental concerns, starting with clean Bathing Waters (1976); 
Drinking Water (1980); Sewage Sludge management (1986); Urban 
Wastewater Treatment (1991); control of Nitrate Pollution (1991); 
Integrated Pollution Control and Prevention, organizing several of the 
previous directives (1996); the paramount Water Framework Directive 
(2000), transposed into the Water Law (Lei da Água, 58/2005), with the 
long-term goal of improving water and habitat quality; and, `nally, the 
Floods Directive (2007).
The `rst few initiatives, based on the earlier directives, addressed 
speci`cally the heavily impaired chemical quality of the bodies of water 
by controlling emissions and treating efauents from industry and agri-
culture (point and nonpoint source) and urban sewage. Before these 
actions, most urban centers in the country lacked proper, if any, treat-
ment of urban wastewater, and raw sewage was regularly spilled into 
the rivers. This led to a severe degradation of most waterways. Several 
rivers garnered ungainly nicknames, such as the “Rio Lixo” (“Garbage 
River”), a play on words with the name of Leiria’s Lis River, or the 
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Trancão’s unof`cial designation as an “open-air sewer.” As a direct con-
sequence, and with the help of European funding, Portugal has already 
made a colossal investment in building new water treatment plants 
(1,035 were built between 2000 and 2007)21 and expanding and mod-
ernizing sewage pipes networks. The target of this ongoing process is to 
provide at least secondary treatment to wastewater for all urban cen-
ters above 2,000 inhabitants by 2013, when the second Strategic Plan 
for Water Provision and Wastewater Treatment (PEAASAR) is expected 
to be fully implemented. In the period between 2000 and 2013, more 
than €5.5 billion will be spent on wastewater treatment infrastructure 
alone.
The water quality of quite a few waterbodies is already showing clear 
signs of improvement. The Tejo Estuary, for instance, had experienced 
severe impacts from agricultural, industrial, and urban discharges of 
pollutants. According to Ramiro Neves, a Portuguese hydrologist, only 
the high turbidity has prevented major algal blooms from occurring.22 
A few major disasters, such as the 1966 accidental spill of 700 tons of 
sulphuric acid from the CUF plant, led to the elimination of a few iconic 
species, such as the Portuguese oyster. With the progressive treatment of 
sewage, the estuary is `nally showing some signs of recovery, as a mul-
tidecade plan to collect and treat all sewerage around the Tejo Estuary, 
included in the PEAASAR II, is nearing completion. Even before the ` nal 
section of the major sewage collector started diverting the last remain-
ing untreated outlets within the city of Lisbon to a newly expanded 
treatment plant, the improvements to water quality were already visible 
and reaected in the growing abundance of `sh species.23
In accordance with the speci`cations of the Water Framework Directive, 
the recently created River Basin Administrations (Administrações de 
Região Hidrográ`ca) were mandated with the elaboration of Basin 
Plans. These plans exhaustively characterize all waterbodies and spec-
ify management practices aimed at achieving a good ecological status 
by 2015. Although this target date now seems unrealistic, these entities 
should eventually be able to gather enough momentum to actually pro-
pose new land-use policies (such as changes to agricultural practices, 
replanting of native forests, and replacement of hard aood protection 
with restored aoodplains) that could, in time, improve the ecological 
condition of most rivers. As proposed over ten years ago by the WFD, 
good ecological status now includes not only the (obviously essential) 
improvement of water quality, but equally the effort to reestablish the 
river’s hydromorphic and biological condition. This is likely to include 
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more passive and environmentally friendly solutions for aood-risk man-
agement, as recommended by the Floods Directive.
The Expo ’98, mentioned in the introduction, set forward a new 
model of waterfront redevelopment that subverted the century-long 
trend toward the detachment of city and river. Since the late 1800s, 
the modest but steady modernization of the country’s economy was 
reaected in the placement of heavy infrastructure (railways, highways, 
ports) in the urban waterfront. Cities like Setúbal, Barreiro, Matosinhos, 
to name only a few of the most obvious examples, saw vast stretches of 
their waterfronts annexed to industrial and port uses, and the associated 
heavy transport infrastructure, linear and parallel to the river, created a 
virtually unsurpassable barrier. In recent decades, the industrial sector 
is in crisis, with the relocation of the production centers to the develop-
ing world, and a few of the former heavy-industrial parks have become 
brown`elds. One such brown`eld, located in the eastern part of Lisbon, 
was selected as the site for the World Expo, and the urban renewal proj-
ect that ensued redeveloped the site into a multifunctional and dense 
new neighborhood, with ample provision of public open spaces along 
the Tejo riverfront, including several social facilities and a large river-
front park, among other amenities.
Polis Urban River Projects
Largely inspired by the success of the Expo ’98 site, Portugal initi-
ated in May 2000 the Polis Program for the Urban Regeneration and 
Environmental Enhancement of Cities, a nationwide project to improve 
urban environments by revitalizing downtown areas. The main objec-
tive of the program was to improve the quality of urban life through 
integrated approaches to environmental improvement. Revitalizing 
urban rivers was seen as a way to contribute to people’s improved qual-
ity of life by increasing green areas, promoting pedestrian travel, and 
providing public spaces for recreation, social gathering, children’s spon-
taneous use, and cultural activities. River projects would also improve 
a city’s attractiveness and competitiveness in the larger urban network. 
Twenty-eight cities were initially selected for the Polis Program based 
on eight criteria, one being the potential for riverfront improvement (see 
`gure 13.4). Another criterion that favored selection of cities along riv-
ers was the revitalization of derelict industrial zones. In the `rst phase 
of the program, eighteen of the cities’ revitalization plans include inter-
ventions to the river and riverbanks.24 We describe four river Polis proj-
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ects based on observations we made in the parks during the summers of 
2008 and 2010: Coimbra, Leiria, Bragança, and Cacém.
In the historic town of Coimbra life revolves around the university 
at the top of the hill. The Polis site is within walking distance at the 
bottom of the hill along the Rio Mondego. The river is wide, about 
710 meters in the park, and deep in some places. It is the largest river 
that lies entirely in Portugal. The Açude-Ponte, a dam built immediately 
downstream from the city’s center, blocks the aow so the water level 
is maintained at a constant level in the summer. Historically, the river 
level auctuated with winter aoods and had a low-aow, dry appearance 
in the summer. People would wade and swim in the river during warm 
Figure 13.4. The twenty-
eight initial Polis sites.25
Figure 13.5. (top) People wade and swim in the Rio Mondego prior to construction 
of the dam downstream (image from an old postcard). (bottom) A view of the cafes and 
restaurants along the bank following the Polis Project (photo by Kristen Podolak).
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summer months. Today, the aow is imperceptible during the summer 
and the Rio Mondego seems more like a lake within the park (see `g-
ure 13.5). It is common to see sailboats on the river drifting past the 
café along the riverbank. The Polis project was completed in 2007 and 
included a pedestrian walkway linking the two sides of the river. On the 
right bank a café, soccer `eld, piers, and a children’s playground repre-
sent the main design elements. On the left bank there are several boat-
houses for sailboats, kayaks, and crew boats and a special events area. 
The park is a popular place and is busy with people in the summertime.
In Leiria, the River Lis winds through the downtown and the river 
park is completely surrounded by the city. In downtown Leiria, a cas-
tle atop a nearby hill is visible from the river trail and illuminated with 
lights at night. The river is straightened in a box channel in this section 
and there is no perceptible aow during the summer due to a dam down-
stream. The Polis project was completed in 2007 and dealt with roughly 
7,500 meters of riverbank. It includes thirteen pedestrian bridges with 
themes like the “sofa bridge,” “bar bridge,” and “modern bridge” (see 
`gure 13.6). One bridge has a children’s playground suspended over the 
river. There is a café and a larger children’s playground in the park on 
Figure 13.6. One of the themed 
pedestrian bridges over the Rio Lis in 
Leiria (photo by Kristen Podolak).
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the right bank. The river is 18 meters wide in the downtown end and 
about 2.5 meters wide at the upstream end of the park before the back-
water from the dam. In the upstream reach of the park the bed and 
banks of the river are natural, and the aow moves through pool and 
rifae. There is a large skate park and aat `eld on the left bank in the 
upstream end.
The Bragança River park, built in 2003, is located in a steep ravine 
and borders the old historic center of town, but it does not touch the 
new center of town. Bragança is the only example where the historic 
and current centers of town are not in the same place. At the upstream 
end of the River Fervença is a skate park and path along the river. Four 
pedestrian bridges were constructed, three in the downtown area and 
one downstream in the residential area. At the center of the park is a 
wide pool of water formed by weirs. On the right bank adjacent to the 
pool is an extensive plaza with a fountain at the base of a hillside park 
(see `gure 13.7). As you walk downstream of the plaza on the left bank, 
you pass a large science education building built overtop the creek, and 
the trail continues downstream on an elevated boardwalk trail in a can-
yon lined by residences. The river here goes through pools and drops 
and is narrow, about 1.2 meters wide. At the end of the boardwalk is a 
trail that leads up to a castle on a hill.
Figure 13.7. The mirror water effect and hillside park in Bragança (photo by Kristen 
Podolak).
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In 2008 a park along the Ribeira das Jardas in the city of Cacém 
was completed (Jardas is the name used for the upstream reaches of 
the Ribeira Barcarena, which aows southward through the Sintra and 
Oeiras municipalities to debouch into the Tejo Estuary along the Estoril 
coast). The goals for the 1.6-hectare Ribeira Jardas Park were to provide 
aood protection, regenerate aquatic and riparian habitat, enhance sce-
nic and aesthetic qualities, provide space for leisure and recreation, and 
create connections between the urban community and the river.26 Prior 
to the project, the stream was inaccessible and largely invisible behind 
aoodwalls, fences, and riparian vegetation. The park design included 
pedestrian bridges across the channel, a café, a grassy ` eld along the riv-
erbank, and exercise equipment along a riverside trail (see `gure 13.8). 
The river itself is now visible, and `sh and eels can be seen in the water. 
Following the park completion, a survey of park users found that 77 
percent feel positively about the intervention.27 Interestingly, respon-
dents’ perceptions of water quality declined postproject compared to 
preproject. Several pointed to sewer outfalls as the main source of pollu-
tion, noting that they wished to see further water quality improvement. 
One explanation for this response is that prior to the park, there was no 
access to the stream, so residents could not see the water and thus could 
not judge its quality.
These four Polis projects have commonalities in the way they 
approached riverfront redevelopment. All of the projects included 
pedestrian bridges spanning the river and linking communities on oppo-
site banks. There are riverside trails in each project that allow people 
to stroll leisurely or exercise by running and biking along the river. The 
projects made the river more visible by either increasing the water vol-
ume during the summer, when it would normally appear dry, or by 
removing infrastructure or vegetation that blocked sightlines to the 
water. The projects included children’s playgrounds, cafés, and unique 
features such as the children’s science museum, skate parks, and themed 
bridges.
During the Polis planning and construction there were efforts to mon-
itor the success pre- and postproject. The Fifth European Framework 
Program developed the Urban River Basin Enhancement Methods 
(URBEM) in 2005. URBEM established three categories of success indi-
cators: ecological, social, and economic.28 The URBEM approach was 
tested at the Bragança Polis site where the River Fervença rehabilita-
tion took place.29 The social indicators showed the most success, with 
the river becoming a “recognized and used space.”30 However, the deci-
Figure 13.8. (top) The view of the river trail in the Cacém Polis Project (photo by 
Rachel Kraai). (bottom) The popular new exercise equipment along the river (photo by 
Kristen Podolak).
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sion to dam the river to maintain a constant water level with a mirror-
like reaective quality and the use of hard concrete materials on the riv-
erbank limited the ecological success of the project. In the process of 
applying the indicators the researchers identi`ed gaps in URBEM, con-
cluded that fewer indicators could be used, and developed a revised set 
of indicators under the RiProCity project.31
Beyond Cacém:  
Restoring the Barcarena as a Linear Park
A collaborative planning and design workshop involving nearly twenty 
students from the University of California, Berkeley, Instituto Superior 
Técnico, and Universidade Lusófona collected data on the Barcarena 
stream in summer 2009 and made recommendations for the future of the 
stream based on an understanding of the history of watershed impacts 
and current needs. The goal was to improve human access and optimize 
ecological restoration opportunities along the length of the stream. The 
Bacarena stream is located `fteen kilometers west of the city of Lisbon 
in the greater Lisbon metropolitan region. It drains a thirty-`ve-kilome-
ter-square catchment, which is forested at the upstream end, urban and 
agricultural in its middle and lower reaches.
The population of the Lisbon metropolitan region has grown rapidly 
since 1970, much of this growth in the region west of Lisbon where the 
Bacarena stream is located. Clustered high-rise apartment blocks, largely 
unplanned, did not provide for sewage treatment and lacked adequate 
mass transit and parks. The main transport axes in the region run east 
to west, connecting these settlements with the city center, but there are 
few north-to-south transport connections. As a result, it is dif`cult for 
residents of these apartment blocks to go the relatively short distance 
from population centers to the coast, where there are ample recreational 
opportunities (only ten kilometers from the city of Cacém).32
The Bacarena stream (known as the Jardas in its upper reaches) 
aows roughly fourteen kilometers north to south through deeply 
incised valleys to the coast. With urbanization, the catchments expe-
rienced increased peak runoff from impervious surfaces, sewage from 
illegal housing settlements, and canalization of streams within concrete 
walls. However, construction has occurred mostly on uplands, leaving 
the bottomlands of the incised stream valleys in many reaches surpris-
ingly unaltered. Neglected for decades, the water quality in these drain-
ages has been improved with the expansion of sewage treatment (largely 
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to preserve the water quality of the beaches downstream). This opens 
up a unique opportunity for the Bacarena stream, by virtue of its linear 
nature, to connect pedestrians and bicyclists to the coastal beaches and 
trail, providing badly needed recreation while revitalizing the riparian 
and aquatic ecology.33
Seven individual studies were synthesized into a vision for the future 
of the Bacarena stream. The students identi`ed opportunities for resto-
ration of aquatic and riparian habitat and recommended placement of 
instream structures to create complex rifae-pool habitats for the endan-
gered Portuguese nase (Iberochondrostoma lusitanicum) and removal 
Figure 13.9. Proposed cross section typologies based on the streambank slope: steep 
(A top) and gradual (B bottom) (illustrations by Andrea Gaffney).
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of invasive riparian reeds and replanting with native vegetation in spe-
ci`c stream reaches. By mapping human use of the Polis project on the 
Ribeira Jardas (Barcarena) in Cacém and talking with people in the 
park, the students found the park is not only a success in terms of heavy 
use, but also a component of the transportation network and recre-
ational space in the city. A pedestrian and bicycle trail along the stream 
could connect with the current trail in the Polis project and extend 
downstream along 10.4 kilometers of the stream, linking underserved 
population centers in the middle and upper reaches of the stream to 
Figure 13.10. Two views of the trail along the Bacarena Stream: (top) the undeveloped 
aoodplain, and (bottom) the proposed expanded trail (illustration by Andrea Gaffney).
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coastal beaches. Various trail designs were developed based upon the 
slope of the streambank and the conditions of the edge between the 
water and land. These design solutions offer a variety of user expe-
riences, visible and audible, in the walled or steep slope settings and 
opportunities to access the stream physically in places where the stream-
bank slope is more gradual (see ` gure 13.9). The vision for the Bacarena 
stream builds on the successful urban Polis project and takes advantage 
of the still largely undeveloped aoodplain for enhanced aquatic and 
riparian habitat, recreation, transportation, and connectivity through-
out the basin (see `gure 13.10).
Conclusion
From their role as Roman and medieval transport and communication 
network, Portuguese rivers were transformed into hard-edged industrial 
channels and dammed to drive turbines and irrigate rice `elds. The last 
decade has seen the rebirth of rivers in Portugal, thanks to improved 
water quality and the example of the Expo ’98 development along the 
Tejo. While Portugal’s already large inventory of dams is slated to be 
increased by new dams, the twentieth-century attitudes of damming, 
rectifying, and even burying rivers have given way to widespread appre-
ciation for rivers as living elements in the landscape. Within cities, aow-
ing rivers provide a source of life and dynamism, meeting some funda-
mental needs of city dwellers for nature in their lives. As water quality 
has improved and formerly utilitarian river spaces are freed up to pro-
vide ecological habitats and recreational opportunities for humans, we 
can say that Portuguese rivers are being reborn.
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The aim of this paper is to advocate for an informed and concerted 
effort in developing and supporting public policy for entrepreneurship, 
with speci`c emphasis on the need to develop initiatives in education 
and training, in today’s and tomorrow’s Portugal. The development of 
entrepreneurship is viewed as a means to further a more pluralistic, 
democratic, participatory Portuguese Republic as well as a source for 
improving the overall ef`ciency and effectiveness of the country’s eco-
nomic and social system as the Republic continues. Explicitly, this is a 
call to academic and civil society organizations to assist in the develop-
ment of country-speci`c knowledge on Portugal that will provide the 
information needed by policymakers and the public-at-large to make 
informed decisions. Many in Portugal are concerned with fostering a 
more entrepreneurial and innovative environment, a country in which 
young people have the mindset and skills necessary to create oppor-
tunities for themselves as well as for society. Coordinated, sustained 
and focused public policy in entrepreneurship education and vocational 
education and training (VET) can provide one of the keys to unleash-
ing this potential.
In addition, promoting entrepreneurship is a powerful means for 
facilitating the rapid growth of innovative Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises (SMEs), which is increasingly recognized by governments 
as an effective means for creating jobs, increasing productivity, foster-
ing competitiveness, and alleviating unemployment and poverty.1 “The 
Chapter 14
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challenge for the European Union is to identify the key factors for build-
ing a climate in which entrepreneurial initiative and business activities 
can thrive. Policy measures should seek to boost the Union’s levels of 
entrepreneurship, adopting the most appropriate approach for produc-
ing more entrepreneurs and for getting more `rms to grow.”2
Entrepreneurship
In de`ning entrepreneurship the European Commission states: “Entre-
preneurship refers to an individual’s ability to turn ideas into action. 
It includes creativity, innovation, and risk taking, as well as the ability 
to plan and manage projects in order to achieve objectives. This sup-
ports everyone in day-to-day life at home and in society, makes employ-
ees more aware of the context of their work and better able to seize 
opportunities, and provides a foundation for entrepreneurs establish-
ing a social or commercial activity.”3 In a recent Commission report, 
“The important role of education in promoting more entrepreneurial 
attitudes and behaviors, starting even at primary school, is now widely 
recognized.”4 This paper assumes that entrepreneurship can be taught. 
And that “universities and technical institutes should integrate entre-
preneurship as an important part of the curriculum, spread across dif-
ferent subjects, and require or encourage students to take entrepre-
neurship courses.”5 In the words of the late management guru Peter 
Drucker: “The entrepreneurial mystique? It’s not magic, it’s not mys-
terious, and it has nothing to do with the genes. It’s a discipline. And, 
like any discipline, it can be learned.”6 Stated another way, it is gener-
ally now accepted that, “the question of whether entrepreneurship can 
be taught is obsolete.”7
Public Policy Complexity
The term policy generally refers to a purposive course of action that 
an individual or group consistently pursues to deal with a given issue. 
“Public policy is what public of`cials within government, and by exten-
sion the citizens they represent, choose to do or not to do about pub-
lic problems. Public problems refer to conditions the public widely per-
ceives to be unacceptable, . . . therefore requiring intervention.”8 Many 
in Portugal feel that lack of creativity, innovation, and risk- taking are 
among the societal and economic factors that are unacceptable and 
need to be changed.9 Indeed, working toward the development of 
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 public/  private partnerships can be an aid in fostering a better connec-
tion between universities, industry, and government.10
Politics, Harold Lasswell famously stated, is about “who gets what, 
when, and how.”11 Politics refers to the practice through which public 
policies are devised and adopted, by an elected of`cial, organized inter-
est groups, and political parties. As Thomas Dye af`rmed, “the focus 
of political science is shifting to public policy — to the description and 
explanation of the causes and consequences of government activity.”12 
Developing public policy can also be viewed as “a set of interrelated 
decisions taken by a political actor or group of actors concerning the 
selection of goals and the means of achieving them within a speci`ed 
situation where those decisions should, in principle, be within the power 
of those actors to achieve.”13
Elusiveness may also be “a fundamental de`ning element” of pub-
lic policy.14 The complexity associated with a systematic examination 
of elusive phenomena has been elaborated by many. As in other areas 
of scholarly study, entrepreneurship lacks a “grand theory.” Issues tend 
to be interlocked and it is dif`cult to isolate the problem(s) that hold 
back entrepreneurship, as it is in the scholarly investigation to under-
stand what causes impoverished inner cities or environmental pollution. 
The expertise and experience necessary to `ll knowledge gaps related to 
complex problems may not be easily obtainable. This fact may in turn 
lead to the need for lengthy pilot programs and/or evaluation periods. 
It is also true that a bias toward excessive caution and risk avoidance 
may lead to an emphasis on process rather than action. Couple this with 
the reality that frequently in government an issue will involve many 
different ministries, agencies, and departments and that these entities 
are limited in their ability to respond because of legal constraints, lim-
ited resources, and an overly bureaucratic decision-making process, and 
action and outcome become even further delayed.
Setting the Agenda
An agenda is conceived as a “list of subjects or problems to which gov-
ernmental of`cials, and people outside government closely associated 
with those of`cials, are paying some serious attention at any given 
time. . . . Apart from the set of subjects or problems that are on the 
agenda, a set of alternatives for governmental action is seriously consid-
ered by government of`cials and those closely associated with them.”15 
One of the bases for the development of entrepreneurship policy in the 
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European Union, and in member state Portugal, is the Lisbon Agenda (or 
Lisbon Strategy) that has set developing entrepreneurship as a priority.
As the nature of entrepreneurship is complex, so too is the devel-
opment of policy related to it. There are many ways entrepreneurs 
and potential entrepreneurs interact with the system. To better under-
stand how this complexity is dealt with in the area of entrepreneur-
ship policy making, it is important to use a framework and to look to 
experienced transnational entities to assist in de`ning it — and to incor-
porate best practices that have been developed by different nations. 
Thus, this paper refers to European Union and OECD (Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development) frameworks and pol-
icy papers in placing the Portuguese experience in a larger context. To 
better understand why policy development is needed it is necessary to 
understand the importance of entrepreneurship in terms of employment 
and economic forces.
The Importance of Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises and Promotion Policy
As mentioned in the introduction of this paper and as elaborated 
by IAPMEI, the Portuguese Institute for the Support of Small and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) and Innovation Promotion, in 2003 
SMEs represented 99.6 percent of the 275,000 companies operating in 
Portugal. These companies were responsible for 76 percent of employ-
ment and 58 percent of annual turnover. From 2000 to 2003, the num-
ber of SMEs increased at an average annual rate of 8.8 percent, with 
real term employment growth of 5.6 percent per year and sales growth 
of 4.3 percent.16 Other European Union countries also demonstrated 
similar patterns. As Günter Verheugen, vice president of the European 
Commission, stated, “SMEs represent the backbone of the European 
Economy and the largest potential source of employment and growth.” 
This is why the European Commission gave a new stimulus to the policy 
on SMEs by focusing its action on tackling SMEs’ “needs and improv-
ing their `nancial and regulatory environment.”17 Research has shown 
that increases in the rate of business ownership as a percentage of the 
labor force have led to lower unemployment rates18 and are correlated 
to higher economic growth.19
Some of the various ways in which the European Commission encour-
ages the promotion of SMEs with member states are: developing initia-
tives that help encourage the promotion of the entrepreneurial spirit; 
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reducing government red tape; introducing improved ways of investing; 
encouraging the involvement of economically disadvantaged groups 
(such as women and ethnic minorities); and fostering social entrepre-
neurship. These, among others, are supported within the European 
Union framework.”20 In 2006, Vice President Verheugen stated that the 
Union needed “to create a more favorable societal climate for entrepre-
neurship, in particular to encourage young Europeans to become the 
entrepreneurs of tomorrow. We need a systematic approach to entre-
preneurship education at all levels, from the primary school to univer-
sity.” It is the Commission’s conviction that “combining entrepreneurial 
mindsets and competences with excellences in scienti`c and technical 
studies should enable students and researchers to better commercialize 
their ideas and new technologies developed.”21
Small Business Policy versus 
Entrepreneurship Policy
The main thrust of government small business policy at its inception 
in the early twentieth century was to ensure that the signi`cant market 
power of large companies was constrained and that monopolies (and 
even public companies that were not monopolies) would not have an 
unfair advantage over their smaller brethren. In contrast, in develop-
ing entrepreneurship policy multiple levels of analysis must be made, 
in particular at the individual — entrepreneur — level. This implies that 
entrepreneurship policy is not as static as small business policy, which 
focuses primarily on existing `rms and organizational analysis consist-
ing of issues related to running a company in the larger business envi-
ronment. Entrepreneurship policy looks at the decision-making pro-
cess of the entrepreneur and is concerned with the larger framework in 
which knowledge transfer is facilitated, technology commercialization 
occurs, networks are formed, and even a cultural environment is estab-
lished that is favorable to taking risks and developing new ideas.
In developing entrepreneurship policies a wide variety of areas need 
to be considered, including broader tax incentives, education, and immi-
gration, as well as speci`c measures such as special `nancing or training 
to promote entrepreneurship.22 In most countries there exists no gov-
ernment structure that is directly responsible for the development and 
promotion of entrepreneurship. Usually, entrepreneurship is developed 
across a variety of ministries or agencies that ranges from economy to 
education to immigration,23 whereas small business policies are usu-
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ally focused on one entity. Such is the case in modern Portugal. IAPMEI 
is responsible for the development and implementation of small and 
medium-sized business policy. But whereas IAPMEI is also responsible 
for part of entrepreneurship policy, it is joined by as many as `ve other 
ministries and agencies in the development and implementation of only 
one aspect of entrepreneurship policy.
Defining the Essentials of 
Entrepreneurship Policy
Lundström and Stevenson de`ned entrepreneurship policy as mea-
sures taken to stimulate entrepreneurship that can focus on the pre-
start, start-up and/or post-start-up phases of the entrepreneurial pro-
cess. Policies should be “designed and delivered” to tackle the areas 
of motivation, opportunity, and skill development. The primary objec-
tive of these policies is to encourage more people to start their own 
businesses.24 Details are presented in the table below, which has been 
adapted from Lundström and Stevenson’s work Entrepreneurship 
Policy for the Future:
It is noteworthy that in this table Lundström and Stevenson refer 
speci`cally to the focus of entrepreneurship policy as “[to] promote 
entrepreneurship.”25 The main dif`culty, as they note, is identifying the 
areas that need to be proactively pursued to create a sustained cultural 
change. As part of improving the business infrastructure for “nascent 
entrepreneurs,” education and counseling are necessary to achieve long-
term policy objectives. Small and medium-sized businesses and individ-
ual entrepreneurs typically do not have suf`cient resources to directly 
lobby a government. Furthermore, forums, seminars, and conferences 
often do not exist where policymakers can sit down with this group for 
consultation.
Lundström and Stevenson emphasize the pre-start-up and start-up 
phases of business ownership because “ . . . these are the targets for 
entrepreneurship policy measures and we propose that entrepreneur-
ship policy measures are taken to stimulate individuals to behave more 
entrepreneurially. It is our position that this can be done by inauencing 
motivation, opportunity and skill factors. Therefore, our aim is to see 
what types of policy actions are taken towards individuals in the pre- 
and early stages of idea and business development.”26
Simon Bridge et al. identify various types of entrepreneurship pro-
motional activities and interventions in accordance with the particu-
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lar stages of business development that a policy aims to support. This 
includes a wide range of policies that can focus on the founding and 
development of a new business as well as on its eventual decline.27
In the case of Portugal, all of the types of interventions men-
tioned above were present in the country in some form or another 
by 2005 except for one area — entrepreneurship education and train-
ing. Entrepreneurship education is a relatively new area for Portuguese 
higher education and an even more recent addition to primary and sec-
ondary schools. As late as 2002, the European Commission reported 
that Portugal was the only EU country where no program in entrepre-
neurship education existed at the primary and secondary school levels,28 
and further research found that the `rst programs in this area started 
in only 2005.29
Industrial Policy in the First and Second 
Republics
In terms of explaining why the liberal ideals of democracy failed dur-
ing the Portuguese First Republic, historian Edward Makefakis suggests 
that “the key was to be found in the ‘intermediacy’ of Southern Europe 
in terms of the stage at which it found itself in the transition toward 
an industrial society — between the Western European model and the 
rural societies of the East.” Malefakis explains how Southern European 
nations did not follow Western European patterns. Powerful institu-
Table 14.1 Summary of Entrepreneurship Policy
Feature Entrepreneurship Policy
Objective Motivate more new entrepreneurs 
Target Nascent entrepreneurs/new business starters;  
i.e., individuals (people)
Targeting General population/subsets (i.e., women, youth)
Client group Dif`cult to identify “nascents” 
Levers Non`nancial, business support (networks, education, counseling)
Focus Entrepreneurial culture/climate (i.e., promote entrepreneurship)
Delivery system Lots of new players (need orientation) 
Approach Proactive outreach 
Results orientation More long-term (results can take longer)
Consultation Forums do not generally exist 
 
Table 14.2 Type of Interventions
Stage of Business Policy Field or Need Intervention/Instrument
Culture An encouraging and 
supportive environment
Community programs, 
entrepreneurship education
Prestart Ideas Spin-off ideas, technology transfer, 
idea-generation workshops
Small business know-how Small business skills training
Networking, access points
Know-who networks
Counseling
Prestart counseling
Start-up (external) Customers Purchasing initiatives
Suppliers Sourcing initiatives and directories
Advice/consultancy Business expertise provision, 
training, counseling, research
Business plan information Databases/business planning
Premises Incubators, science parks
Start-up (internal) Finance Grants, loans, business angels
Market/admin. expertise Training services
Financial management Advice/counseling, mentoring
Established New ideas Idea-generation workshops, spin-
off ideas, technology transfer
Specialist guidance and 
investments
Guidance services, including 
banks, accountants, solicitors
Growth Market opportunities/exports Trade missions, export advisers
Market/technical information
Product development Development courses
Strategic approach
Management skills, `nance
Salary support, subsidies, grants
Decline Con`dence, customers, money
Strategic review and planning
Mentors
Advice and guidance
Termination Legal/other advice Advice and counseling
Other dimensions Business sector Sectorial initiatives/training
Business support environment Information and education
All Information on small business 
needs
Research coordination, research 
databases
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tions, such as the Church and the armed forces, as well as associations 
and interest groups linked to sectors of the oligarchy, were instrumental 
in destabilizing modern (republican) political movements that occurred 
earlier, but were unable to establish their hegemony. “[This is] the prob-
lem of societies which have experienced an ‘early parliamentarianism 
and late industrialization.’ Even though ‘capitalism was accepted as the 
primary mode of economic organization . . . its legitimacy was always 
questioned.’ It was this ‘economic dualism,’ which left a harsh imprint 
on Southern Europe’s social and political reality.”30
Probably the most profound piece of legislation to affect the struc-
ture of Portuguese industry was the Industrial Regulation Law (Lei 
do Condicionamento Industrial) created during the Estado Novo. It 
required that any project for new industrial facilities (or the substitu-
tion or updating of equipment) that represented a means of increasing 
productive capacity needed to be ` rst approved by the government. This 
also applied to the transfer of industrial licenses or sale of businesses to 
foreign companies.
Entrepreneurship and Public Policy in the 
Second Republic
Small business policy typically targets the existing array of small enter-
prises and their viability, especially in light of the cost disadvantages 
they must overcome due to their intrinsic size disadvantage when com-
pared to large ` rms. This policy approach was needed to combat the oli-
gopolies of the First Republic and Estado Novo. Currently, international 
investors believe the lack of an entrepreneurial culture to be one of the 
least attractive aspects in their perception of investing in Portugal.31
David Audretsch states, “the mandate for entrepreneurship policy 
emanates from regions and even countries that . . . more recently [have] 
been adversely affected by globalization and loss of competitiveness in 
traditional industries, resulting in adverse economic performance.”32 
Since 2002 Portugal has had lower economic growth than the majority 
of other European member states, and this has hit small and medium-
sized companies especially hard. Nevertheless, according to IAPMEI, in 
2004 there were 290,000 SMEs that generated more than half of the 
economic activity in Portugal. Approximately €163.5 billion (this rep-
resents more than half of the Portuguese economy) and 2 million jobs 
are attributed to SMEs in Portugal.33
Similar to other parts of Europe and North America, Portugal’s man-
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ufacturing sector has suffered a sustained shift in competitive advantage 
to developing countries characterized by cheaper unskilled and semi-
skilled labor. The north of Portugal, traditionally seen as the manufac-
turing heartland of the country, is often referenced as being more entre-
preneurial than the rest of the country. In the entrepreneurial north as 
well as throughout the country there is now a strong desire for increased 
entrepreneurship.
According to a Eurobarometer study made in September of 2003, 
47 percent of the working-age population of the EU 15 wanted to be 
self-employed. The Portuguese, at 67 percent, had the strongest desire 
to be self-employed.34 This desire to be entrepreneurs makes promoting 
entrepreneurship not only a major economic imperative but also dem-
onstrates the necessity for policy-makers and organizations to address 
the issue in the context of social cohesion and satisfying the populace.
In the most recent Eurobarometer study, Portugal had the worst 
entrepreneurial climate index out of the twenty-`ve countries surveyed, 
as well as the highest percentage of people who agreed that there is a 
lack of `nancial support, that there are complex administrative proce-
dures, and that it was dif`cult to receive information about starting up 
a business. In addition, the Portuguese were three times more likely than 
their European counterparts to believe that their school education could 
help them develop the skills and interest in becoming entrepreneurs.35
As much as 30 percent of the differences in GDP growth rates among 
EU member states is attributed to varied levels of entrepreneurial activ-
ity.36 The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) is an annual com-
parative assessment of national entrepreneurial activity levels. In 2004, 
the GEM project conducted research in thirty-nine countries. The report 
from that study concluded that “Portugal has one of the lowest rates of 
entrepreneurial activity in the EU and among the GEM 2004 countries 
globally. Portugal only has 4 entrepreneurs for every 100 people aged 
18 – 64 years. This ranks Portugal in 13th place of the 16 EU countries 
included in GEM.”37
Conclusion
Throughout the Portuguese Republic entrepreneurs have played an 
important role that has sometimes been suppressed by public poli-
cies that served only a select few. Modern policymaking in the area 
of entrepreneurship is complex and transversal, cutting across various 
government ministries as well as different parts of society. In light of 
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the European Commission’s recommendations it might be useful for 
Portugal to develop an articulated agenda or strategy for entrepreneur-
ship, especially entrepreneurship education and training to help aid the 
development of the entrepreneur at the individual level.
Portugal’s nascent entrepreneurship education system at the post- 
secondary level aims to address several areas within the European 
Union policy context. One of the driving forces behind the European 
Commission push for entrepreneurship education is the employment 
opportunities it offers young people. The `ndings also show that Portu-
guese educators have a desire to promote entrepreneurship as a career 
choice for their students.
One of the greatest challenges for a government is to stimulate and 
support economic growth through policy initiatives. However, trans-
forming a society’s aspiration for increased levels of entrepreneurship is 
a relatively new area of policymaking, and indeed many in government 
have trouble articulating the meaning and substance of entrepreneur-
ship policy.38
In regard to entrepreneurship, public policy institutions have a duty 
to assist when market failures occur — be they regulatory, educational, 
or societal — and to foster their countries and regions in economic 
growth. To move this development forward in the Second Republic, 
entrepreneurial policies need to evolve and continue to gain importance 
and impact in the overall portfolio of economic policy instruments for 
Portuguese development.
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